Interactive Methods and Collaborative Performance: A New Future for Indirect Infringement

An individual is liable for patent infringement if he infringes one or more patented claims either directly under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) or indirectly under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) or § 271(c). In 2012, the Federal Circuit clarified its interpretation of § 271(b) and § 271(c) in the case of Akamai v. Limelight. However, the court failed to address issues of “divided” direct infringement, where two or more entities combine and together complete each and every step of a method claim, but no single entity does all of the steps. This Note walks through the history of the judicial interpretation of §§ 271(b) and (c) up until Akamai v. Limelight, discusses the decision itself, and acknowledges the accompanying criticism. This Note proposes a reformed test for cases of divided infringement: a finding of divided direct infringement should be a prerequisite for §§ 271(b) and (c) liability, but divided direct infringement liability under § 271(a) should not be possible absent the alleged infringer meeting the single entity rule

The Ontological Function of the Patent Document

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The Policy Implications of Granting Patent Protection to Computer Software: An Economic Analysis

This Note analyzes the propriety of granting patent law protection to computer software by viewing this problem from economic, legal, public and technological policy perspectives. Part II explains the relationship between computer hardware and software, discusses the role of algorithms in software development,and traces the development of the computer software industry.Part III analyzes the economic policies underlying the patent system. Part IV identifies the patent law principles that are relevant to the software patentability issue and discusses their underlying policy foundations. Part V examines the Supreme Court\u27s application of these principles in the leading software patent cases and concludes that the Court\u27s failure to understand computer technology has caused it to withhold patent protection from computer software. Part V reveals that the Supreme Court has mischaracterized software algorithms by treating them as unpatentable mathematical laws. Part VI of this Note analyzes the benefits and costs of granting patent protection to computer software and demonstrates the compelling societal need for this protection. \u27Part VI also proposes an addition to the Patent Office of a small staff of computer science experts to remedy the administrative problem of processing software patent applications

From Photocopying to Object-Copying in the Classroom: 3D Printing and the Need for Educational Fair Use in Patent Law

This Note is broken into three parts. Part I includes background information about additive manufacturing, the Maker Movement and its importance in the promotion of STEM education, and the history of copyright and patent law. Part II analyzes the development of fair use in copyright law, potential reasons that patent law has no statutory fair use defense, and one exception in patent law that is essentially fair use—the Hatch-Waxman Act, a codified version of the experimental use exception for the pharmaceutical industry. Finally, Part III offers three distinct solutions aimed at protecting educators who use 3D printing in their curriculum

Engineering Competitive Policy and Copyright Misuse

Symposium: Copyright Protection and Reverse Engineering of Softwar

Causal Responsibility and Patent Infringement

It is not uncommon for multiple parties in the stream of commercemanufacturers, distributors, end users-to be involved in the infringement of a single patent. Yet courts continue to struggle with such scenarios. Attempts to deal with them-particularly when plaintiffs asserted so-called method patents, which cover specific steps, or actions-have produced results that defy commonsense notions of legal responsibility. In method patent cases, the patentee must clear much higher legal hurdles to prevail against a manufacturer who designed and supplied an infringing device than against an end user who simply bought that device and operated it as intended. The manufacturer can lose only upon proof of fault, while the user is subject to strict liability--a result that seems backwards because the manufacturer is clearly the more responsible party. Even greater difficulties arise when the manufacturer performs some steps of a method patent and the user performs the others, giving rise to a so-called divided infringement problem. One such case, Akamai v. Limelight, has been in litigation for over ten years and generated multiple appellate opinions, including a decision by the Supreme Court. Although the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit finally resolved Akamai in a fact-specific fashion, no comprehensive solution to the divided infringement problem is in sight. I explain that these problems persist because patent law formalistically clings to what I term the \u27oerformer/non-performer distinction, which holds that physical performance of an act is the linchpin of legal accountability. I then contend that they can be solved by reading the Patent Act in view of the principle of causal responsibility, which pervades the law and rests on a firm philosophical foundation. Simply put, this principle holds that one is responsible for the actions of others that one has caused, leading to the legal effect of imputing the act of the causee (in patent cases, often the user) to the causer (e.g., the manufacturer). I draw on examples from criminal law and tort law to elucidate this principle and demonstrate its consistency with the Patent Act. I also maintain that applying causal responsibility in patent law would lead to three practical and sensible results. First, doing so would effectively lower the mens rea barriers needed to establish the liability of manufacturers who supply devices configured so that their only intended use by a passive customer results in the performance of steps of some method patent. Second, it would provide a path for resolving the vexing problem of divided infringement exemplified by Akamai. Third, the proposed approach may in some cases help to shift the burden of ensuring compliance with existing patents from end users to manufacturers, which is as it should be