Negotiable Auction Based on Mixed Graph: A Novel Spectrum Sharing Framework

© 2015 IEEE. Auction-based spectrum sharing is a promising solution to improve the spectrum utilization in 5G networks. Along with the spatial reuse, we observe that the ability to adjust the coverage of a spectrum bidder can provide room to itself for further negotiation while auctioning. In this paper, we propose a novel economic tool, size-negotiable auction mechanism (SNAM), which provides a hybrid solution between auction and negotiation for multi-buyers sharing spectrum chunks from a common database. Unlike existing auction-based spectrum sharing models, each bidder of the SNAM submits its bid for using the spectrum per unit space and a set of coverage ranges over which the bidder is willing to pay for the spectrum. The auctioneer then coordinates the interference areas (or coverage negotiation) to ensure no two winners interfere with each other while aiming to maximize the auction's total coverage area or revenue. In this scenario, the undirected graph used by existing auction mechanisms fails to model the interference among bidders. Instead, we construct a mixed interference graph and prove that SNAM's auctioning on the mixed graph is truthful and individually rational. Simulation results show that, compared with existing auction approaches, the proposed SNAM dramatically improves the spatial efficiency, hence leads to significantly higher seller revenue and buyer satisfaction under various setups. Thanks to its low complexity and low overhead, SNAM can target fine timescale trading (in minutes or hours) with a large number of bidders and requested coverages

ECONOMIC APPROACHES AND MARKET STRUCTURES FOR TEMPORAL-SPATIAL SPECTRUM SHARING

In wireless communication systems, economic approaches can be applied to spectrum sharing and enhance spectrum utilization. In this research, we develop a model where geographic information, including licensed areas of primary users (PUs) and locations of secondary users (SUs), plays an important role in the spectrum sharing system. We consider a multi-price policy and the pricing power of noncooperative PUs in multiple geographic areas. Meanwhile, the value assessment of a channel is price-related and the demand from the SUs is price-elastic. By applying an evolutionary procedure, we prove the existence and uniqueness of the optimal payoff for each PU selling channels without reserve. In the scenario of selling channels with reserve, we predict the channel prices for the PUs leading to the optimal supplies of the PUs and hence the optimal payoffs. To increase spectrum utilization, the scenario of spatial spectrum reuse is considered. We consider maximizing social welfare via on-demand channel allocation, which describes the overall satisfaction of the SUs when we involve the supply and demand relationship. We design a receiver-centric spectrum reuse mechanism, in which the optimal channel allocation that maximizes social welfare can be achieved by the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction for maximal independent groups (MIGs). We prove that truthful bidding is the optimal strategy for the SUs, even though the SUs do not participate in the VCG auction for MIGs directly. Therefore, the MIGs are bidding truthfully and the requirement for social welfare maximization is satisfied. To further improve user satisfaction, user characteristics that enable heterogeneous channel valuations need to be considered in spatial spectrum reuse. We design a channel transaction mechanism for non-symmetric networks and maximize user satisfaction in consideration of multi-level flexible channel valuations of the SUs. Specifically, we introduce a constrained VCG auction. To facilitate the bid formation, we transform the constrained VCG auction to a step-by-step decision process. Meanwhile, the SUs in a coalition play a coalitional game with transferable utilities. We use the Shapley value to realize fair payoff distribution among the SUs in a coalition

Dynamic Fairness-Aware Spectrum Auction for Enhanced Licensed Shared Access in 6G Networks

This article introduces a new approach to address the spectrum scarcity challenge in 6G networks by implementing the enhanced licensed shared access (ELSA) framework. Our proposed auction mechanism aims to ensure fairness in spectrum allocation to mobile network operators (MNOs) through a novel weighted auction called the fair Vickery-Clarke-Groves (FVCG) mechanism. Through comparison with traditional methods, the study demonstrates that the proposed auction method improves fairness significantly. We suggest using spectrum sensing and integrating UAV-based networks to enhance efficiency of the LSA system. This research employs two methods to solve the problem. We first propose a novel greedy algorithm, named market share based weighted greedy algorithm (MSWGA) to achieve better fairness compared to the traditional auction methods and as the second approach, we exploit deep reinforcement learning (DRL) algorithms, to optimize the auction policy and demonstrate its superiority over other methods. Simulation results show that the deep deterministic policy gradient (DDPG) method performs superior to soft actor critic (SAC), MSWGA, and greedy methods. Moreover, a significant improvement is observed in fairness index compared to the traditional greedy auction methods. This improvement is as high as about 27% and 35% when deploying the MSWGA and DDPG methods, respectively.Comment: 13 pages, 11 figure

Spectrum Trading: An Abstracted Bibliography

This document contains a bibliographic list of major papers on spectrum trading and their abstracts. The aim of the list is to offer researchers entering this field a fast panorama of the current literature. The list is continually updated on the webpage \url{http://www.disp.uniroma2.it/users/naldi/Ricspt.html}. Omissions and papers suggested for inclusion may be pointed out to the authors through e-mail (\textit{[email protected]})

Dynamic Spectrum Sharing in Cognitive Radio Networks Using Truthful Mechanisms and Virtual Currency

In cognitive radio networks, there are scenarios where secondary users (SUs) utilize opportunistically the spectrum originally allocated to primary users (PUs). The spectrum resources available to SUs fluctuates over time due to PUs activity, SUs mobility and competition between SUs. In order to utilize these resources efficiently spectrum sharing techniques need to be implemented. In this paper we present an approach based on game-theoretical mechanism design for dynamic spectrum sharing. Each time a channel is not been used by any PU, it is allocated to SUs by a central spectrum manager based on the valuations of the channel reported by all SUs willing to use it. When an SU detects a free channel, it estimates its capacity according to local information and sends the valuation of it to the spectrum manager. The manager calculates a conflict-free allocation by implementing a truthful mechanism. The SUs have to pay for the allocation an amount which depends on the set of valuations. The objective is not to trade with the spectrum, but to share it according to certain criteria. For this, a virtual currency is defined and therefore monetary payments are not necessary. The spectrum manager records the credit of each SU and redistributes the payments to them after each spectrum allocation. The mechanism restricts the chances of each SU to be granted the channel depending on its credit availability. This credit restriction provides an incentive to SUs to behave as benefit maximizers. If the mechanism is truthful, their best strategy is to communicate the true valuation of the channel to the manager, what makes possible to implement the desired spectrum sharing criteria. We propose and evaluate an implementation of this idea by using two simple mechanisms which are proved to be truthful, and that are tractable and approximately efficient. We show the flexibility of these approach by illustrating how these mechanisms can be modified to achieve different sharing objectives which are trade-offs between efficiency and fairness. We also investigate how the credit restriction and redistribution affects the truthfulness of these mechanisms.This work was supported by the Spanish government through Projects TIN 2008-06739-C04-02 and TIN 2010-21378-C02-02.Vidal Catalá, JR.; Pla, V.; Guijarro Coloma, LA.; Martínez Bauset, J. (2013). Dynamic Spectrum Sharing in Cognitive Radio Networks Using Truthful Mechanisms and Virtual Currency. Ad Hoc Networks. 11:1858-1873. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adhoc.2013.04.010S185818731

HySIM: A Hybrid Spectrum and Information Market for TV White Space Networks

We propose a hybrid spectrum and information market for a database-assisted TV white space network, where the geo-location database serves as both a spectrum market platform and an information market platform. We study the inter- actions among the database operator, the spectrum licensee, and unlicensed users systematically, using a three-layer hierarchical model. In Layer I, the database and the licensee negotiate the commission fee that the licensee pays for using the spectrum market platform. In Layer II, the database and the licensee compete for selling information or channels to unlicensed users. In Layer III, unlicensed users determine whether they should buy the exclusive usage right of licensed channels from the licensee, or the information regarding unlicensed channels from the database. Analyzing such a three-layer model is challenging due to the co-existence of both positive and negative network externalities in the information market. We characterize how the network externalities affect the equilibrium behaviours of all parties involved. Our numerical results show that the proposed hybrid market can improve the network profit up to 87%, compared with a pure information market. Meanwhile, the achieved network profit is very close to the coordinated benchmark solution (the gap is less than 4% in our simulation).Comment: This manuscript serves as the online technical report of the article published in IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM), 201

LTE network slicing and resource trading schemes for machine-to-machine communications

The Internet of Things (IoT) is envisioned as the future of human-free communications. IoT relies on Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communications rather than conventional Human-to-Human (H2H) communications. It is expected that billions of Machine Type Communication Devices (MTCDs) will be connected to the Internet in the near future. Consequently, the mobile data traffic is poised to increase dramatically. Long Term Evolution (LTE) and its subsequent technology LTE-Advanced (LTE-A) are the candidate carriers of M2M communications for the IoT purposes. Despite the significant increase of traffic due to IoT, the Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) revenues are not increasing at the same pace. Hence, many MNOs have resorted to sharing their radio resources and parts of their infrastructures, in what is known as Network Virtualization (NV). In the thesis, we focus on slicing in which an operator known as Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO), does not own a spectrum license or mobile infrastructure, and relies on a larger MNO to serve its users. The large licensed MNO divides its spectrum pool into slices. Each MVNO reserves one or more slice(s). There are 2 forms of slice scheduling: Resource-based in which the slices are assigned a portion of radio resources or Data rate-based in which the slices are assigned a certain bandwidth. In the first part of this thesis we present different approaches for adapting resource-based NV, Data rate-based NV to Machine Type Communication (MTC). This will be done in such a way that resources are allocated to each slice depending on the delay budget of the MTCDs deployed in the slice and their payloads. The adapted NV schemes are then simulated and compared to the Static Reservation (SR) of radio resources. They have all shown an improved performance over SR from deadline missing perspective. In the second part of the thesis, we introduce a novel resource trading scheme that allows sharing operators to trade their radio resources based on the varying needs of their clients with time. The Genetic Algorithm (GA) is used to optimize the resource trading among the virtual operators. The proposed trading scheme is simulated and compared to the adapted schemes from the first part of the thesis. The novel trading scheme has shown to achieve significantly better performance compared to the adapted schemes