Intellectual Property: The Practical and Legal Fundamentals

Patents, copyrights, trademarks and related interests are known as intellectual property (IP). It has not been long since patents especially were regarded in U.S. courts, and the Supreme Court in particular, as tools of monopolists, and their owners often fared poorly. However, people have come increasingly to view privately funded innovation as critical to national economic well-being and to agree that such innovation cannot occur unless companies that succeed in the marketplace can recoup their research, development and marketing costs. That is a major function of IP, and, particularly within the past dozen years, IP has been seen, both here and abroad, as playing a key role in developing technologies for the next century

Women in the 2000, 2004 and 2008 Olympic and Paralympic Games

This report analyzes the representation and participation of women in the international and U.S. Olympic organizations relative to the Olympic and Paralympic Games, especially for 2000, 2004, and 2008. In addition it examines the types and extent of opportunities that are provided for women in administrative and leadership roles within these structures and the chances women have to compete in the Games themselves. This report also assesses the extent that the IOC, IPC and USOC are fulfilling their stated missions with respect to fairness and gender equity and whether or not legal statutes are being upheld. Finally, there is analysis of media coverage of female athletes in the 2008 Olympic Games

Moving Public Law Out of the Deference Trap in Regulated Industries

This Article argues that public law has fallen into what I call a deference trap in addressing conflicts in deregulated industries, such as telecommunications and electric power. The deference trap describes a judicial reluctance to intervene in disputes involving political institutions, such as regulatory agencies and states. By reassessing the deference trap across the legal doctrines that are effecting emerging telecommunications and electric power markets, public law can deliver much more for deregulated markets. The deference trap poses a particular cost as markets are deregulated, one that may not have been present during previous regulatory eras in which public and private interests in regulatory bargaining were more likely to converge. In expanding the range and degree of potential divergence between public and private interests, deregulation challenges policy makers and courts to reevaluate many of the traditional public law doctrines that frame the process for defining and implementing the rules in competitive markets. This Article sets out to advance this project in the context of three vignettes. In doing so, I draw on a bargaining account of regulation, supplemented with a comparative institutional analysis. The approach evaluates the institutional setting for governance of deregulated markets; it does not limit its analysis to the decisions of a single regulator but pays attention to alternative (and often competing) institutions, including courts, Congress and state legislatures, and state versus federal regulation. Part I illustrates that public law has fallen into a deference trap in the context of the filed tariff doctrine and suggests that, by focusing on bargaining conditions in tariffing, courts could minimize strategic forum shopping in regulatory enforcement. Part II warns against public law falling into a deference trap in the context of judicial review of state regulation under the dormant commerce clause and state action immunity to antitrust enforcement, suggesting that courts correct for this by taking into account private firm incentives in the state lawmaking process. Part III suggests that federal preemption, as currently construed, also invites a deference trap which can create regulatory commons problems and recommends that courts reformulate preemption principles to realign incentive to facilitate regulatory coordination between the federal government and states. By isolating ex ante and ex post incentives and stressing the institutional context for institutional bargaining in the regulatory process, together these examples reveal weaknesses in traditional doctrines of regulatory law in deregulated markets and suggest ways courts might correct for them

Changes in the Competitive Position of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in the EU Market

This paper aims at comparing the uneven process of changes in competitiveness among three accession countries' manufacturing industries, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, during the period prior to their EU membership (1996-2003). It demonstrates that the three countries improved competitiveness in the majority of their manufacturing industries. However, these changes were differentiated across time, among industries, in terms of the quality of segments and between the three countries overall. A drop in the productivity gap between the manufacturing industries of the three accession and the incumbent EU countries played the major role in improvement in competitiveness. It determined the drop in relative unit labour costs. The paper shows that changes in competitive advantages of a given country's industry reflect changes in relative (as compared to foreign) productivity rather than differences in level and changes in productivity among industries of a given country. The dynamics and levels of productivity among the Czech and Polish larger winners were lower than the manufacturing average of both countries. However, since the improvement in productivity in these industries in both countries was larger than in their incumbent EU counterparts, the former pushed the latter out of the EU market. Poland's and the Czech Republic's export specialisation in less productive industries implies that their export expansion to the EU would result in lower than potential economic growth in both countries. The paper shows that Smith's law of absolute advantages tends to determine changes in market share.competitiveness, productivity, transition economies, manufacturing industry, EU integration

Did somebody say Neoliberalism? On the uses and limitations of a critical concept in media and communication studies

This paper explores the political-economic basis and ideological effects of talk about neoliberalism with respect to media and communication studies. In response to the supposed ascendancy of the neoliberal order since the 1980s, many media and communication scholars have redirected their critical attentions from capitalism to neoliberalism. This paper tries to clarify the significance of the relatively new emphasis on neoliberalism in the discourse of media and communication studies, with particular reference to the 2011 phone hacking scandal at The News of the World. Questioning whether the discursive substitution of ‘neoliberalism’ for ‘capitalism’ offers any advances in critical purchase or explanatory power to critics of capitalist society and its media, the paper proposes that critics substitute a Marxist class analysis in place of the neoliberalism-versus-democracy framework that currently dominates in the field

The Measure and Regulation of Competition in Telecommunications Markets

The development of the canadian telecommunications web is significantly influenced by the regulatory framework put in place to oversee the evolution of the web toward a competitive system. This paper has two specific objectives: first, to develop a methodological framework, which will allow a proper characterization of the level of competition in the telecommunications industry, more specifically in the residential local access market and second, to recommend some (significant) changes in the CRTC approach to the regulation of the Canadian Telecommunications industry. I argue that the current approach to the regulation of telecommunications in Canada is likely to generate significant harms to consumers and businesses as well as efficiency losses for the Canadian economy. I conclude that there is a urgent need for a telecommunications regulatory reform, with a stronger accent put on three crucial roles of the telecommunications regulator as the trusted generator of information for the consumers, as the manager of the level playing field conditions, and as the promoter of efficient investment programmes. Le développement du réseau canadien des télécommunications est influencé de façon significative par le cadre réglementaire adopté pour régir l’évolution de ce réseau vers la concurrence. Cet article a deux objectifs principaux : d’une part, développer un cadre méthodologique adéquat pour caractériser le niveau de concurrence dans l’industrie des télécommunications, plus particulièrement du marché des services résidentiels locaux, et, d’autre part, de proposer des changements (importants) au cadre réglementaire actuel. Je montre que le cadre réglementaire actuel peut engendrer des problèmes importants pour les consommateurs et l’industrie ainsi que des pertes d’efficacité pour l’économie canadienne. Il existe un besoin urgent de réformer le cadre réglementaire actuel, en mettant l’accent sur trois rôles essentiels de l’agence de régulation des télécommunications comme fournisseur d’informations aux consommateurs, comme gestionnaire des conditions de concurrence loyale pour toutes les entreprises et comme promoteur de programmes d’investissement efficaces.competition, regulatory reform, telecommunications , concurrence, réforme de la réglementation, télécommunication

ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИЙ РЕЖИМ СОВРЕМЕННОЙ РОССИИ: ФАКТОРЫ ТРАНСФОРМАЦИИ И ИНСТИТУЦИОНАЛЬНЫЕ ЛОВУШКИ

The possibility of applying a neoinstitutional theory in the study of hybrid political regimes has been studied in the article. The authors use the "institutional traps" theory of Academician V. Polterovich to analyze the state of the post-Soviet political regime. The authors have identified six institutional traps that penetrate the hybrid political regime at the present stage (the "separation of powers" trap, the "freedom of gathering" trap, the "freedom of speech" trap, the "legislature" trap, the "electoral region" trap, the "federalism" trap) and have given a characteristic of each of them. In conclusion, the authors have defined the general framework and concepts of methodology and have come to the conclusion about the advantage of using the methodology of neoinstitutionalism to study hybrid political regimes.La posibilidad de aplicar una teoría neoinstitucional en el estudio de regímenes políticos híbridos ha sido estudiada en el artículo. Los autores utilizan la teoría de las "trampas institucionales" del académico V. Polterovich para analizar el estado del régimen político postsoviético. Los autores han identificado seis trampas institucionales que penetran en el régimen político híbrido en la etapa actual (la trampa de "separación de poderes", la trampa de "libertad de reunión", la trampa de "libertad de expresión", la trampa de "legislatura", el " "trampa de la región electoral, la trampa del" federalismo ") y han dado una característica de cada uno de ellos. En conclusión, los autores han definido el marco general y los conceptos de metodología y han llegado a la conclusión sobre la ventaja de utilizar la metodología del neoinstitucionalismo para estudiar regímenes políticos híbridos.В статье исследована возможность применения неоинституциональной теории при изучении гибридных политических режимов. Авторы используют теорию «институциональных ловушек» академика В. Полтеровича для анализа состояния постсоветского политического режима. Авторы определили шесть институциональных ловушек, которые проникают в гибридный политический режим на современном этапе (ловушка "разделения властей", ловушка "свободы собраний", ловушка "свободы слова", ловушка "законодательного органа", "избирательный округ" ловушка, "федерализм", ловушка) и дали характеристику каждому из них. В заключение авторы определили общие рамки и концепции методологии и пришли к выводу о преимуществе использования методологии неоинституционализма для изучения гибридных политических режимов

A critical rationalist approach to organizational learning: testing the theories held by managers

The common wisdom is that Popper's critical rationalism, a method aimed at knowledge validation through falsification of theories, is inadequate for managers in organizations. This study falsifies this argument in three phases: first, it specifies the obstructers that prevent the method from being employed; second, the critical rationalist method is adapted for strategic management purposes; last, the method and the hypotheses are tested via action research. Conclusions are that once the obstructers are omitted the method is applicable and effective

The effect of regional differences on the performance of software firms in the Netherlands

In this paper, we concentrate on how evolutionary economics contributes to a better understanding of the spatial evolution of newly emerging industries. Inspired by evolutionary thinking, four types of explanations are discussed and tested in an empirical analysis of the spatial pattern of the software sector in the Netherlands. Traditionally, agglomeration economies provide an explanation for the spatial concentration of an industry. Firms located in a cluster of similar or related sectors benefit from cost reductions, due to lower transportation costs, a thick labour market, specialised suppliers and information spillovers. An evolutionary approach on agglomeration economies provides an alternative view. It focuses explicit attention on knowledge spillovers as a vehicle of local diffusion of organizational routines or competences from one firm to the other. Such transfers of (tacit) knowledge are facilitated by spatial proximity of firms and a common knowledge base. In addition, an evolutionary approach takes a dynamic perspective on the role of agglomeration economies. During the initial stage of development of a new industry, the surrounding environment is still directed to routines and competences related to existing industries. When the new industry concentrates in a particular area to a considerable degree, a supportive environment (specialized knowledge, labour with specific skills) may gradually come into being, and localization economies may arise. Other evolutionary mechanisms may also provide an explanation for the spatial formation of new industries. We distinguish another three of them. First of all, transfer of knowledge and successful routines between firms in an emerging industry may occur through spin-off dynamics. Secondly, (social) networks may function as effective channels of knowledge diffusion and interactive learning, because they can provide a common knowledge base and mutual understanding and trust. Thirdly, firms in new industries with organizational capabilities that can deal effectively with the lack of required resources (such as knowledge, skills and capital) may become dominant, due to selection and imitation. Based on cross-sectional data gathered among 265 software firms in the Netherlands in 2003, we have tested which factors have influenced the innovative productivity of these firms. Using regression techniques, the outcomes suggest that spin-offs and firms with organizational capabilities perform better, while networks relations do not seem to affect the performance of software firms. Geography matters as well: software firms located in a region with a labour market with more ICT-skills show a higher innovative productivity. Keywords: evolutionary economics, industrial location, evolution of industries, software sector, agglomeration economies, organizational capabilities, spin-off, networks