How to be naïve about the mind

This dissertation defends common-sense views of the mind by com- bating two widespread tendencies among philosophers. One such tendency is to eliminate: to resolve puzzles about the mind by denying the existence of or- dinary mental features. For instance, many think that while we can experience the shape, color, and texture of a baseball, we cannot experience the time it takes for a baseball to fall to the ground or the number of times it bounces — indeed, we cannot experience any temporal features. The other tendency is to inflate: to resolve puzzles about the mind by positing new and unusual mental features. For instance, it is almost universally accepted among philosophers that to allow for the rationality of agents, especially those like Lois Lane and Oedipus, we must posit guises (or senses, or modes of presentation) under which agents think. Against these tendencies, I argue that we can resolve puzzles about the mind without invoking new features or denying ordinary ones. In chapter one I confront ‘Frege puzzles’ concerning Lois Lane and show that there several distinct yet often-conflated issues at play. Moreover, the plausibility of such puzzles depends on an equivocation between them. Once disentangled, it is clear there are simple explanations of Lois’ rationality that do not employ guises. In chapter two I confront the Knowledge Argument, which aims to establish that Mary the color scientist learns a non-physical fact upon seeing red for the first time, and by extension that the mind is not physical. The most popular responses to this argument invoke special mental features, including so-called phenomenal concepts, knowledge by acquaintance, and certain mental abilities. I argue for a simple response to the argument which does not invoke any special mental features. On the simple response, Mary is simply misled into thinking she’s learned something when she has not. In chapter three I confront a puzzle about temporal experience that many take to suggest we do not experience temporal features. I argue that experiencing is a process rather than a state (more like running than like being tall) and that this distinction resolves the puzzle: we experience temporal features over periods of time but not in virtue of experiencing them at instants during that time (just as one runs over periods of time but not in virtue of running at instants during that time).Philosoph

Re-composing the digital present

This paper investigates the temporality that is produced in some recent and historical examples of media art. In exploring works by Janet Cardiff, Dennis Del Favero, and Omer Fast, I use the philosophy of Michel Serres and Gilles Deleuze to understand the convergence of temporalities that are composed in the digital present, as one moment in time overlays another moment. Developing Serres' concept of multi-temporality and Deleuze's philosophy of time and memory into a means to understand the non-linear time presented in these works, I argue that the different compositional strategies enacted by these artists provide the aesthetic grounding to experience “temporal thickness.” From here I investigate the interactive digital artworks Frames by Grahame Weinbren and Can You See Me Now? by the artist group Blast Theory. In this investigation, I understand interaction with technology, and the way that it shapes our sensory and processual experience, as a specifically temporal and temporalizing transaction, where human movements in the present are overlayed by technological processes

Identifying the mechanisms underpinning recognition of structured sequences of action

© 2012 The Experimental Psychology SocietyWe present three experiments to identify the specific information sources that skilled participants use to make recognition judgements when presented with dynamic, structured stimuli. A group of less skilled participants acted as controls. In all experiments, participants were presented with filmed stimuli containing structured action sequences. In a subsequent recognition phase, participants were presented with new and previously seen stimuli and were required to make judgements as to whether or not each sequence had been presented earlier (or were edited versions of earlier sequences). In Experiment 1, skilled participants demonstrated superior sensitivity in recognition when viewing dynamic clips compared with static images and clips where the frames were presented in a nonsequential, randomized manner, implicating the importance of motion information when identifying familiar or unfamiliar sequences. In Experiment 2, we presented normal and mirror-reversed sequences in order to distort access to absolute motion information. Skilled participants demonstrated superior recognition sensitivity, but no significant differences were observed across viewing conditions, leading to the suggestion that skilled participants are more likely to extract relative rather than absolute motion when making such judgements. In Experiment 3, we manipulated relative motion information by occluding several display features for the duration of each film sequence. A significant decrement in performance was reported when centrally located features were occluded compared to those located in more peripheral positions. Findings indicate that skilled participants are particularly sensitive to relative motion information when attempting to identify familiarity in dynamic, visual displays involving interaction between numerous features

Does Reformational philosophy have an answer to the many guises of pluralism?

Both the transformation of society and the inner reformation of the sciences require and are dependent upon global views of reality, society, man, nature and truth and implicitly harbour views of order. Moreover, Reformational philosophy as a transcendentalist project argues that all theoretical positions implicitly or explicitly harbour such global views. Dooyeweerd’s philosophy, rooted in the ‘metanarrative’ of Christianity provides significant distinctions which make it possible to contextualize many of the issues raised in post-modernism. It is this type of global view that arouses the suspicion ofpostmodernists who have a strong suspicion about meta-narratives of any kind and especially notions of totality and universality. In this paper it is argued that Reformational philosophy’s emphasis on the diversity and coherence of the creational order and the diversity transcending fullness of meaning given in Jesus Christ provide significant barriers to counteract the phenomenon o f 'wild pluralism’ so characteristic of post-modernism’s emphasis on pluralism in cultures and scientific theorizing

Bakhtinian Dialogic and Vygotskian Dialectic: Compatabilities and contradictions in the classroom?

This article explores two central notions of ‘dialectics’ and ‘dialogics’ based on the work of Vygotsky (drawing on philosophers such as Hegel, Spinoza, Engels and Marx) and Bakhtin (drawing on members of the Bakhtin Circle and writers such as Dostoevsky and Rabelais) respectively, as well their varying interanimations within Stalin-Marxist Russian society. It is proposed that these two positions are incommensurably located alongside one another in contemporary education. I argue that Bakhtin offers diametrically oppositional educational provocations to those of Vygotsky. The implications of these interpretations will be explored with consideration of their underlying philosophical incompatibilities and contradictions, as well as the opportunities such a consideration pose for educational practice today