EU-Russia Relations in the Context of Energy Security : Analysis of Energy Securitization Discourses 2014-2017

For long energy trade has been viewed as an important element of EU– (Soviet) Russia relations. The West European energy engagement with what was then Soviet Union that emerged in late 1960s over the next decades evolved into an important strategic partnership in between the European Union (EU) and the Russian Federation (Russia), with considerable degree of interdependence surrounding their energy ties. Although the EU-Russia energy relations are, in general, concerned with both oil and natural gas, in the present research the author narrowed down the notion of energy to natural gas assigning this commodity a unique importance in the analysis of energy politics between the two. This is given the difference in the structural and economic terms of its trade when compared to other types of fossil fuels, which leads to path-dependent nature of energy relations between the actors involved. The disruptions of Russian natural gas supplies to Europe in 2006 and 2009 as a result of Ukraine-Russia gas disputes already contributed to concerns in regards to security of Russian energy supplies and corresponding natural gas demand from the side of the EU in the light of long-standing interdependence of the energy trade between the two. That being said, the subsequent 2014 Ukrainian crisis involving Russia’s annexation of Crimea and yet another Ukraine-Russia gas dispute can be seen as a turning point in the EU-Russia relations in the context of energy trade. The present study drew from previous research on the topic and, using a securitization theory coined by Copenhagen School of Security Studies as an analytical framework, deploys discourse analysis as a methodological tool in order to examine series of political rhetoric over the years 2014-2017 pertaining to the issue of EU-Russia relations when it comes to security of energy supplies. The analysis of the content of both EU’s and Russia’s energy securitization discourses revealed a presence of some cross related key themes that demonstrate certain similarities as well as differences in actors’ interpretations of their mutual energy trade and the implications of such for each of the party’s respective energy securities. It may be argued that over the years 2014-2017 Russia has been going through the process of de-securitization of its energy relations with the European Union. That being said over the same period the EU has been going through the processes of securitization of its relations with Russian Federation

What can the EU do to address the high natural gas prices?

Natural gas prices worldwide increased on the back of the COVID economic recovery in 2021. European prices skyrocketed when the dominant external supplier, Gazprom, started to withhold supplies in Q4 2021. This analysis uses market modelling to assess and compare the effectiveness of various measures to mitigate the gas – and by extension energy – price crisis in the short and longer term. First, the realization of the 5th PCI package adopted by the European Commission in November 2021 would significantly reduce EU prices, especially in the Eastern Member States that tend to be more dependent on the single external supplier. At the same time, the billions of euros that would be poured in risk becoming stranded assets in the long-term with tightening climate regulations. Secondly, uniform voluntary demand response has significant potential to reduce prices, especially in the Eastern Member States. Thirdly, the introduction of European strategic gas reserves can bring temporary price relief but is not a cost-efficient solution. However, security of supply considerations can outweigh the negative economic outcomes

Russian gas games or well-oiled conflict? Energy security and the 2014 Ukraine crisis

This essay explores the link between energy security and the 2014 Ukraine crisis. Whenever there is an international conflict involving a major oil or gas producer, commentators are often quick to assume a direct link, and the Ukraine crisis was no exception. Yet, the various avenues through which energy politics have affected the Ukraine crisis, and vice versa, are not well understood. This paper seeks to shed light on the issue by addressing two specific questions. First, how exactly did energy contribute to the crisis in the region? Second, can energy be wielded as a ‘weapon’ by Russia, the EU, or the US? We find that Russian gas pricing played a crucial role as a context factor in igniting the Ukrainian crisis, yet at the same time we guard against ‘energy reductionism’, that is, the fallacy of attributing all events to energy-related issues. We also note that there are strict limits to the so-called energy weapon, whoever employs it. In the conclusion we provide a discussion of the policy implications of these findings

Ensuring Energy Security in Europe: The EU between a Market-based and a Geopolitical Approach. EU Diplomacy Paper 03/2013

The question of energy security of the European Union (EU) has come high on the European political agenda since the mid-2000s as developments in the international energy sector have increasingly been perceived as a threat by the EU institutions and by the Member State governments. The externalisation of the EU’s internal energy market has in that context been presented as a means to ensure energy security. This approach, which can be called ‘post-modern’ with reference to Robert Cooper’s division of the world into different ‘ages’,1 however, shows insufficiencies in terms of energy security as a number of EU energy partners belonging to the ‘modern’ world do not accept to play the same rules. This consequently poses the questions of the relevance of the market-based approach and of the need for alternative solutions. This paper therefore argues that the market-based approach, based on the liberalisation of the European energy market, needs to be complemented by a geopolitical approach to ensure the security of the EU’s energy supplies. Such a geopolitical approach, however, still faces important challenges

EU-Russia energy diplomacy: The need for an active strategic partnership. EU Diplomacy Paper 4/2012, July 2012

This paper explains the conflictive and cooperative elements of energy diplomacy between the European Union (EU) and Russia. It argues that interdependence forms the underlying principle of this relationship and creates both sensitivity and vulnerability for the interdependent parties, thus carrying the sperms of both conflict and cooperation. Both sides would be negatively affected by the other side’s noncooperation within the current policy framework and the prevailing mistrust and recurring tensions can be explained by this sensitivity. However, even if both sides’ policies were adjusted, vulnerability interdependence would still prevent them from seriously reducing their energy cooperation. It is necessary then to see how EU and Russian energy diplomacy can converge and how their strategic energy partnership can be cemented

European Energy Security: What Should It Mean? What to Do? ESF Working Paper, No. 23, 30 October 2006

[From the Introduction]. • Is energy a strategic good? If it is, to what extent does it make sense to deny the extraction of political leverage from energy policy? In criticising Russian energy policy, are we not protesting too much against the fact that Russia (as others) is using energy for political ends – instead of criticising, as we should, the content of Russia’s policy? And if energy is strategic, should a European Union energy policy be primarily about the liberalisation of the energy market? • Is claiming reciprocity always smart? After all, do we really want Russian firms to control both the downstream as well as the upstream elements of the EU’s energy supply chain, in exchange for access by EU firms to Russian energy production and transport? • Should it really be EU policy to help Turkey to make full use of its potential as a major energy hub? After all, half of Russia’s oil exports already pass through the Bosporus, creating a major risk if that very vulnerable route were to be cut

Russian gas imports in Europe: how does Gazprom reliability change the game?.

Europe’s dependence on Russian gas imports has been the subject of increasing political concern after gas conflicts between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 and 2009. This paper assesses the potential impact of Russian unreliability on the European gas market, and how it affects European gas import strategy. We also study to what extent Europe should invest in strategic gas storage capacity to mitigate the effects of possible Russian unreliability. The European gas import market is described by differentiated competition between Russia and a – more reliable – competitive fringe of other exporters. The results show that Russian contract volumes and prices decline significantly as a function of unreliability, so that not only Europe but also Russia suffers if Russia’s unreliability increases. For Europe, buying gas from more reliable suppliers at a price premium turns out to be generally more attractive than building strategic gas storage capacity.

Competing Dimensions of Energy Security: An International Perspective

How well are industrialized nations doing in terms of their energy security? Without a standardized set of metrics, it is difficult to determine the extent that countries are properly responding to the emerging energy security challenges related to climate change, growing dependence on fossil fuels, population growth and economic development. In response, we propose the creation of an Energy Security Index to inform policymakers, investors and analysts about the status of energy conditions. Using the United States and 21 other member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as an example, and looking at energy security from 1970 to 2007, our index shows that only four countries¡ªBelgium, Denmark, Japan, and the United Kingdom¡ªhave made progress on multiple dimensions of the energy security problem. The remaining 18 have either made no improvement or are less secure. To make this argument, the first section of the article surveys the scholarly literature on energy security from 2003 to 2008 and argues that an index should address accessibility, affordability, efficiency, and environmental stewardship. Because each of these four components is multidimensional, the second section discusses ten metrics that comprise an Energy Security Index: oil import dependence, percentage of alternative transport fuels, on-road fuel economy for passenger vehicles, energy intensity, natural gas import dependence, electricity prices, gasoline prices, sulfur dioxide emissions, and carbon dioxide emissions. The third section analyzes the relative performance of four countries: Denmark (the top performer), Japan (which performed well), the United States (which performed poorly), and Spain (the worst performer). The article concludes by offering implications for policy. Conflicts between energy security criteria mean that advancement along any one dimension can undermine progress on another dimension. By focusing on a 10-point index, public policy can better illuminate such tradeoffs and can identify compensating policies

Energy policies and risks on energy markets; a cost-benefit analysis

The key question dealt with in this report is whether and how governments should be involved in taking measures regarding security of energy supply. In order to answer this question, we developed a framework for cost-benefit analysis and applied this framework to a number of policy options. Read also the press release and accompanying�document ' Increasing the reliability of electricity production: a cost-benefit analysis '. The options chosen vary from government investments in strategic oil stocks to financial incentives for consumers to reduce their consumption of electricity. The set of options comprises several types of governmental action, including subsidies, regulation and government investments. Moreover, the selection includes measures meant to address risks on all three major energy markets: oil, natural gas, and electricity. The general picture following from the cases studied is that security of supply measures are hardly ever beneficial to welfare: benefits of policy measures do generally not outweigh costs. From an economic point of view, therefore, it would be often wiser to accept consequences of supply disruptions than to pursue security of supply at any cost. This implies that governments should exercise caution in imposing measures regarding security of supply. If serious market failure is detected, careful attention should be paid to the design of the corrective measure. Establishing and maintaining well-functioning markets appears to be an efficient approach in realising a secure supply of energy. That approach would include removal of entry barriers, securing equal access to essential facilities and increasing transparency of markets.