Chip and Skim: cloning EMV cards with the pre-play attack

EMV, also known as "Chip and PIN", is the leading system for card payments worldwide. It is used throughout Europe and much of Asia, and is starting to be introduced in North America too. Payment cards contain a chip so they can execute an authentication protocol. This protocol requires point-of-sale (POS) terminals or ATMs to generate a nonce, called the unpredictable number, for each transaction to ensure it is fresh. We have discovered that some EMV implementers have merely used counters, timestamps or home-grown algorithms to supply this number. This exposes them to a "pre-play" attack which is indistinguishable from card cloning from the standpoint of the logs available to the card-issuing bank, and can be carried out even if it is impossible to clone a card physically (in the sense of extracting the key material and loading it into another card). Card cloning is the very type of fraud that EMV was supposed to prevent. We describe how we detected the vulnerability, a survey methodology we developed to chart the scope of the weakness, evidence from ATM and terminal experiments in the field, and our implementation of proof-of-concept attacks. We found flaws in widely-used ATMs from the largest manufacturers. We can now explain at least some of the increasing number of frauds in which victims are refused refunds by banks which claim that EMV cards cannot be cloned and that a customer involved in a dispute must therefore be mistaken or complicit. Pre-play attacks may also be carried out by malware in an ATM or POS terminal, or by a man-in-the-middle between the terminal and the acquirer. We explore the design and implementation mistakes that enabled the flaw to evade detection until now: shortcomings of the EMV specification, of the EMV kernel certification process, of implementation testing, formal analysis, or monitoring customer complaints. Finally we discuss countermeasures

Chip and Skim: cloning EMV cards with the pre-play attack

EMV, also known as "Chip and PIN", is the leading system for card payments worldwide. It is used throughout Europe and much of Asia, and is starting to be introduced in North America too. Payment cards contain a chip so they can execute an authentication protocol. This protocol requires point-of-sale (POS) terminals or ATMs to generate a nonce, called the unpredictable number, for each transaction to ensure it is fresh. We have discovered two serious problems: a widespread implementation flaw and a deeper, more difficult to fix flaw with the EMV protocol itself. The first flaw is that some EMV implementers have merely used counters, timestamps or home-grown algorithms to supply this nonce. This exposes them to a "pre-play" attack which is indistinguishable from card cloning from the standpoint of the logs available to the card-issuing bank, and can be carried out even if it is impossible to clone a card physically. Card cloning is the very type of fraud that EMV was supposed to prevent. We describe how we detected the vulnerability, a survey methodology we developed to chart the scope of the weakness, evidence from ATM and terminal experiments in the field, and our implementation of proof-of-concept attacks. We found flaws in widely-used ATMs from the largest manufacturers. We can now explain at least some of the increasing number of frauds in which victims are refused refunds by banks which claim that EMV cards cannot be cloned and that a customer involved in a dispute must therefore be mistaken or complicit. The second problem was exposed by the above work. Independent of the random number quality, there is a protocol failure: the actual random number generated by the terminal can simply be replaced by one the attacker used earlier when capturing an authentication code from the card. This variant of the pre-play attack may be carried out by malware in an ATM or POS terminal, or by a man-in-the-middle between the terminal and the acquirer. We explore the design and.

Chip and Skim: cloning EMV cards with the pre-play attack

EMV, also known as "Chip and PIN", is the leading system for card payments worldwide. It is used throughout Europe and much of Asia, and is starting to be introduced in North America too. Payment cards contain a chip so they can execute an authentication protocol. This protocol requires point-of-sale (POS) terminals or ATMs to generate a nonce, called the unpredictable number, for each transaction to ensure it is fresh. We have discovered two serious problems: a widespread implementation flaw and a deeper, more difficult to fix flaw with the EMV protocol itself. The first flaw is that some EMV implementers have merely used counters, timestamps or home-grown algorithms to supply this nonce. This exposes them to a "pre-play" attack which is indistinguishable from card cloning from the standpoint of the logs available to the card-issuing bank, and can be carried out even if it is impossible to clone a card physically. Card cloning is the very type of fraud that EMV was supposed to prevent. We describe how we detected the vulnerability, a survey methodology we developed to chart the scope of the weakness, evidence from ATM and terminal experiments in the field, and our implementation of proof-of-concept attacks. We found flaws in widely-used ATMs from the largest manufacturers. We can now explain at least some of the increasing number of frauds in which victims are refused refunds by banks which claim that EMV cards cannot be cloned and that a customer involved in a dispute must therefore be mistaken or complicit. The second problem was exposed by the above work. Independent of the random number quality, there is a protocol failure: the actual random number generated by the terminal can simply be replaced by one the attacker used earlier when capturing an authentication code from the card. This variant of the pre-play attack may be carried out by malware in an ATM or POS terminal, or by a man-in-the-middle between the terminal and the acquirer. We explore the design and.

Planting the Seeds for Public Health: How the Farm Bill Can Help Farmers to Produce and Distribute Healthy Foods

Analyzes provisions in the 2008 Farm Bill that impede farmers' production and strategic marketing of fruits and vegetables. Recommends policy changes to remove such barriers, improve consumer access to healthy foods, and help prevent childhood obesity

Secure protocols for contactless credit cards and electronic wallets

The contactless credit card protocol in use today is insecure. The credit card industry has chosen to use the NFC channel for contactless transactions. However, reliance on NFC's short range has led to poor assumptions in the contactless credit card protocol. For example, the card assumes (sometimes incorrectly) that its ability to receive a solicitation implies the cardholder's intent to purchase. In this dissertation, we examine the protocol currently in use, and present a family of three replacement protocols to defend against its deficiencies. First, we consider "outsider" attacks (e.g. eavesdropping, skimming attacks, relay attacks, and attacks facilitated by compromised points of sale) and design our first protocol to defend against these attacks. We call this protocol the Externally Secure CC Protocol, and design it using stepwise refinement. This protocol makes use of single-use "charge tokens" verifiable by the bank, while minimizing computation that needs to occur on the card. Second, we identify two attacks which may be carried out by malicious retailers: Over-charge attacks and Transparent Bridge attacks. Both attacks are predicated on the customer's lack of participation in the protocol, and involve modifying or replacing a charge after it has been confirmed by the customer. We look to Electronic Wallet applications (such as Android Pay and Apple Wallet), which provide a channel between customer and card. We augment the Externally Secure CC Protocol using this channel to construct the Secure CC Protocol, binding charge tokens to a given price, and thus stymieing both outsider and malicious retailer attacks. The Secure CC Protocol supports a property known as linkability: while only the bank can verify charge tokens, tokens from the same card can be recognized as such by the retailer. This property is also supported by the (insecure) protocol in use today, and is commonly used by retailers to construct marketing profiles on their customers. However, linkability has serious consumer privacy consequences, so we consider the converse property of unlinkability, where a retailer cannot identify different purchases as having been made by the same card. We require that our unlinkable protocol make use of existing infrastructure, so as not to require retailer cooperation. In response, we design the Unlinkable Wallet Protocol, leveraging techniques from the Secure CC Protocol to guard against malicious outsiders and retailers, while tunneling secure and unlinkable charge tokens through the protocol in use today.Computer Science

Personal Privacy Protection within Pervasive RFID Environments

Recent advancements in location tracking technologies have increased the threat to an individual\u27s personal privacy. Radio frequency identification (RFID) technology allows for the identification and potentially continuous tracking of an object or individual, without obtaining the individual\u27s consent or even awareness that the tracking is taking place. Although many positive applications for RFID technology exist, for example in the commercial sector and law enforcement, the potential for abuse in the collection and use of personal information through this technology also exists. Location data linked to other types of personal information allows not only the detection of past spatial travel and activity patterns, but also inferences regarding past and future behavior and preferences. Legislative and technological solutions to deal with the increased privacy threat raised by this and similar tracking technologies have been proposed. Such approaches in isolation have significant limitations. This thesis hypothesizes that an approach may be developed with high potential for sufficiently protecting individual privacy in the use of RFID technologies while also strongly supporting marketplace uses of such tags. The research develops and investigates the limits of approaches that might be us,ed to protect privacy in pervasive RFID surveillance environments. The conclusion is ultimately reached that an approach facilitating individual control over the linking of unique RFID tag ID numbers to personal identity implemented though a combination of legal controls and technological capabilities would be a highly desirable option in balancing the interests of both the commercial sector and the information privacy interests of individuals. The specific model developed is responsive to the core ethical principle of autonomy of the individual and as such is also intended to be more responsive to the needs of individual consumers. The technological approach proposed integrated with enabling privacy legislation and private contract law to enable interactive alteration of privacy preferences should result in marketplace solutions acceptable to both potential commercial users and those being tracked

Near Field Communication: From theory to practice

This book provides the technical essentials, state-of-the-art knowledge, business ecosystem and standards of Near Field Communication (NFC)by NFC Lab - Istanbul research centre which conducts intense research on NFC technology. In this book, the authors present the contemporary research on all aspects of NFC, addressing related security aspects as well as information on various business models. In addition, the book provides comprehensive information a designer needs to design an NFC project, an analyzer needs to analyze requirements of a new NFC based system, and a programmer needs to implement an application. Furthermore, the authors introduce the technical and administrative issues related to NFC technology, standards, and global stakeholders. It also offers comprehensive information as well as use case studies for each NFC operating mode to give the usage idea behind each operating mode thoroughly. Examples of NFC application development are provided using Java technology, and security considerations are discussed in detail. Key Features: Offers a complete understanding of the NFC technology, including standards, technical essentials, operating modes, application development with Java, security and privacy, business ecosystem analysis Provides analysis, design as well as development guidance for professionals from administrative and technical perspectives Discusses methods, techniques and modelling support including UML are demonstrated with real cases Contains case studies such as payment, ticketing, social networking and remote shopping This book will be an invaluable guide for business and ecosystem analysts, project managers, mobile commerce consultants, system and application developers, mobile developers and practitioners. It will also be of interest to researchers, software engineers, computer scientists, information technology specialists including students and graduates.Publisher's Versio