The roads to non-individuals (and how not to read their maps)

Ever since its beginnings, standard quantum mechanics has been associated with a metaphysical view according to which the theory deals with non-individual objects, i.e., objects deprived of individuality in some sense of the term. We shall examine the grounds of the claim according to which quantum mechanics is so closely connected with a metaphysics of non-individuals. In particular, we discuss the attempts to learn the required `metaphysical lessons' required by quantum mechanics coming from four distinct roads: from the formalism of the theory, treating separately the case of the physics and the underlying logic; from the ontology of the theory, understood as the furniture of the world according to the theory; and, at last, we analyze whether a metaphysics of non-individuals is indispensable from a purely metaphysical point of view. We argue that neither non-individuality nor individuality is not to be found imposed on us in any of these levels so that it should be seen as a metaphysical addition to the theory, rather than as a lesson from it.Comment: Forthcoming in J. R. B. Arenhart, R. W. Arroyo (eds.), Non-Reflexive Logics, Non-Individuals, and the Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics: Essays in Honour of the Philosophy of D\'ecio Krause, Springer, Synthese Library 476, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31840-5_

Entities Without Intrinsic Physical Identity

This paper critically discusses recent objections that have been raised against the contextual understanding of fundamental physical objects advocated by non-eliminative ontic structural realism. One of these recent objections claims that such a purely relational understanding of objects cannot account for there being a determinate number of them. A more general objection concerns a well-known circularity threat: relations presuppose the objects they relate and so cannot account for them. A similar circularity objection has also been raised within the framework of the weak discernibility claims made in the last few years about quantum particles. We argue that these objections rely either on mere metaphysical prejudice or on confusing the logico-mathematical formalism within which a physical theory is formulated with the physical theory itself. Furthermore, we defend the motivations for taking numerical diversity as a primitive fact in this context

O Realismo estrutural ontológico e o problema das relações sem os relata

Neste artigo, após fazermos uma breve explanação do realismo estrutural ontológico, apresentaremos o problema das relações sem os relata como uma forte objeção a essa teoria. Serão então discutidas duas possíveis alternativas ao problema. A primeira desconsidera os particulares relata(individuais) envolvidos nas relações, constituindo-se em uma soluçãoparcial do problema; a segunda tem por base o cálculo de relações, que propõe uma completa eliminação de variáveis individuais. AbstractIn this paper we first present a brief explanation of the ontic structural realism, after which we introduce the problem of relations without relata as a strong objection to this theory. Two possible solutions to the problem are then discussed. The first one rejects the particulars relata (individuals) involved in these relations and as such is only a partial solution to the problem; the second one is based on the relational calculus and it proposes the complete elimination of individual variables

Understanding Defective Theories: The case of Quantum Mechanics and non-individuality

Here, we deal with the question of under which circumstances can scientists achieve a legitimate understanding of defective theories qua defective. We claim that scientists understand a theory if they can recognize the theory’s underlying inference pattern(s) and if they can reconstruct and explain what is going on in specific cases of defective theories as well as consider what the theory would do if non-defective –even before finding ways of fixing it. Furthermore, we discuss the implications of this approach to understanding the meta-metaphysics of Quantum Mechanics, specifically with regard to Quasi-set theory. We illustrate this by employing Quasi-set theory to structure a defective scientific theory and make possible the understanding of the theory

Heraclitean Flux Metaphysics

This essay offers an original interpretation and defense of the doctrine of flux, as it is presented in Plato’s Theaetetus. The methodology of the paper’s analysis is in the style of rational reconstruction, and it is highly analytic in scope, in the sense that I will focus on the text itself, and only on certain parts of it too, while ignoring the rest of Plato’s extensive corpus, and without worrying about whether, how, and to what extent the interpretation of the view coheres well with the other elements of the secret doctrine view discussed in the dialogue, as well. In the first part of the essay, I’ll offer my interpretation of the doctrine. Then, in the second part of the essay, I’ll examine two potential criticisms of the doctrine, including Socrates’s infamous linguistic paradox, and show how my interpretation of Heraclitean flux metaphysics is able to circumvent both

Memorial de Atividades Acadêmicas

Memorial da trajetória acadêmica.Memorial de Atividades Acadêmicas apresentado para progressão para a Classe de Professor Titular do Departamento de Filosofia da UFSC em 2015