1,927 research outputs found
Incentive Design for Operations-Marketing Multitasking
A firm hires an agent (e.g., store manager) to undertake both operational and marketing tasks. Marketing tasks boost demand, but for demand to translate into sales, operational effort is required to maintain adequate inventory. The firm designs a compensation plan to induce the agent to put effort into both marketing and operations while facing “demand censoring” (i.e., demand in excess of available inventory is unobservable). We formulate this incentive-design problem in a principal-agent framework with a multitasking agent subject to a censored signal. We develop a bang-bang optimal control approach, with a general optimality structure applicable to a broad class of incentive-design problems. Using this approach, we characterize the optimal compensation plan, with a bonus region resembling a “mast” and “sail,” such that a bonus is paid when either all inventory above a threshold is sold or the sales quantity meets an inventory-dependent target. The optimal “mast and sail” compensation plan implies non-monotonicity, where the agent can be less likely to receive a bonus for achieving a better outcome. This gives rise to an ex post moral hazard issue where the agent may “hide” inventory to earn a bonus. We show this ex post moral hazard issue is a result of demand censoring. If available information includes a waitlist (or other noisy signals) to gauge unsatisfied demand, no ex post moral hazard issues remain
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Long-term versus Short-term Contracting in Salesforce Compensation
This dissertation investigates multi-period salesforce incentive contracting. The first chapter is an overview of the problems as well as the main findings. The second chapter continues with a review of the related literatures. The third and fourth chapters address a central question in salesforce contracting: how frequently should a firm compensate its sales agents over a long-term horizon? Agents can game the long-term contract by varying their effort levels dynamically over time, as discussed in Chapter 3, or by altering between a “bold" action and a “safe" action dynamically over time, as discussed in Chapter 4.
Chapter 3 studies multi-period salesforce incentive provisions when agents are able to vary their demand-enhancing effort levels dynamically. I establish a stylized agency-theory model to analyze this central question. I consider salespeople's dynamic responses in exerting effort (often known as “gaming"). I find that long time horizon contracts weakly dominate short time horizon contracts, even though they enable gaming by the agent, because they allow compensation to be contingent on more extreme outcomes; this not only motivates the salesperson more, but also leads to lower expected payment to the salesperson. A counterintuitive observation that my analysis provides is that under the optimal long time horizon contract, the firm may find it optimal to induce the agent to not exert high effort in every period. This provides a rationale for effort exertion patterns that are often interpreted as suboptimal for the firm (e.g., exerting effort only in early periods, often called “giving up"; exerting effort only in later periods, often called “postponing effort"). I also discuss the implication of sales pull-in and push-out, and dependence of periods (through limited inventory) upon the structure of the optimal contracting.
Chapter 4 examines multi-period salesforce incentive contracting, where sales agents can dynamically choose between a bold action with higher sales potential but also higher variance, and a safe action with limited sales potential but lower variance. I find that the contract format is determined by how much the firm wants later actions to depend on earlier outcomes. Making later actions independent of earlier demand outcomes reduces agents' gaming, but it also reduces an agent's incentive to take bold actions. When the two periods are independent, an extreme two-period contract with a hard-to-achieve quota, or a polarized two-period contract allowing agents to make up sales, can strictly dominate a period-by-period contract, because they induce more bold actions in earlier periods by making later actions dependent on earlier outcomes. However, when the two periods are dependent through a limited inventory to be sold across two periods, the period-by-period contract can strictly dominate the two-period contract, by allowing the principal more flexibility in adjusting the contract
Petropolitics
The importance of energy to the functioning of any economy has meant that energy industries are amongst the most regulated of industries. What might appear to be purely private decisions are made within a complex and evolving web of government regulations.
Petropolitics: Petroleum Development, Markets and Regulations, Alberta as an Illustrative History provides an economic history of the petroleum industry in Alberta as well as a detailed analysis of the operation of the markets for Alberta oil and natural gas, and the main governmental regulations (apart from environmental regulations) faced by the industry. The tools used within this study are applicable to oil and gas industries throughout the world.
Winner, 2014 Book of the Year, Petroleum History Societ
Petropolitics
The importance of energy to the functioning of any economy has meant that energy industries are amongst the most regulated of industries. What might appear to be purely private decisions are made within a complex and evolving web of government regulations.
Petropolitics: Petroleum Development, Markets and Regulations, Alberta as an Illustrative History provides an economic history of the petroleum industry in Alberta as well as a detailed analysis of the operation of the markets for Alberta oil and natural gas, and the main governmental regulations (apart from environmental regulations) faced by the industry. The tools used within this study are applicable to oil and gas industries throughout the world.
Winner, 2014 Book of the Year, Petroleum History Societ
Economic Reforms and Constitutional Transition
This paper investigates the relationship between economic reforms and constitutional transition, which has been neglected by many transition economists. It is argued that assessment of reform performance might be very misleading if it is not recognized that economic reforms are just a small part of large scale of constitutional transition. Rivalry and competition between states and between political forces within each country are the driving forces for constitutional transition. We use Russia as an example of economic reforms associated with constitutional transition and China as an example of economic reforms in the absence of constitutional transition to examine features and problems in the two patterns of transition. It is concluded that under political monopoly of the ruling party, economic transition will be hijacked by state opportunism. Dual track approach to economic transition may generate very high long-term cost of constitutional transition that might well outweigh its short-term benefit of buying out the vested interests.constitutional transition, economic reform, division of labor, debate of shock therapy vs gradualism, debate of convergence vs institutional innovation
A framework for the analysis of mineral tax policy in sub-Saharan Africa
Given the dual role played by the Government as resource owner and tax collector in many sub - Saharan economies, it is important to separate"resource factor payments"from taxes through the use of different instruments. The instruments to be considered are: (1) a factor payment system that includes"ad rem"or"ad valorem"royalties. Production sharing, resource rent schemes, and fixed fees could also be used, but some form of unit payment is necessary and justified, because natural resources in the ground are inputs into the production process; (2) a cash flow and withholding tax system initially for the mineral sectors and eventually for other sectors of the economy. The cash flow tax would capture a share of the"economic rent"from each sector and be neutral across sectors; and (3) a depletion account to preserve the nations capital stock. Natural resources are part of an economy's capital stock, which will fall unless"replacement investment"is made as the resource is depleted.Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Banks&Banking Reform,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Health Economics&Finance
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