Integrated game-theory modelling for multi enterprise-wide coordination and collaboration under uncertain competitive environment

In this work, an integrated Game Theory (GT) approach is developed for the coordination of multi-enterprise Supply Chains (SCs) in a competitive uncertain environment. The conflicting goals of the different participants are solved through coordination contracts using a non-cooperative non-zero-sum Stackelberg game under the leadership of the manufacturer. The Stackelberg payoff matrix is built under the nominal conditions, and then evaluated under different probable uncertain scenarios using a Monte-Carlo simulation. The competition between the Stackelberg game players and the third parties is solved through a Nash Equilibrium game. A novel way to analyze the game outcome is proposed based on a win–win Stackelberg set of “Pareto-frontiers”. The benefits of the resulting MINLP tactical models are illustrated by a case study with different vendors around a client SC. The results show that the coordinated decisions lead to higher expected payoffs compared to the standalone case, while also leading to uncertainty reduction.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

Analysis of the Dynamical Behavior of Firms in a Three Layered Modular Assembly Model

This paper formulate an option model considers supplier's reaction as the profit sharing in module production, and analyses it by the agent theory. A dynamic environment in the model of the system of the production of modules of three layers is assumed, and the maker and the supplier are modeled by the technique of Genetic Programming (GP) as an agent who takes the action of selfoptimization. As result, the condition that the agent can exist continuously in the market is requested. In conclusion, violent competition and the selection of the similar agent are found even in the model of the option to consider the profit sharing and the reaction

Managerial switching and myopia

"Incomplete and very preliminary draft. October 16, 1987."--3rd prelim page.Includes bibliographical references.Research support from the Pew Charitable Trust, the Center for Energy Policy Research at MIT and the National Science Foundation.by J.-J. Laffont and J. Tirole

Managerial switching and myopia

Pew Charitable Trust, the Center for Energy Policy Research at MIT and the National Science Foundatio

The structure of the optimal combined sourcing policy using capacity reservation and spot market with price uncertainty

This contribution focuses on the cost-effective management of the combined use of two procurement options: the short-term option is given by a spot-market with random price, whereas the long-term alternative is characterized by a multi period capacity reservation contract with fixed purchase price, reservation level and capacity reservation cost. Considering a multiperiod problem with stochastic demand, the structure of the optimal combined purchasing policy is derived using stochastic dynamic programming.Capacity reservation, spot market, purchasing policy, supply contracts, stochastic inventory control

Capacity Reservation under Spot Market Price Uncertainty

The traditional way of procurement, using long-term contract and capacity reservation, is competing with the escalating global spot market. Considering the variability of the spot prices, the flexibility of combined sourcing can be used to benefit from occasional low short-term spot price levels while the long-term contract is a means to hedge the risk of high spot market price incidents. This contribution focuses on the cost-effective management of the combined use of the above two procurement options. The structure of the optimal combined purchasing policy is complex. In this paper we consider the capacity reservation - base stock policy to provide a simple implementation and comparison to single sourcing options. Our analysis shows that in case of large spot market price variability the combined sourcing is superior over spot market sourcing even in case of low average spot market price and also superior over long-term sourcing even in case of high average spot market price.Capacity reservation; spot market; purchasing policy; supply chain contracts; stochastic inventory control

Theories of loan commitments: a literature review

A loan commitment is an agreement by which a bank promises to lend to a customer at prespecified terms while retaining the right to renege on its promise if the borrower's creditworthiness deteriorates. The contract also specifies the various fees that must be paid over the life of the commitment. Loan commitments are widely used in the economy. As their use has spread, a rich literature has evolved to explain why they exist, how they are priced, and how they affect the risk of the bank and the deposit insurer. This article summarizes what we have learned on these issues. Its main insight is that loan commitments are an optimal tool for risk sharing and for resolving informational problems. The author also points out some issues that the current literature leaves unexplained.Bank loans

Market design

Europe is liberalising electricity in accordance with the European Commission’s Electricity Directives. Different countries have responded differently, notably in the extent of restructuring, treatment of mergers, market power, and vertical unbundling. While Britain and Norway have achieved effective competition, others like Germany, Spain and France are still struggling to deal with dominant and sometimes vertically integrated companies. The Netherlands offers an interesting intermediate case, where good economic analysis has sometimes been thwarted by legalistic interpretations. Investment under the new Emissions Trading system could further transform the electricity industry but may be hampered by slow progress in liberalising European gas markets

Shift, not drift : towards active demand response and beyond

Each semester the THINK project publishes two research reports based on topics proposed by the European Commission.Topic 11QM-01-13-151-EN-CQM-01-13-151-EN-NNowadays, the European electricity systems are evolving towards a generation mix that is more decentralised, less predictable and less dispatchable to operate. In this context, additional flexibility is expected to be provided by the demand side. Thus, how to engage consumers to participate in active demand response is becoming a pressing issue. This THINK report assesses how to realise this shift towards active consumers using a consumer-centred approach and does so from the perspective of contracts. On this basis, we recommend measures to be undertaken in the short-term, during the transition and in the long term, respectively, to achieve a full take-off of active demand response. The THINK project (2010-2013) is funded by the European Commission under the Seventh Framework Programme, Strategic Energy Technology Plan. (Call FP7-ENERGY-2009-2, Grant Agreement no: 249736). Coordinator: Prof. Jean-Michel Glachant and Prof. Leonardo Meeus, Florence School of Regulation, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute

Vertical foreclosure: a policy framework

Whenever you phone your mother, switch on the light, or buy health insurance you purchase a service or product from a chain of vertically related industries. Providers of these products or services need access to a telecommunications network, an electricity network or to health care services. In such industries, integration and exclusive contracts between vertically related firms may have important welfare enhancing effects, but can also deny or limit rivals' access to input or customers, leading to foreclosure. Foreclosure can harm welfare if it reduces competition. This document provides policymakers with a framework to assess the potential for welfare reducing foreclosure of vertical integration and vertical restraints and describes possible remedies. The framework consists of four steps. Each step requires its own detailed analysis. First, market power should exist either upstream or downstream. Second, a theory of foreclosure should be formulated that explains why foreclosure is a profitable equilibrium strategy. Third, the existence and magnitude of potential welfare enhancing effects of the vertical restrains or vertical integration should be assessed. Fourth, suitable policies to address foreclosure should be found.