243 research outputs found

    How Well Do Doodle Polls Do?

    Get PDF
    Web-based Doodle polls, where respondents indicate their availability for a collection of times provided by the poll initiator, are an increasingly common way of selecting a time for an event or meeting. Yet group dynamics can markedly influence an individual’s response, and thus the overall solution quality. Via theoretical worst-case analysis, we analyze certain common behaviors of Doodle poll respondents, including when participants are either more generous with or more protective of their time, showing that deviating from one’s “true availability” can have a substantial impact on the overall quality of the selected time. We show perhaps counter-intuitively that being more generous with your time can lead to inferior time slots being selected, and being more protective of your time can lead to superior time slots being selected. We also bound the improvement and degradation of outcome quality under both types of behaviors

    Heuristics in Multi-Winner Approval Voting

    Full text link
    In many real world situations, collective decisions are made using voting. Moreover, scenarios such as committee or board elections require voting rules that return multiple winners. In multi-winner approval voting (AV), an agent may vote for as many candidates as they wish. Winners are chosen by tallying up the votes and choosing the top-kk candidates receiving the most votes. An agent may manipulate the vote to achieve a better outcome by voting in a way that does not reflect their true preferences. In complex and uncertain situations, agents may use heuristics to strategize, instead of incurring the additional effort required to compute the manipulation which most favors them. In this paper, we examine voting behavior in multi-winner approval voting scenarios with complete information. We show that people generally manipulate their vote to obtain a better outcome, but often do not identify the optimal manipulation. Instead, voters tend to prioritize the candidates with the highest utilities. Using simulations, we demonstrate the effectiveness of these heuristics in situations where agents only have access to partial information

    The Influence of Early Respondents: Information Cascade Effects in Online Event Scheduling

    Full text link
    Sequential group decision-making processes, such as online event scheduling, can be subject to social influence if the decisions involve individuals’ subjective preferences and values. Indeed, prior work has shown that scheduling polls that allow respondents to see others’ answers are more likely to succeed than polls that hide other responses, suggesting the impact of social influence and coordination. In this paper, we investigate whether this difference is due to information cascade effects in which later respondents adopt the decisions of earlier respondents. Analyzing more than 1.3 million Doodle polls, we found evidence that cascading effects take place during event scheduling, and in particular, that early respondents have a larger influence on the outcome of a poll than people who come late. Drawing on simulations of an event scheduling model, we compare possible interventions to mitigate this bias and show that we can optimize the success of polls by hiding the responses of a small percentage of low availability respondents.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/134703/1/Romero et al 2017 (WSDM).pd

    Reaching Consensus Under a Deadline

    Full text link
    Committee decisions are complicated by a deadline, e.g., the next start of a budget, or the beginning of a semester. In committee hiring decisions, it may be that if no candidate is supported by a strong majority, the default is to hire no one - an option that may cost dearly. As a result, committee members might prefer to agree on a reasonable, if not necessarily the best, candidate, to avoid unfilled positions. In this paper, we propose a model for the above scenario - Consensus Under a Deadline (CUD)- based on a time-bounded iterative voting process. We provide convergence guarantees and an analysis of the quality of the final decision. An extensive experimental study demonstrates more subtle features of CUDs, e.g., the difference between two simple types of committee member behavior, lazy vs.~proactive voters. Finally, a user study examines the differences between the behavior of rational voting bots and real voters, concluding that it may often be best to have bots play on the voters' behalf

    A Local-Dominance Theory of Voting Equilibria

    Full text link
    It is well known that no reasonable voting rule is strategyproof. Moreover, the common Plurality rule is particularly prone to strategic behavior of the voters and empirical studies show that people often vote strategically in practice. Multiple game-theoretic models have been proposed to better understand and predict such behavior and the outcomes it induces. However, these models often make unrealistic assumptions regarding voters' behavior and the information on which they base their vote. We suggest a new model for strategic voting that takes into account voters' bounded rationality, as well as their limited access to reliable information. We introduce a simple behavioral heuristic based on \emph{local dominance}, where each voter considers a set of possible world states without assigning probabilities to them. This set is constructed based on prospective candidates' scores (e.g., available from an inaccurate poll). In a \emph{voting equilibrium}, all voters vote for candidates not dominated within the set of possible states. We prove that these voting equilibria exist in the Plurality rule for a broad class of local dominance relations (that is, different ways to decide which states are possible). Furthermore, we show that in an iterative setting where voters may repeatedly change their vote, local dominance-based dynamics quickly converge to an equilibrium if voters start from the truthful state. Weaker convergence guarantees in more general settings are also provided. Using extensive simulations of strategic voting on generated and real preference profiles, we show that convergence is fast and robust, that emerging equilibria are consistent across various starting conditions, and that they replicate widely known patterns of human voting behavior such as Duverger's law. Further, strategic voting generally improves the quality of the winner compared to truthful voting

    Doodle: an innovative tool for organizing group tutorials in University education

    Full text link
    [EN] Group tutorials are becoming an ever-increasing learning methodology in University education due to the continuous knowledge feedback among students. Despite the positive impact of such kind of sessions on students, their previous organization phase remains most of the times misleading. The traditional way of arranging a group tutorial through e-mail normally results in a long and ineffective method mainly caused by the different schedule availability between the professor and the different students. Is in this context where Doodle arises as a virtual application to enhance this first group tutorial phase. Generally, Doodle allows users to schedule meetings in a quick, effective and free way: the organizer creates a new meeting, proposes different schedule options and invites the other participants through an e-mail invitation or a link created by Doodle. Then, participants vote for the schedule options that best fit their availability, so that the final meeting schedule is selected democratically. In the University context, professors would play the role of organizers and students of participants, respectively. In this paper, we analyze the application of Doodle in the organization of a group tutorial of students of Electrical Circuits from the Bachelor Degree in Electrical Engineering (Polytechnic University of Valencia). Particularly, the tutorial was formed by six students and the professor, and took place in the Department of Electrical Engineering. After the meeting, the students answered a survey. Their answers reveled the positive acceptance of Doodle among them in terms of efficiency and ease of use. 100% of them agree on its suitability for arranging future group tutorials. Moreover, a comparative study demonstrated that using Doodle instead of e-mail while arranging a group tutorial leads to an average of up to 64% reduction in process time.This work was supported in part by the regional public administration of Valencia under the grant ACIF/2018/106.Bastida Molina, P.; Vargas Salgado, CA.; Montuori, L.; Alcázar Ortega, M. (2021). Doodle: an innovative tool for organizing group tutorials in University education. En Proceedings INNODOCT/20. International Conference on Innovation, Documentation and Education. Editorial Universitat Politècnica de València. 185-193. https://doi.org/10.4995/INN2020.2020.11883OCS18519

    Strategic Voting and Social Networks

    Get PDF
    With the ever increasing ubiquity of social networks in our everyday lives, comes an increasing urgency for us to understand their impact on human behavior. Social networks quantify the ways in which we communicate with each other, and therefore shape the flow of information through the community. It is this same flow of information that we utilize to make sound, strategic decisions. This thesis focuses on one particular type of decisions: voting. When a community engages in voting, it is soliciting the opinions of its members, who present it in the form of a ballot. The community may then choose a course of action based on the submitted ballots. Individual voters, however, are under no obligation to submit sincere ballots that accurately reflects their opinions; they may instead submit a strategic ballot in hopes of affecting the election's outcome to their advantage. This thesis examines the interplay between social network structure and strategic voting behavior. In particular, we will explore how social network structure affects the flow of information through a population, and thereby affect the strategic behavior of voters, and ultimately, the outcomes of elections. We will begin by considering how network structure affects information propagation. This work builds upon the rich body of literature called opinion dynamics by proposing a model for skeptical agents --- agents that distrust other agents for holding opinions that differ too wildly from their own. We show that network structure is one of several factors that affects the degree of penetration that radical opinions can achieve through the community. Next, we propose a model for strategic voting in social networks, where voters are self-interested and rational, but may only use the limited information available through their social network contacts to formulate strategic ballots. In particular, we study the ``Echo Chamber Effect'', the tendency for humans to favor connections with similar people, and show that it leads to the election of less suitable candidates. We also extend this voter model by using boundedly-rational heuristics to scale up our simulations to larger populations. We propose a general framework for voting agents embedded in social networks, and show that our heuristic models can demonstrate a variation of the ``Micromega Law'' which relates the popularity of smaller parties to the size of the population. Finally, we examine another avenue for strategic behavior: choosing when to cast your vote. We propose a type of voting mechanism called ``Sticker Voting'', where voters cast ballots by placing stickers on their favored alternatives, thereby publicly and irrevocably declaring their support. We present a complete analysis of several simple instances of the Sticker Voting game and discuss how our results reflect human voting behavior

    Convergence of Multi-Issue Iterative Voting under Uncertainty

    Full text link
    We study the effect of strategic behavior in iterative voting for multiple issues under uncertainty. We introduce a model synthesizing simultaneous multi-issue voting with Meir, Lev, and Rosenschein (2014)'s local dominance theory and determine its convergence properties. After demonstrating that local dominance improvement dynamics may fail to converge, we present two sufficient model refinements that guarantee convergence from any initial vote profile for binary issues: constraining agents to have O-legal preferences and endowing agents with less uncertainty about issues they are modifying than others. Our empirical studies demonstrate that although cycles are common when agents have no uncertainty, introducing uncertainty makes convergence almost guaranteed in practice.Comment: 19 pages, 4 figure

    Bots as Virtual Confederates: Design and Ethics

    Full text link
    The use of bots as virtual confederates in online field experiments holds extreme promise as a new methodological tool in computational social science. However, this potential tool comes with inherent ethical challenges. Informed consent can be difficult to obtain in many cases, and the use of confederates necessarily implies the use of deception. In this work we outline a design space for bots as virtual confederates, and we propose a set of guidelines for meeting the status quo for ethical experimentation. We draw upon examples from prior work in the CSCW community and the broader social science literature for illustration. While a handful of prior researchers have used bots in online experimentation, our work is meant to inspire future work in this area and raise awareness of the associated ethical issues.Comment: Forthcoming in CSCW 201
    • …
    corecore