False-name-Proof Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms

In Internet auctions, it is easy for a bidder to submit multiple bids under multiple identifiers (e.g., multiple e-mail addresses). If only one good is sold, a bidder cannot make any additional profit by using multiple bids. However, in combinatorial auctions, where multiple goods are sold simultaneously, submitting multiple bids under fictitious names can be profitable. A bid made under a fictitious name is called a {em false-name bid}. In this talk, I describe the summary of existing works and open problems on false-name bids

Time-based combinatorial auction for timber allocation and delivery coordination

The timber auction system currently used in the province of Québec, Canada, is a single unit auction, in which timber users bid on the entire forest stands located within a specific area. In this procurement system, timber users (i.e., winners) are responsible for harvesting the entire stands and for reselling undesirable timber species to others. In order to improve the limits of this system, this paper proposes a sustainable auction system, referred to as time-based timber combinatorial auction. In this approach, time is not part of the definition of the goods for sale. It is used to valuate the good for sale with respect to their expected delivery period. Therefore, this system aims to simultaneously allocate multiple goods, or products in mixed forest stand, to multiple winners, and address the coordination of timber deliveries to their winners. The proposed timber combinatorial auction provides an open access allocation of timber, based on its intrinsic economic value, while allowing the Ministry of natural resources to exercise high standard for environmentally friendly forest operations. From a logistic point of view, a sensitive analysis is conducted in order to compare the proposed time-based combinatorial auction with a combinatorial auction with no delivery coordination. Both models are compared according to bidders' and seller's time flexibility. Experimental results illustrate the impact (i.e., cost) of delivery coordination on total revenue due to loss of value when time preference is not fully satisfied. This cost evaluation can then be used as an upper bound of the cost of coordination, when delivery coordination must be manually negotiated among multi-stakeholders

Timber Auction Simulation and Design

RÉSUMÉ : La commercialisation sous forme de vente aux enchères publique du bois provenant de forêts, comme dans la province de Québec, est une tâche difficile. En effet, il est crucial de déterminer les prix représentatifs de la vente aux enchères de bois dans toutes les régions du Québec afin de permettre à plus d'acheteurs potentiels d'accéder au marché. De même, il est également important de concevoir un système d'enchères qui est bénéfique pour les entreprises forestières et les gens de Québec. La vente unitaire, dans lequel les utilisateurs de bois autorisés à soumissionner pour le lot entier, est actuellement appliquée comme une méthode de vente aux enchères. Dans ce système de vente aux enchères du bois, les utilisateurs de bois sont responsables de la récolte de la totalité du lot et pour la revente espèces ligneuses indésirables à d'autres utilisateurs. Dans ce projet, nous analysons d'abord différentes configurations d’enchères à rondes multiples de type premier prix sous pli scellé, tel que proposé par le ministère des Ressources naturelles du Québec, afin de mieux comprendre la dynamique et les facteurs dominants de la réussite de ce type de mécanisme d'allocation de bois. Pour cela, nous utilisons la simulation à base d'agents pour modéliser et simuler des ventes aux enchères, en proposant notamment des comportements de soumissionnaires réalistes, incluant des stratégies d'adaptation et d'apprentissage, qui ont été simulées et comparées dans diverses configurations. Les comparaisons ont été menées en mesurant notamment le taux de succès de gagner l'enchère et le prix unitaire remporté en $/m3. Cette étude suggère également des configurations de paramètres permettant maximiser les recettes pour le commissaire-priseur. À l’étape suivante de la recherche, cette thèse présente la simulation de la vente de plusieurs sortes de bois rond en utilisant une méthode d’enchères combinatoires. Dans ce processus de vente, les soumissionnaires peuvent avoir besoin d’une combinaison des produits. En utilisant l'approche par simulation, les résultats montrent que les revenus générés par enchère combinatoire peuvent être plus élevés que le revenu de l’enchère unitaire. Afin d'effectuer une analyse de sensibilité, les expériences sont répétées et testés avec diverses combinaisons de quatre paramètres de configuration. Les résultats de l'analyse permettent d’évaluer dans quel contexte l’enchère combinatoire peut faire mieux que l’enchère unitaire, et cela dans différents marchés. Enfin, cette thèse présente un système d'enchères combinatoires qui alloue le bois aux soumissionnaires afin d'améliorer la coordination des dépendances entre les soumissionnaires retenus dans les zones forestières mixtes (c’est à dire avec plusieurs types de produits et utilisateurs potentiels). Pour supporter la coordination des opérations et améliorer la fraicheur du bois, nous proposons une vente aux enchères combinatoire, qui permet aux soumissionnaires d’ajuster la valeur des offres en fonction du temps, via une sorte de calendriers. Cette enchère combinatoire permet ainsi au commissaire-priseur de trouver les meilleures combinaisons de soumissions gagnantes maximisant ainsi les préférences temporelles des soumissionnaires. Pour cela, nous définissons un nouveau problème de détermination du vainqueur (WDP) qui utilise ces fonctions de valeur. Afin de comparer l’impact de diverses préférences temporelles, une analyse de sensibilité est menée. Mots-clés: enchères du bois, enchères séquentielles, la stratégie d'apprentissage, systèmes multi-agents, l'affectation enchères combinatoire, la coordination, la fraicheur du bois, et de problèmes de détermination du vainqueur.----------ABSTRACT : The marketing of wood obtained from forests in public auction, such as in the province of Québec, is a challenging task. Indeed, it is crucial to determine representative prices of the wood auction in all regions of Quebec in order to allow more potential buyers to access the market. Similarly, it is also important to design an auction system that is beneficial for forest companies and the people of Québec. Single-unit auction, in which timber users allowed to bid on the entire lot, is currently applied as a method of auction. In this timber auction system, timber users (i.e., winners) are responsible for harvesting the entire lot and for reselling unwanted timber species to other users. In this project, we first analyze various configurations of the multiple-round first-price sealed-bid auction of wood as proposed by the Québec Ministry of Natural Resources to better understand the dynamics and the dominant factors of success of this type of wood allocation mechanism. To do so, we use agent-based simulation to model and simulate auctions with realistic bidders’ behavior. Different bidding patterns including adaptive and learning strategies are then simulated and compared in various setup configurations. The comparisons have been conducted on the success rate of winning the auction and the winning price per m3. This study also suggests parameter configurations to maximize revenue for the auctioneer. In the next step of research, in the last part, this thesis presents the simulation of multiple-round timber combinatorial auction as the bidders may need variety of species and the size of timber companies may be different. Using simulation approach, the results shows the revenue generated by combinatorial auction can be higher than the revenue of a single unit auction. In order to do sensitive analysis of the comparison, the experiments are repeated and tested with different setup configuration of four parameters. The results of analysis help to evaluate how combinatorial auction can perform better than single auction in different markets. Finally, we intend to present an auction system, which allocates wood to bidders in order to improve the coordination of the dependencies between winning bidders in mixed forest areas (i.e., wood lots with multiple users). To achieve the coordination of procurement operations and improve the freshness of the wood, we propose an auction, by allowing the value of bids to be expressed as a function of time, via some sort of timetables, and by using a combinatorial auction that will allow the auctioneer to find the best combinations of winning bids. In order to do that, we define a new winner determination problem (WDP) that use these value functions for coordination procurement and delivery operations and wood freshness. In order to compare the proposed time-based combinatorial auction with combinatorial auction a sensitive analysis is conducted. The comparison is done according to bidders’ and seller’s time flexibility. Keywords: timber auction, sequential auction, learning strategy, multi agent system, allocation combinatorial auction, coordination, wood freshness, and winner determination problem

Resistance Is Not Futile: Harnessing the Power of Counter-Offensive Tactics in Legal Persuasion

A core competency for people working in law or business is the ability to influence and persuade: People need to become expert at getting others to agree, to go along, and to give in. The potential “targets” of one’s influence throughout a given workday are seemingly endless and include clients and customers, co-counsel, opposing counsel, supervisors, direct reports, contractors, subcontractors, consultants, secretaries, judges, juries, witnesses, police officers, court personnel, and others. Moreover, that influence is largely exerted through words spoken and behaviors exhibited within the context of a negotiation. And yet, leading academics have argued that the vast majority of academic writing on negotiation has ignored the element of interpersonal influence. This Article was written to help correct this glaring omission.This Article underscores the notion that throughout each day, people move rapidly and fluently between the roles of persuasion “agent” (that is, one who attempts to persuade others) and persuasion “target” (that is, one whom others attempt to persuade). If an agent” party is attempting to persuade, the receiving or “target” party must understand the various tactics, strategies, and techniques being employed in those attempts, as well as ways to resist and defend against them. This Article provides this knowledge and understanding so that all parties, whether agents or targets, can be more effective negotiators. Those who are not aware that these techniques exist and who cannot recognize them and resist them place themselves (and their clients) at a clear disadvantage with respect to negotiation outcomes and final settlement results. It is only by recognizing and responding to various strategies and techniques of influence and persuasion that negotiators can begin to resist their powers and nullify their impacts

Resistance Is Not Futile:Harnessing the Power of Counter-Offensive Tactics in Legal Persuasion

A core competency for people working in law or business is the ability to influence and persuade: People need to become expert at getting others to agree, to go along, and to give in. The potential “targets” of one’s influence throughout a given workday are seemingly endless and include clients and customers, co-counsel, opposing counsel, supervisors, direct reports, contractors, subcontractors, consultants, secretaries, judges, juries, witnesses, police officers, court personnel, and others. Moreover, that influence is largely exerted through words spoken and behaviors exhibited within the context of a negotiation. And yet, leading academics have argued that the vast majority of academic writing on negotiation has ignored the element of interpersonal influence. This Article was written to help correct this glaring omission.This Article underscores the notion that throughout each day, people move rapidly and fluently between the roles of persuasion “agent” (that is, one who attempts to persuade others) and persuasion “target” (that is, one whom others attempt to persuade). If an “agent” party is attempting to persuade, the receiving or “target” party must understand the various tactics, strategies, and techniques being employed in those attempts, as well as ways to resist and defend against them. This Article provides this knowledge and understanding so that all parties, whether agents or targets, can be more effective negotiators. Those who are not aware that these techniques exist and who cannot recognize them and resist them place themselves (and their clients) at a clear disadvantage with respect to negotiation outcomes and final settlement results. It is only by recognizing and responding to various strategies and techniques of influence and persuasion that negotiators can begin to resist their powers and nullify their impacts

Auctions and bidding: A guide for computer scientists

There is a veritable menagerie of auctions-single-dimensional, multi-dimensional, single-sided, double-sided, first-price, second-price, English, Dutch, Japanese, sealed-bid-and these have been extensively discussed and analyzed in the economics literature. The main purpose of this article is to survey this literature from a computer science perspective, primarily from the viewpoint of computer scientists who are interested in learning about auction theory, and to provide pointers into the economics literature for those who want a deeper technical understanding. In addition, since auctions are an increasingly important topic in computer science, we also look at work on auctions from the computer science literature. Overall, our aim is to identifying what both these bodies of work these tell us about creating electronic auctions. © 2011 ACM.This work was funded in part by HP under the “Always on” grant, by NSF IIS-0329037 “Tools and Techniques for Automated Mechanism Design”, and by IEA (TIN2006-15662-C02-01), OK (IST-4-027253-STP), eREP(EC-FP6-CIT5-28575) and Agreement Technologies (CONSOLIDER CSD2007-0022, INGENIO 2010).Peer Reviewe