Folk teleology drives persistence judgments

Two separate research programs have revealed two different factors that feature in our judgments of whether some entity persists. One program—inspired by Knobe—has found that normative considerations affect persistence judgments. For instance, people are more inclined to view a thing as persisting when the changes it undergoes lead to improvements. The other program—inspired by Kelemen—has found that teleological considerations affect persistence judgments. For instance, people are more inclined to view a thing as persisting when it preserves its purpose. Our goal in this paper is to determine what causes persistence judgments. Across four studies, we pit normative considerations against teleological considerations. And using causal modeling procedures, we find a consistent, robust pattern with teleological and not normative considerations directly causing persistence judgments. Our findings put teleology in the driver’s seat, while at the same time shedding further light on our folk notion of an object

Using the theory of planned behaviour as a process evaluation tool in randomised trials of knowledge translation strategies : A case study from UK primary care

Peer reviewedPublisher PD

Use of mental simulations to change theory of planned behaviour variables

Objectives. The predictive validity of the theory of planned behaviour iswell established, but much less is known about: (a) whether there are causal relationships between key components of the model and (b) how to go about changing the theory of planned behaviour variables. This study tested the ability of outcome and process simulations to change variables specified in the theory of planned behaviour in relation to blood donation. Design. Participants (N ¼ 146) were randomized to one of four conditions: outcome simulation only, process simulation only, process-plus-outcome simulation and a distractor control condition. The dependent variables were state anxiety, and intention attitude, subjective norm and perceived control from the theory of planned behaviour. Methods. Participants were asked to empty their mind and visualize themselves: (a) after donating blood (outcome manipulation), (b) preparing to donate blood (process manipulation), (c) both preparing to donate blood and after having donated blood (process-plus-outcome manipulation) or (d) both preparing to get a high mark and after having got a high mark on their course (control condition). Following mental rehearsal, participants completed the dependent variables. Results. There were no main effects of outcome simulation, but process simulation successfully increased intention, subjective norm and perceived control. There was also a significant outcome simulation x process simulation interaction for attitude. The effect of the process manipulation on intention was mediated by subjective norm and perceived control. Conclusions. The findings show promise for the use of mental simulations in changing cognitions and further research is required to extend the present findings to other health behaviours.</p

Oppressive Things

In analyzing oppressive systems like racism, social theorists have articulated accounts of the dynamic interaction and mutual dependence between psychological components, such as individuals’ patterns of thought and action, and social components, such as formal institutions and informal interactions. We argue for the further inclusion of physical components, such as material artifacts and spatial environments. Drawing on socially situated and ecologically embedded approaches in the cognitive sciences, we argue that physical components of racism are not only shaped by, but also shape psychological and social components of racism. Indeed, while our initial focus is on racism and racist things, we contend that our framework is also applicable to other oppressive systems, including sexism, classism, and ableism. This is because racist things are part of a broader class of oppressive things, which are material artifacts and spatial environments that are in congruence with an oppressive system

Psychiatry beyond the brain: externalism, mental health, and autistic spectrum disorder

Externalist theories hold that a comprehensive understanding of mental disorder cannot be achieved unless we attend to factors that lie outside of the head: neural explanations alone will not fully capture the complex dependencies that exist between an individual’s psychiatric condition and her social, cultural, and material environment. Here, we firstly offer a taxonomy of ways in which the externalist viewpoint can be understood, and unpack its commitments concerning the nature and physical realization of mental disorder. Secondly, we apply a strongly externalist approach to the case of Autistic Spectrum Disorder, and argue that this condition can be illuminated by appeal to the hypothesis of extended cognition. We conclude by briefly considering the significance this strongly externalist approach may have for psychiatric practice and pedagogy

Folk intuitions of Actual Causation: A Two-Pronged Debunking Explanation

How do we determine whether some candidate causal factor is an actual cause of some particular outcome? Many philosophers have wanted a view of actual causation which fits with folk intuitions of actual causation and those who wish to depart from folk intuitions of actual causation are often charged with the task of providing a plausible account of just how and where the folk have gone wrong. In this paper, I provide a range of empirical evidence aimed at showing just how and where the folk go wrong in determining whether an actual causal relation obtains. The evidence suggests that folk intuitions of actual causation are generated by two epistemically defective processes. I situate the empirical evidence within a background discussion of debunking, arguing for a two-pronged debunking explanation of folk intuitions of actual causation. I conclude that those who wish to depart from folk intuitions of actual causation should not be compelled to square their account of actual causation with the verdicts of the folk. In the dispute over actual causation, folk intuitions deserve to be rejected

Normality: Part Descriptive, part prescriptive

People’s beliefs about normality play an important role in many aspects of cognition and life (e.g., causal cognition, linguistic semantics, cooperative behavior). But how do people determine what sorts of things are normal in the first place? Past research has studied both people’s representations of statistical norms (e.g., the average) and their representations of prescriptive norms (e.g., the ideal). Four studies suggest that people’s notion of normality incorporates both of these types of norms. In particular, people’s representations of what is normal were found to be influenced both by what they believed to be descriptively average and by what they believed to be prescriptively ideal. This is shown across three domains: people’s use of the word ‘‘normal” (Study 1), their use of gradable adjectives (Study 2), and their judgments of concept prototypicality (Study 3). A final study investigated the learning of normality for a novel category, showing that people actively combine statistical and prescriptive information they have learned into an undifferentiated notion of what is normal (Study 4). Taken together, these findings may help to explain how moral norms impact the acquisition of normality and, conversely, how normality impacts the acquisition of moral norms