Revenue Sharing, Demand Uncertainty, and Vertical Control of Competing Firms

This paper argues that revenue sharing is a valuable instrument in vertically separated industries when there is intrabrand competition among the downstream firms, demand is stochastic or variable, and downstream inventory is chosen before demand is realized. In these environments, the upstream firm would like to simultaneously soften downstream competition and encourage efficient inventory holding. Traditional two-part tariffs cannot achieve both objectives in the presence of downstream competition. Raising the price of the inputs softens price competition but distorts the downstream firms' inventory decisions. We argue that revenue sharing, combined with a low input price, aligns the incentives in the vertical chain. The use of revenue sharing in video rental retailing is discussed. Blockbuster in particular has used revenue sharing in conjunction with heavy marketing of availability to grow significantly in the video rental retail industry. Many other outlets use revenue sharing as well. Some antitrust concerns have been raised by smaller firms suggesting that revenue sharing might be an anticompetitive vertical restraint. Although our model does not address retailer market power, we show that revenue sharing contracts can be used by upstream firms increase inventory holding and consumer welfare.

ARE INVENTORIES A BUFFER AGAINST WEAK LEGAL SYSTEMS?

Weak enforcement of contracts leads to inefficient breach of contract and to an overall increase of contract breaches for firms and individuals. Existing literature on contract enforcement has focussed on self-enforcing contracts and contracts within a relationship, family or clan. At the firm level the focus is on ownership structures and vertical integration. Here, we suggest that firms use inventory holdings as a means to counteract weak contract enforcement. We test the hypothesis that firms operating in weak legal environments have a higher ratio of inventories to net sales than firms operating in strong legal environments. We present a conceptual model and empirical evidence in support of the hypothesis using data from over three hundred firms from fourteen product groups across thirty nine countries.

CAPTIVE SUPPLY TRENDS AND IMPACTS SINCE THE ADVENT OF MANDATORY PRICE REPORTING

Captive supplies have been a contentious issue in the livestock industry for fifteen years and the subject of both theoretical and empirical research. In 2001, mandatory price reporting was implemented. One objective by its proponents was to increase the amount of information available on captive supplies. This paper examines data now available as a result of mandatory price reporting to determine what additional information is available compared to previously. Second, several models were specified and estimated to determine the impacts captive supplies had on fed cattle prices in the two years following implementation of mandatory price reporting. Models showed mixed results. There was a consistent negative effect on cash market prices from formula priced trades; generally a positive impact from negotiated trades and packer owned trades on cash market prices; and mixed but often a positive impact from forward contract trades on cash market prices.Livestock Production/Industries, Marketing,

LOGISTICAL STRATEGIES AND RISKS IN CANADIAN GRAIN MARKETING

Supply chain management in grain marketing has become very important with the maturity of the industry. This is particularly important in the Canadian grain marketing system which has experienced disruptions for various reasons over many years. These problems have been the topic of numerous industry evaluations, have resulted in a complaint about service obligations and recently have been addressed by the Estey Commission. A detailed model of the supply chain in the Canadian grain logistics system was developed in this paper to evaluate factors that cause disruptions, as well as the effect of several important logistics and marketing strategies on system performance. The results indicated that in a normal year there is sufficient randomness throughout the various elements of the system that it is expected that demurrage at the West Coast would be a major cost. However, the amount of service disruptions and demurrage are affected by several important factors including the distribution of tough and damp grains, mis-graded grain, and the level of exportable supplies. There are several important strategic variables that have important effects on system performance. These include the aggressiveness in selling relative to capacity, and the level of beginning port stocks.Grain Marketing, Transportation, Supply Chain Management, Logistics, Marketing,

Strategic Inventories in a Supply Chain with Vertical Control and Downstream Cournot Competition

Strategic Inventory (SI) has been an area of increased interest in theoretical supply chain literature recently. Most of the work so far however, has only considered a supply chain without downstream competition between retailers. Competition is ubiquitous in most market situations, hence, interactions between SI and retailer competition merits study as a first step in bringing the conversations and insights from this stream of literature to the real world. We present here a two-period and a three-period model of one manufacturer supplying an identical product to two retailers who form a Cournot duopoly. We also study a Commitment contract, where the manufacturer commits to all the selling seasons’ wholesale prices at the beginning of the 1st period. Commitment contracts have been shown previously to eliminate SI carriage over two selling seasons in the absence of retailer competition. We aim to deduce if this type of contract has the same effect in the presence of downstream competition. We determine closed-form Nash Equilibrium decision variable values for each of these models using game-theoretic modeling, a price-dependent linear demand function, and backward induction. We find that, the introduction of downstream Cournot duopoly competition leads to lower profits for both the manufacturer and retailer. This holds, whether the number of selling season is two or three. Consumer Surplus is also uniformly lower under retailer competition, compared to a downstream monopoly supply chain. When we try to deduce the effect of SI carriage under Cournot duopoly competition, by comparing an SC with Cournot duopoly competition and SI allowed between periods, to a similar SC with a Cournot duopoly downstream and a static, repeating, one-shot game in each period, with no SI carried – we find again that manufacturer and retailer profits are both lower when SI carriage is allowed. This holds whether the number of selling seasons is two or three. Consumer Surplus is also lower uniformly over both two and three selling seasons. Under a Commitment contract, over two selling seasons, the manufacturer ends up with an advantage, making a higher profit with downstream retailer competition, than compared to supplying to a monopoly downstream under the same contract. The retailers, while competing as a Cournot duopoly, are not able to use the relative advantage that comes from a Commitment contract to make a higher profit, as they are, when the downstream is a single retailer monopoly. The consumer also is disadvantaged by the introduction of downstream Cournot competition under a Commitment contract. When we compare a manufacturer supplying to a Cournot duopoly downstream of retailers, with, and without a Commitment contract (dynamic ordering), we see that the manufacturer and consumer benefit under a Commitment contract, making higher profits, but the retailer is at a disadvantage. It would be an interesting extension of this work to generalize the results from two and three selling seasons, presented here, to the “n” period case. It would also be benefi-cial to run empirical studies in real-world supply chains to validate if and to what extent the insights developed by this kind of game-theoretic modeling hold in a real-world supply chain setting. Development of contracts that are more effective than a Commitment con-tract in coordinating this supply chain would be another possible area for further research

Catalonian pork value chain’s resilience: ready for environmental challenge?

The hog production model in Catalonia (Spain) has been, until recently, an example of success. Inventories and production have been increasing substantially and the sector has proven to have great export potential. Also, the Catalonian hog model has allowed the survival of crops and fruits’ small farms, through diversification with pork. Part of this success is based on the organizational system of the value chain or, as we call, “governance instruments” of the value chain. These “governance instruments” are, on one hand, contract relationships between agribusiness firms (specially, in feed sector) and farms and, on the other, a Marketing Board to fix pig prices (Mercolleida). However, recently, there have been some tensions in hog production model in Catalonia. The tensions are related with the tradeoff between requirements of international competitiveness and the implementation of new regulations in the sector. Specifically, new environmental regulation entails a great challenge to the resilience of the pork value chain in Catalonia.hog production model, pork value chain, governance, Critical Success Factor analysis, environmental regulations., Agricultural and Food Policy,

Nominal Contracting and Price Flexibility in Product Markets

The search for microeconomic foundations of non-Walrasian outcomes in labor and product markets has spawned many studies of contracting. This paper emphasizes the role of contracts for market equilibrium -- for many raw materials and basic industrial commodities -- in which long-term contractual arrangements and spot markets coexist. Our principal goals are two -- (i) to explain the existence of contracts and the equilibrium fraction of trades carried out under contract, and (ii) to consider the impact of demand and supply shocks on spot prices when market trades also take place through long-term contracts. We find that the relative importance of contracting depends on, inter alia, the variance of the spot price and the sources of underlying fluctuations. Consistent with the findings of previous macroeconomic studies, we find that contracting and price rigidity are more likely the more important demand shocks are relative to supply shocks. We adapt our static model of contract price and quantity determination to discuss the adjustment of contract prices. Finally, we discuss three important applications of our multiple-price modeling structure -- to (i) analyses of the effects of changes in vertical market structure on market equilibrium in commodity markets (with specific reference to petroleum and copper), (ii) models of the optimal degree of contract indexation,and (iii) aggregate studies of "sticky prices" in macroeconomics.

Inventory drivers in a pharmaceutical supply chain

In recent years, inventory reduction has been a key objective of pharmaceutical companies, especially within cost optimization initiatives. Pharmaceutical supply chains are characterized by volatile and unpredictable demands –especially in emergent markets-, high service levels, and complex, perishable finished-good portfolios, which makes keeping reasonable amounts of stock a true challenge. However, a one-way strategy towards zero-inventory is in reality inapplicable, due to the strategic nature and importance of the products being commercialised. Therefore, pharmaceutical supply chains are in need of new inventory strategies in order to remain competitive. Finished-goods inventory management in the pharmaceutical industry is closely related to the manufacturing systems and supply chain configurations that companies adopt. The factors considered in inventory management policies, however, do not always cover the full supply chain spectrum in which companies operate. This paper works under the pre-assumption that, in fact, there is a complex relationship between the inventory configurations that companies adopt and the factors behind them. The intention of this paper is to understand the factors driving high finished-goods inventory levels in pharmaceutical supply chains and assist supply chain managers in determining which of them can be influenced in order to reduce inventories to an optimal degree. Reasons for reducing inventory levels are found in high inventory holding and scrap related costs; in addition to lost sales for not being able to serve the customers with the adequate shelf life requirements. The thesis conducts a single case study research in a multi-national pharmaceutical company, which is used to examine typical inventory configurations and the factors affecting these configurations. This paper presents a framework that can assist supply chain managers in determining the most important inventory drivers in pharmaceutical supply chains. The findings in this study suggest that while external and downstream supply chain factors are recognized as being critical to pursue inventory optimization initiatives, pharmaceutical companies are oriented towards optimizing production processes and meeting regulatory requirements while still complying with high service levels, being internal factors the ones prevailing when making inventory management decisions. Furthermore, this paper investigates, through predictive modelling techniques, how various intrinsic and extrinsic factors influence the inventory configurations of the case study company. The study shows that inventory configurations are relatively unstable over time, especially in configurations that present high safety stock levels; and that production features and product characteristics are important explanatory factors behind high inventory levels. Regulatory requirements also play an important role in explaining the high strategic inventory levels that pharmaceutical companies hold

Strategic Inventory and Supply Chain Behavior

Based on a serial supply chain model with 2-periods and price-sensitive demand, we present the first experimental test of the effect of strategic inventories on supply chain performance. In theory, if holding costs are low enough, the buyer builds up a strategic inventory (even if no operational reasons for stock-holding exist) to limit the supplier\u27s market power, to increase the own profit share, and to enhance the overall supply chain performance. The supplier anticipates the effect of the strategic inventory and differentiates prices to capture a part of the increased supply chain profits. Our results show that the positive effects of strategic inventories are even more pronounced than theoretically predicted, because strategic inventories empower buyers to reduce payoff inequalities and suppliers exhibit a willingness to reduce inequalities as long as their payoff remains above a certain threshold. Overall, strategic inventories have a double positive effect, a strategic and a behavioral, both reducing the average wholesale prices and damping the double marginalization effect and the latter leading to more equitable payoffs