Precommitment, Transparency and Monetary Policy

Conventional wisdom says that commitment eliminates the inflationary bias of monetary policy. However, this paper shows that the inflation bias can persist even when the central bank commits. A simple model is presented in which the central bank precommits by setting the policy instrument, and the subsequent adjustment of inflation expectations is part of the transmission mechanism. Generally there is still an inflation bias, despite the absence of a time-inconsistency problem. It is caused by uncertainty about the economic disturbances to which the central bank responds. Only perfect transparency about economic information completely eliminates the inflation bias. -- Üblicherweise wird angenommen, dass ein Inflationsbias verschwindet, wenn sich eine Zentralbank glaubwürdig im voraus auf ihre Politik festlegt. Dieses Papier zeigt, dass ein Inflationsbias trotzdem fortbestehen kann. Es wird ein einfaches Modell dargestellt, in dem die Zentralbank im voraus ihre Instrumente festlegt und die anschließende Anpassung der Inflationserwartungen Teil des Transmissionsprozesses ist. Im allgemeinen existiert ein Inflationsbias weiter, obwohl kein Zeitinkonsistenzproblem mehr auftritt. Ursache ist die Unsicherheit über die ökonomischen Störungen, auf die die Zentralbank reagiert. Nur vollkommene Transparenz hinsichtlich der Informationen beseitigt vollständig den Inflationsbias.

Applications of Repeated Games in Wireless Networks: A Survey

A repeated game is an effective tool to model interactions and conflicts for players aiming to achieve their objectives in a long-term basis. Contrary to static noncooperative games that model an interaction among players in only one period, in repeated games, interactions of players repeat for multiple periods; and thus the players become aware of other players' past behaviors and their future benefits, and will adapt their behavior accordingly. In wireless networks, conflicts among wireless nodes can lead to selfish behaviors, resulting in poor network performances and detrimental individual payoffs. In this paper, we survey the applications of repeated games in different wireless networks. The main goal is to demonstrate the use of repeated games to encourage wireless nodes to cooperate, thereby improving network performances and avoiding network disruption due to selfish behaviors. Furthermore, various problems in wireless networks and variations of repeated game models together with the corresponding solutions are discussed in this survey. Finally, we outline some open issues and future research directions.Comment: 32 pages, 15 figures, 5 tables, 168 reference

Social responsibility allocation in two-echelon supply chains: Insights from wholesale price contracts

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is considered in a two-echelon supply chain consisting of an upstream supplier and a downstream firm that are bound by a wholesale price contract. CSR performance (the outcome of CSR conduct) of the whole supply chain is gauged by a global variable and the associated cost of achieving this CSR performance is only incurred by the supplier with an expectation of being shared with the downstream firm via the wholesale price contract. As such, the key issue is to determine who should be allocated as the responsibility holder with the right of offering the contract and how this right should be appropriately restricted. Game-theoretical analyses are carried out on six games, resulting from different interaction schemes between the supplier and the firm, to derive their corresponding equilibriums. Comparative institutional analyses are then conducted to determine the optimal social responsibility allocation based on both economic and CSR performance criteria. Main results are furnished in a series of propositions and their implications to the real-world business practice are discussed. The key findings are threefold: under the current model settings: (1) the optimal allocation scheme is to assign the supplier as the responsibility holder with appropriate restrictions on the corresponding rights to determine the wholesale price; (2) inherent conflict exists between the economic and CSR performance criteria and, hence, the two maxima cannot be achieved simultaneously; and (3) although integrative channel profit is not attainable, the system-wide profit will be improved by implementing optimal social responsibility allocation schemes

Is Congestion Pricing Effective for Traffic Jams?

The complexity of urban congestion requires policy-makers to adopt different congestion control measures that suit the characteristics of the city at the proper time. The paper focuses on the most controversial congestion pricing and offers methods to judge the efficacy of the policy by game theoretic approaches. It is found that congestion pricing is not merely a Pigouvian tax that internalizes drivers’ externalities, but also a powerful means to enhance public traffic proportion and balance road utilization on the premise of maximized social util-ity. Meanwhile, the embedded multiple case study shows that theoretical correctness of the policy is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for its effectiveness because the valid operation of the policy further requires cities to hold certain attributes in some aspects, such as econom-ic level, population density, proper pricing mechanism, and the ability to limit access to and from certain areas. Moreover, the authority should pay attention to matching the policy goal and its functions for successful implementation

Game Theory for Multi-Access Edge Computing:Survey, Use Cases, and Future Trends

Game theory (GT) has been used with significant success to formulate, and either design or optimize, the operation of many representative communications and networking scenarios. The games in these scenarios involve, as usual, diverse players with conflicting goals. This paper primarily surveys the literature that has applied theoretical games to wireless networks, emphasizing use cases of upcoming multiaccess edge computing (MEC). MEC is relatively new and offers cloud services at the network periphery, aiming to reduce service latency backhaul load, and enhance relevant operational aspects such as quality of experience or security. Our presentation of GT is focused on the major challenges imposed by MEC services over the wireless resources. The survey is divided into classical and evolutionary games. Then, our discussion proceeds to more specific aspects which have a considerable impact on the game's usefulness, namely, rational versus evolving strategies, cooperation among players, available game information, the way the game is played (single turn, repeated), the game's model evaluation, and how the model results can be applied for both optimizing resource-constrained resources and balancing diverse tradeoffs in real edge networking scenarios. Finally, we reflect on lessons learned, highlighting future trends and research directions for applying theoretical model games in upcoming MEC services, considering both network design issues and usage scenarios