36,545 research outputs found

    Insight and search in Katona’s five-square problem

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    Insights are often productive outcomes of human thinking. We provide a cognitive model that explains insight problem solving by the interplay of problem space search and representational change, whereby the problem space is constrained or relaxed based on the problem representation. By introducing different experimental conditions that either constrained the initial search space or helped solvers to initiate a representational change, we investigated the interplay of problem space search and representational change in Katona’s five-square problem. Testing 168 participants, we demonstrated that independent hints relating to the initial search space and to representational change had little effect on solution rates. However, providing both hints caused a significant increase in solution rates. Our results show the interplay between problem space search and representational change in insight problem solving: The initial problem space can be so large that people fail to encounter impasse, but even when representational change is achieved the resulting problem space can still provide a major obstacle to finding the solution

    Theories about architecture and performance of multi-agent systems

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    Multi-agent systems are promising as models of organization because they are based on the idea that most work in human organizations is done based on intelligence, communication, cooperation, and massive parallel processing. They offer an alternative for system theories of organization, which are rather abstract of nature and do not pay attention to the agent level. In contrast, classical organization theories offer a rather rich source of inspiration for developing multi-agent models because of their focus on the agent level. This paper studies the plausibility of theoretical choices in the construction of multi-agent systems. Multi-agent systems have to be plausible from a philosophical, psychological, and organizational point of view. For each of these points of view, alternative theories exist. Philosophically, the organization can be seen from the viewpoints of realism and constructivism. Psychologically, several agent types can be distinguished. A main problem in the construction of psychologically plausible computer agents is the integration of response function systems with representational systems. Organizationally, we study aspects of the architecture of multi-agent systems, namely topology, system function decomposition, coordination and synchronization of agent processes, and distribution of knowledge and language characteristics among agents. For each of these aspects, several theoretical perspectives exist.

    Development and Evaluation of "Where Are We?" Map-Skills Software and Curriculum

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    The "Where are We?" software and lessons are designed to help children in grades two through four learn to "translate" between the visually-perceived world that they sense around them, and the schematic representation of that landscape on a map. Field-based tests were developed to examine students' ability to absorb information in the real world and to transfer it onto a map and, conversely, the ability to absorb information from a map and transfer it into an action in the real world. Formative evaluation of a prototype version of "Where are We?" resulted in the following improvements in the instructional materials: more and prompter feedback for students, additional assessment tools for teachers, development of lessons to model successful map-using strategies, development of lessons to overcome common misconceptions, and replacement of text-based instructions with a voiceover demo. Educational levels: Graduate or professional

    LOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PARTITIONING OF MIND: DEPICTING THE SAME MAP?

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    The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that empirically delimited structures of mind are also differentiable by means of systematic logical analysis. In the sake of this aim, the paper first summarizes Demetriou's theory of cognitive organization and growth. This theory assumes that the mind is a multistructural entity that develops across three fronts: the processing system that constrains processing potentials, a set of specialized structural systems (SSSs) that guide processing within different reality and knowledge domains, and a hypecognitive system that monitors and controls the functioning of all other systems. In the second part the paper focuses on the SSSs, which are the target of our logical analysis, and it summarizes a series of empirical studies demonstrating their autonomous operation. The third part develops the logical proof showing that each SSS involves a kernel element that cannot be reduced to standard logic or to any other SSS. The implications of this analysis for the general theory of knowledge and cognitive development are discussed in the concluding part of the paper

    Getting the picture : iconicity does not affect representation-referent confusion

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    Three experiments examined 3- to 5-year-olds' (N = 428) understanding of the relationship between pictorial iconicity (photograph, colored drawing, schematic drawing) and the real world referent. Experiments 1 and 2 explored pictorial iconicity in picture-referent confusion after the picture-object relationship has been established. Pictorial iconicity had no effect on referential confusion when the referent changed after the picture had been taken/drawn (Experiment 1) and when the referent and the picture were different from the outset (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 investigated whether children are sensitive to iconicity to begin with. Children deemed photographs from a choice of varying iconicity representations as best representations for object reference. Together, findings suggest that iconicity plays a role in establishing a picture-object relation per se but is irrelevant once children have accepted that a picture represents an object. The latter finding may reflect domain general representational abilities

    Attributions as Behavior Explanations: Toward a New Theory

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    Attribution theory has played a major role in social-psychological research. Unfortunately, the term attribution is ambiguous. According to one meaning, forming an attribution is making a dispositional (trait) inference from behavior; according to another meaning, forming an attribution is giving an explanation (especially of behavior). The focus of this paper is on the latter phenomenon of behavior explanations. In particular, I discuss a new theory of explanation that provides an alternative to classic attribution theory as it dominates the textbooks and handbooks—which is typically as a version of Kelley’s (1967) model of attribution as covariation detection. I begin with a brief critique of this theory and, out of this critique, develop a list of requirements that an improved theory has to meet. I then introduce the new theory, report empirical data in its support, and apply it to a number of psychological phenomena. I finally conclude with an assessment of how much progress we have made in understanding behavior explanations and what has yet to be learned

    Modelling the Developing Mind: From Structure to Change

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    This paper presents a theory of cognitive change. The theory assumes that the fundamental causes of cognitive change reside in the architecture of mind. Thus, the architecture of mind as specified by the theory is described first. It is assumed that the mind is a three-level universe involving (1) a processing system that constrains processing potentials, (2) a set of specialized capacity systems that guide understanding of different reality and knowledge domains, and (3) a hypecognitive system that monitors and controls the functioning of all other systems. The paper then specifies the types of change that may occur in cognitive development (changes within the levels of mind, changes in the relations between structures across levels, changes in the efficiency of a structure) and a series of general (e.g., metarepresentation) and more specific mechanisms (e.g., bridging, interweaving, and fusion) that bring the changes about. It is argued that different types of change require different mechanisms. Finally, a general model of the nature of cognitive development is offered. The relations between the theory proposed in the paper and other theories and research in cognitive development and cognitive neuroscience is discussed throughout the paper
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