336,308 research outputs found
Decompositions of two player games: potential, zero-sum, and stable games
We introduce several methods of decomposition for two player normal form
games. Viewing the set of all games as a vector space, we exhibit explicit
orthonormal bases for the subspaces of potential games, zero-sum games, and
their orthogonal complements which we call anti-potential games and
anti-zero-sum games, respectively. Perhaps surprisingly, every anti-potential
game comes either from the Rock-Paper-Scissors type games (in the case of
symmetric games) or from the Matching Pennies type games (in the case of
asymmetric games). Using these decompositions, we prove old (and some new)
cycle criteria for potential and zero-sum games (as orthogonality relations
between subspaces). We illustrate the usefulness of our decomposition by (a)
analyzing the generalized Rock-Paper-Scissors game, (b) completely
characterizing the set of all null-stable games, (c) providing a large class of
strict stable games, (d) relating the game decomposition to the decomposition
of vector fields for the replicator equations, (e) constructing Lyapunov
functions for some replicator dynamics, and (f) constructing Zeeman games
-games with an interior asymptotically stable Nash equilibrium and a pure
strategy ESS
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in Quantum Games
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) in classical game theory is a refinement
of Nash equilibrium concept. We investigate the consequences when a small group
of mutants using quantum strategies try to invade a classical ESS in a
population engaged in symmetric bimatrix game of Prisoner's Dilemma. Secondly
we show that in an asymmetric quantum game between two players an ESS pair can
be made to appear or disappear by resorting to entangled or unentangled initial
states used to play the game even when the strategy pair remains a Nash
equilibrium in both forms of the game.Comment: RevTex,contents extended to include asymmetric games,no figur
Hedonic Games with Graph-restricted Communication
We study hedonic coalition formation games in which cooperation among the
players is restricted by a graph structure: a subset of players can form a
coalition if and only if they are connected in the given graph. We investigate
the complexity of finding stable outcomes in such games, for several notions of
stability. In particular, we provide an efficient algorithm that finds an
individually stable partition for an arbitrary hedonic game on an acyclic
graph. We also introduce a new stability concept -in-neighbor stability- which
is tailored for our setting. We show that the problem of finding an in-neighbor
stable outcome admits a polynomial-time algorithm if the underlying graph is a
path, but is NP-hard for arbitrary trees even for additively separable hedonic
games; for symmetric additively separable games we obtain a PLS-hardness
result
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