20 research outputs found

    Some Economics of Market-Based Distributed Scheduling

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    Market mechanisms solve distributed scheduling problems by allocating the scheduled resources according to market prices. We model distributed scheduling as a discrete resource allocation problem, and demonstrate the applicability of economic analysis to this framework. Drawing on results from the literature, we discuss the existence of equilibrium prices for some general classes of scheduling problems, and the quality of equilibrium solutions. We then present two protocols for implementing market solutions, and analyze their computational and economic properties.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/60422/1/mb-scheduling-extended.pd

    Q-Strategy: A Bidding Strategy for Market-Based Allocation of Grid Services

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    The application of autonomous agents by the provisioning and usage of computational services is an attractive research field. Various methods and technologies in the area of artificial intelligence, statistics and economics are playing together to achieve i) autonomic service provisioning and usage of Grid services, to invent ii) competitive bidding strategies for widely used market mechanisms and to iii) incentivize consumers and providers to use such market-based systems. The contributions of the paper are threefold. First, we present a bidding agent framework for implementing artificial bidding agents, supporting consumers and providers in technical and economic preference elicitation as well as automated bid generation by the requesting and provisioning of Grid services. Secondly, we introduce a novel consumer-side bidding strategy, which enables a goal-oriented and strategic behavior by the generation and submission of consumer service requests and selection of provider offers. Thirdly, we evaluate and compare the Q-strategy, implemented within the presented framework, against the Truth-Telling bidding strategy in three mechanisms – a centralized CDA, a decentralized on-line machine scheduling and a FIFO-scheduling mechanisms

    Coordination of Supply Webs Based on Dispositive Protocols

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    A lot of curricula in information systems, also at master level, exists today. However, the strong need in new approaches and new curricula still exists, especially, in European area. The paper discusses the modern curriculum in information systems at master level that is currently under development in the Socrates/Erasmus project MOCURIS. The curriculum is oriented to the students of engineering schools of technical universities. The proposed approach takes into account integration trends in European area as well as the transformation of industrial economics into knowledge-based digital economics The paper presents main characteristics of the proposed curriculum, discuses curriculum development techniques used in the project MOCURIS, describes the architecture of the proposed curriculum and the body of knowledge provided by it

    Beyond electronic disintermediation through multi-agent systems

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    Supply chain management represents a critical competency in today's global business environment and has been the focus of considerable, but mixed, information systems research. The research described in this paper builds on work in multi-agent systems to argue that intelligent agents offer excellent potential and capability for supply chain management, and contributes to discussion and theory pertaining to electronic markets and supply chain disintermediation. Argues that the knowledge associated with intermediation work represents a key mediating variable between disintermediating technology and supply chain efficacy and discusses how intelligent agent technology can be employed to both intermediate and disintermediate the supply chain, attaining the cost and cycle-time benefits of disintermediation without the attendant loss of human knowledge and expertise. The paper outlines a number of implications for theory and practice in information systems, and it formalizes some important research questions through a contingency framework to help stimulate and guide future work along these lines

    Decentralized Markets versus Central Control - A Comparative Study,

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    Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) promise to offer solutions to problems where established, older paradigms fall short. In order to validate such claims that are repeatedly made in software agent publications, empirical in-depth studies of advantages and weaknesses of multi-agent solutions versus conventional ones in practical applications are needed. Climate control in large buildings is one application area where multi-agent systems, and marketoriented programming in particular, have been reported to be very successful, although central control solutions are still the standard practice. We have therefore constructed and implemented a variety of market designs for this problem, as well as different standard control engineering solutions. This article gives a detailed analysis and comparison, so as to learn about differences between standard versus agent approaches, and yielding new insights about benefits and limitations of computational markets. An important outcome is that "local in..

    Decentralized Markets versus Central Control: A Comparative Study

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    Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) promise to offer solutions to problems where established, older paradigms fall short. In order to validate such claims that are repeatedly made in software agent publications, empirical in-depth studies of advantages and weaknesses of multi-agent solutions versus conventional ones in practical applications are needed. Climate control in large buildings is one application area where multi-agent systems, and market-oriented programming in particular, have been reported to be very successful, although central control solutions are still the standard practice. We have therefore constructed and implemented a variety of market designs for this problem, as well as different standard control engineering solutions. This article gives a detailed analysis and comparison, so as to learn about differences between standard versus agent approaches, and yielding new insights about benefits and limitations of computational markets. An important outcome is that "local information plus market communication produces global control"

    Algorithmic Mechanism Design for Load Balancing in Distributed Systems

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    Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial Part 1- Key concepts and classical results

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    Mechanism design, an important tool in microeconomics, has found widespread applications in modelling and solving decentralized design problems in many branches of engineering, notably computer science, electronic commerce, and network economics. Mechanism design is concerned with settings where a social planner faces the problem of aggregating the announced preferences of multiple agents into a collective decision when the agents exhibit strategic behaviour. The objective of this paper is to provide a tutorial introduction to the foundations and key results in mechanism design theory. The paper is in two parts. Part 1 focuses on basic concepts and classical results which form the foundation of mechanism design theory. Part 2 presents key advanced concepts and deeper results in mechanism design

    Auction Protocols for Decentralized Scheduling

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    Scheduling is the problem of allocating resources to alternate possible uses over designated periods of time. Several have proposed (and some have tried) market-based approaches to decentralized versions of the problem, where the competing uses are represented by autonomous agents. Market mechanisms use prices derived through distributed bidding protocols to determine an allocation, and thus solve the scheduling problem. To analyze the behavior of market schemes, we formalize decentralized scheduling as a discrete resource allocation problem, and bring to bear some relevant economic concepts. Drawing on results from the literature, we discuss the existence of equilibrium prices for some general classes of scheduling problems, and the quality of equilibrium solutions. To remedy the potential nonexistence of price equilibria due to complementarity in preference, we introduce additional markets in combinations of basic goods. We present some auction mechanisms and bidding protocols corresponding to the two market structures, and analyze their computational and economic properties. Finally, we consider direct revelation mechanisms, and compare to the market-based approach.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/50443/1/gebfinal.pd
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