On the philosophical relevance of Gödel's incompleteness theorems

A survey of more philosophical applications of Gödel's incompleteness results

The Significance of Evidence-based Reasoning for Mathematics, Mathematics Education, Philosophy and the Natural Sciences

In this multi-disciplinary investigation we show how an evidence-based perspective of quantification---in terms of algorithmic verifiability and algorithmic computability---admits evidence-based definitions of well-definedness and effective computability, which yield two unarguably constructive interpretations of the first-order Peano Arithmetic PA---over the structure N of the natural numbers---that are complementary, not contradictory. The first yields the weak, standard, interpretation of PA over N, which is well-defined with respect to assignments of algorithmically verifiable Tarskian truth values to the formulas of PA under the interpretation. The second yields a strong, finitary, interpretation of PA over N, which is well-defined with respect to assignments of algorithmically computable Tarskian truth values to the formulas of PA under the interpretation. We situate our investigation within a broad analysis of quantification vis a vis: * Hilbert's epsilon-calculus * Goedel's omega-consistency * The Law of the Excluded Middle * Hilbert's omega-Rule * An Algorithmic omega-Rule * Gentzen's Rule of Infinite Induction * Rosser's Rule C * Markov's Principle * The Church-Turing Thesis * Aristotle's particularisation * Wittgenstein's perspective of constructive mathematics * An evidence-based perspective of quantification. By showing how these are formally inter-related, we highlight the fragility of both the persisting, theistic, classical/Platonic interpretation of quantification grounded in Hilbert's epsilon-calculus; and the persisting, atheistic, constructive/Intuitionistic interpretation of quantification rooted in Brouwer's belief that the Law of the Excluded Middle is non-finitary. We then consider some consequences for mathematics, mathematics education, philosophy, and the natural sciences, of an agnostic, evidence-based, finitary interpretation of quantification that challenges classical paradigms in all these disciplines

Conceptions of truth in intuitionism

Intuitionism’s disagreement with classical logic is standardly based on its specific understanding of truth. But different intuitionists have actually explicated the notion of truth in fundamentally different ways. These are considered systematically and separately, and evaluated critically. It is argued that each account faces difficult problems. They all either have implausible consequences or are viciously circular

Mechanised metamathematics : an investigation of first-order logic and set theory in constructive type theory

In this thesis, we investigate several key results in the canon of metamathematics, applying the contemporary perspective of formalisation in constructive type theory and mechanisation in the Coq proof assistant. Concretely, we consider the central completeness, undecidability, and incompleteness theorems of first-order logic as well as properties of the axiom of choice and the continuum hypothesis in axiomatic set theory. Due to their fundamental role in the foundations of mathematics and their technical intricacies, these results have a long tradition in the codification as standard literature and, in more recent investigations, increasingly serve as a benchmark for computer mechanisation. With the present thesis, we continue this tradition by uniformly analysing the aforementioned cornerstones of metamathematics in the formal framework of constructive type theory. This programme offers novel insights into the constructive content of completeness, a synthetic approach to undecidability and incompleteness that largely eliminates the notorious tedium obscuring the essence of their proofs, as well as natural representations of set theory in the form of a second-order axiomatisation and of a fully type-theoretic account. The mechanisation concerning first-order logic is organised as a comprehensive Coq library open to usage and contribution by external users.In dieser Doktorarbeit werden einige Schlüsselergebnisse aus dem Kanon der Metamathematik untersucht, unter Verwendung der zeitgenössischen Perspektive von Formalisierung in konstruktiver Typtheorie und Mechanisierung mit Hilfe des Beweisassistenten Coq. Konkret werden die zentralen Vollständigkeits-, Unentscheidbarkeits- und Unvollständigkeitsergebnisse der Logik erster Ordnung sowie Eigenschaften des Auswahlaxioms und der Kontinuumshypothese in axiomatischer Mengenlehre betrachtet. Aufgrund ihrer fundamentalen Rolle in der Fundierung der Mathematik und ihrer technischen Schwierigkeiten, besitzen diese Ergebnisse eine lange Tradition der Kodifizierung als Standardliteratur und, besonders in jüngeren Untersuchungen, eine zunehmende Bedeutung als Maßstab für Mechanisierung mit Computern. Mit der vorliegenden Doktorarbeit wird diese Tradition fortgeführt, indem die zuvorgenannten Grundpfeiler der Methamatematik uniform im formalen Rahmen der konstruktiven Typtheorie analysiert werden. Dieses Programm ermöglicht neue Einsichten in den konstruktiven Gehalt von Vollständigkeit, einen synthetischen Ansatz für Unentscheidbarkeit und Unvollständigkeit, der großteils den berüchtigten, die Essenz der Beweise verdeckenden, technischen Aufwand eliminiert, sowie natürliche Repräsentationen von Mengentheorie in Form einer Axiomatisierung zweiter Ordnung und einer vollkommen typtheoretischen Darstellung. Die Mechanisierung zur Logik erster Ordnung ist als eine umfassende Coq-Bibliothek organisiert, die offen für Nutzung und Beiträge externer Anwender ist

Three Dogmas of First-Order Logic and some Evidence-based Consequences for Constructive Mathematics of differentiating between Hilbertian Theism, Brouwerian Atheism and Finitary Agnosticism

We show how removing faith-based beliefs in current philosophies of classical and constructive mathematics admits formal, evidence-based, definitions of constructive mathematics; of a constructively well-defined logic of a formal mathematical language; and of a constructively well-defined model of such a language. We argue that, from an evidence-based perspective, classical approaches which follow Hilbert's formal definitions of quantification can be labelled `theistic'; whilst constructive approaches based on Brouwer's philosophy of Intuitionism can be labelled `atheistic'. We then adopt what may be labelled a finitary, evidence-based, `agnostic' perspective and argue that Brouwerian atheism is merely a restricted perspective within the finitary agnostic perspective, whilst Hilbertian theism contradicts the finitary agnostic perspective. We then consider the argument that Tarski's classic definitions permit an intelligence---whether human or mechanistic---to admit finitary, evidence-based, definitions of the satisfaction and truth of the atomic formulas of the first-order Peano Arithmetic PA over the domain N of the natural numbers in two, hitherto unsuspected and essentially different, ways. We show that the two definitions correspond to two distinctly different---not necessarily evidence-based but complementary---assignments of satisfaction and truth to the compound formulas of PA over N. We further show that the PA axioms are true over N, and that the PA rules of inference preserve truth over N, under both the complementary interpretations; and conclude some unsuspected constructive consequences of such complementarity for the foundations of mathematics, logic, philosophy, and the physical sciences