5,511 research outputs found

    Self-love and sociability: the ‘rudiments of commerce’ in the state of nature

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    Istvan Hont’s classic work on the theoretical links between the seventeenth-century natural jurists Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf and the eighteenth-century Scottish political economists remains a popular trope among intellectual and economic historians of various stamps. Despite this, a common criticism levelled at Hont remains his relative lack of engagement with the relationship between religion and economics in the early modern period. This paper challenges this aspect of Hont’s narrative by drawing attention to an alternative, albeit complementary, assessment of the natural jurisprudential heritage of eighteenth-century British political economy. Specifically, the article attempts to map on to Hont’s thesis the Christian Stoic interpretation of Grotius and Pufendorf which has gained greater currency in recent years. In doing so, the paper argues that Grotius and Pufendorf’s contributions to the ‘unsocial sociability’ debate do not necessarily lead directly to the Scottish school of political economists, as is commonly assumed. Instead, it contends that a reconsideration of Grotius and Pufendorf as neo-Stoic theorists, particularly via scrutiny of their respective adaptations of the traditional Stoic theory of oikeiosis, steers us towards the heart of the early English ‘clerical’ Enlightenment

    Value Commitment, Resolute Choice, and the Normative Foundations of Behavioural Welfare Economics

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    Given the endowment effect, the role of attention in decision-making, and the framing effect, most behavioral economists agree that it would be a mistake to accept the satisfaction of revealed preferences as the normative criterion of choice. Some have suggested that what makes agents better off is not the satisfaction of revealed preferences, but ‘true’ preferences, which may not always be observed through choice. While such preferences may appear to be an improvement over revealed preferences, some philosophers of economics have argued that they face insurmountable epistemological, normative, and methodological challenges. This article introduces a new kind of true preference – values-based preferences – that blunts these challenges. Agents express values-based preferences when they choose in a manner that is compatible with a consumption plan grounded in a value commitment that is normative, affective, and stable for the agent who has one. Agents who choose according to their plans are resolute choosers. My claim is that while values-based preferences do not apply to every choice situation, this kind of preference provides a rigorous way for thinking about classic choice situations that have long interested behavioral economists and philosophers of economics, such as ‘Joe-in-the-cafeteria.

    Cynic cosmopolitanism

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    Recently, British Prime Minister Theresa May made a bold anti-cosmopolitan claim: 'If you believe you are a citizen of the world, you are a citizen of nowhere. You don't understand what citizenship means'. Given that many have never found nationalism particularly appealing, some have been moved to become citizens of the world after hearing these lines. But how is one to become a cosmopolitan? The answer is found in the history of philosophy. Cosmopolitanism has taken many forms. There are moral, political, legal, economic and cultural cosmopolitanisms. A form that has not received much attention is therapeutic cosmopolitanism. The focus of this form is on how being a world-citizen entails certain health benefits. I argue that therapeutic cosmopolitanism is both the original and best way of being a world-citizen. To do so, I summarize the present taxonomy of cosmopolitanisms and show how therapeutic cosmopolitanism contrasts with these options. I use classical Cynicism as the primary example of therapeutic cosmopolitanism. Instead of the universalist humanism and supranational communitarianism that characterizes cosmopolitan options, Cynic cosmopolitanism employs extreme naturalism. I show how being a Cynic cosmopolitan is the preferable way of rejecting nationalists of all stripes

    Lucretius' arguments on the swerve and free-action

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    In his version of atomism, Lucretius made explicit reference to the concept of an intrinsic declination of the atom, the atomic swerve (clinamen in Latin), stressing that the time and space of the infinitesimal atomic vibration is uncertain. The topic of this article is the Epicurean and Lucretian arguments in favour of the swerve. Our exposition of the Lucretian model of the atomic clinamen will present and elucidate the respective considerations on the alleged role of the swerve in the generation of free-action

    Why a Virtual Assistant for Moral Enhancement When We Could have a Socrates?

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    This article was written as a part of the research project Digital Ethics. Moral Enhancement through an Interactive Use of Artificial Intelligence (PID2019-104943RB-I00), funded by the State Research Agency of the Spanish Government. The author is very grateful for the helpful suggestions and comments given on earlier versions of this paper by Jon Rueda, Juan Ignacio del Valle, Blanca Rodriguez, Miguel Moreno and Jan Deckers.Can Artificial Intelligence (AI) be more effective than human instruction for the moral enhancement of people? The author argues that it only would be if the use of this technology were aimed at increasing the individual’s capacity to reflectively decide for themselves, rather than at directly influencing behaviour. To support this, it is shown how a disregard for personal autonomy, in particular, invalidates the main proposals for applying new technologies, both biomedical and AI-based, to moral enhancement. As an alternative to these proposals, this article proposes a virtual assistant that, through dialogue, neutrality and virtual reality technologies, can teach users to make better moral decisions on their own. The author concludes that, as long as certain precautions are taken in its design, such an assistant could do this better than a human instructor adopting the same educational methodology.State Research Agency of the Spanish Government PID2019-104943RB-I0

    Epicurean Justice and Law

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    This dissertation concerns a cluster of related issues surrounding the Epicurean conception of justice. First, I show that the Epicureans defend a sophisticated kind of social contract theory and maintain a kind of legal positivism, views that are widely held today and so are of continuing interest for contemporary readers. In doing so, I argue that thinking about justice and law forms an integral part of Epicurean philosophy (pace the standard view). Second, I take up some neglected issues regarding justice and so provide detailed accounts of the metaphysics of moral properties in Epicureanism as well as of Epicurean moral epistemology. After the introduction in chapter 1, I set out the main features of the Epicurean view of justice and law in chapters 2-4. In chapter 2, I explain the basics of the Epicurean conception of justice as an agreement and relate it to Epicurean ethics as whole. In chapter 3, I examine Epicurean culture stories and I point out in what way the Epicurean view is a kind of social contract theory. In chapter 4, I argue that the most important aspect of the Epicurean conception of justice from a metaethical perspective is that justice, a moral fact, depends on benefit, a natural fact about the world. On the basis of this analysis, I subsequently argue that the Epicurean conception of the law is best understood as a kind of inclusive positivism. After having laid out the Epicurean view in this way, I enlarge the conversation in chapters 5-7. In chapter 5, I discuss the motivations Epicurean agents have to be just and comment on the relationship between contractual justice, that is, justice that comes about by agreements, and aretetic justice, that is, justice understood as a virtue or character disposition. In chapter 6, I turn to the metaphysics of justice, arguing that the just, for the Epicureans, is an accidental property. In chapter 7, finally, I show that Epicurean agents come to have an understanding of justice via sense experience in the same way that they have an understanding of everyday objects

    Epicurean Justice and Law

    Get PDF
    This dissertation concerns a cluster of related issues surrounding the Epicurean conception of justice. First, I show that the Epicureans defend a sophisticated kind of social contract theory and maintain a kind of legal positivism, views that are widely held today and so are of continuing interest for contemporary readers. In doing so, I argue that thinking about justice and law forms an integral part of Epicurean philosophy (pace the standard view). Second, I take up some neglected issues regarding justice and so provide detailed accounts of the metaphysics of moral properties in Epicureanism as well as of Epicurean moral epistemology. After the introduction in chapter 1, I set out the main features of the Epicurean view of justice and law in chapters 2-4. In chapter 2, I explain the basics of the Epicurean conception of justice as an agreement and relate it to Epicurean ethics as whole. In chapter 3, I examine Epicurean culture stories and I point out in what way the Epicurean view is a kind of social contract theory. In chapter 4, I argue that the most important aspect of the Epicurean conception of justice from a metaethical perspective is that justice, a moral fact, depends on benefit, a natural fact about the world. On the basis of this analysis, I subsequently argue that the Epicurean conception of the law is best understood as a kind of inclusive positivism. After having laid out the Epicurean view in this way, I enlarge the conversation in chapters 5-7. In chapter 5, I discuss the motivations Epicurean agents have to be just and comment on the relationship between contractual justice, that is, justice that comes about by agreements, and aretetic justice, that is, justice understood as a virtue or character disposition. In chapter 6, I turn to the metaphysics of justice, arguing that the just, for the Epicureans, is an accidental property. In chapter 7, finally, I show that Epicurean agents come to have an understanding of justice via sense experience in the same way that they have an understanding of everyday objects

    Summer 2017 Full Issue

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    Artificial moral advisors:A new perspective from moral psychology

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