System-level Non-interference for Constant-time Cryptography

International audienceCache-based attacks are a class of side-channel attacks that are particularly effective in virtualized or cloud-based en-vironments, where they have been used to recover secret keys from cryptographic implementations. One common ap-proach to thwart cache-based attacks is to use constant-time implementations, i.e. which do not branch on secrets and do not perform memory accesses that depend on secrets. How-ever, there is no rigorous proof that constant-time implemen-tations are protected against concurrent cache-attacks in virtualization platforms with shared cache; moreover, many prominent implementations are not constant-time. An alter-native approach is to rely on system-level mechanisms. One recent such mechanism is stealth memory, which provisions a small amount of private cache for programs to carry po-tentially leaking computations securely. Stealth memory in-duces a weak form of constant-time, called S-constant-time, which encompasses some widely used cryptographic imple-mentations. However, there is no rigorous analysis of stealth memory and S-constant-time, and no tool support for check-ing if applications are S-constant-time. We propose a new information-flow analysis that checks if an x86 application executes in constant-time, or in S-constant-time. Moreover, we prove that constant-time (resp. S-constant-time) programs do not leak confidential infor-mation through the cache to other operating systems exe-cuting concurrently on virtualization platforms (resp. plat-forms supporting stealth memory). The soundness proofs are based on new theorems of independent interest, includ-ing isolation theorems for virtualization platforms (resp. plat-forms supporting stealth memory), and proofs that constant-time implementations (resp. S-constant-time implementa-tions) are non-interfering with respect to a strict information flow policy which disallows that control flow and memory ac-cesses depend on secrets. We formalize our results using the Coq proof assistant and we demonstrate the effectiveness of our analyses on cryptographic implementations, including PolarSSL AES, DES and RC4, SHA256 and Salsa20

Quantum Cryptography

Quantum cryptography could well be the first application of quantum mechanics at the individual quanta level. The very fast progress in both theory and experiments over the recent years are reviewed, with emphasis on open questions and technological issues.Comment: 55 pages, 32 figures; to appear in Reviews of Modern Physic

A high-speed multi-protocol quantum key distribution transmitter based on a dual-drive modulator

We propose a novel source based on a dual-drive modulator that is adaptable and allows Alice to choose between various practical quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols depending on what receiver she is communicating with. Experimental results show that the proposed transmitter is suitable for implementation of the Bennett and Brassard 1984 (BB84), coherent one-way (COW) and differential phase shift (DPS) protocols with stable and low quantum bit error rate. This could become a useful component in network QKD, where multi-protocol capability is highly desirable.Comment: 15 pages, 7 figure

One-Way Entangled-Photon Autocompensating Quantum Cryptography

A new quantum cryptography implementation is presented that combines one-way operation with an autocompensating feature that has hitherto only been available in implementations that require the signal to make a round trip between the users. Using the concept of advanced waves, it is shown that this new implementation is related to the round-trip implementations in the same way that Ekert's two-particle scheme is related to the original one-particle scheme of Bennett and Brassard. The practical advantages and disadvantages of the proposed implementation are discussed in the context of existing schemes.Comment: 5 pages, 1 figure; Minor edits--conclusions unchanged; accepted for publication in Physical Review

Quantum Cryptography

Quantum cryptography is a new method for secret communications offering the ultimate security assurance of the inviolability of a Law of Nature. In this paper we shall describe the theory of quantum cryptography, its potential relevance and the development of a prototype system at Los Alamos, which utilises the phenomenon of single-photon interference to perform quantum cryptography over an optical fiber communications link.Comment: 36 pages in compressed PostScript format, 10 PostScript figures compressed tar fil