Cycle time optimization by timing driven placement with simultaneous netlist transformations

We present new concepts to integrate logic synthesis and physical design. Our methodology uses general Boolean transformations as known from technology-independent synthesis, and a recursive bi-partitioning placement algorithm. In each partitioning step, the precision of the layout data increases. This allows effective guidance of the logic synthesis operations for cycle time optimization. An additional advantage of our approach is that no complicated layout corrections are needed when the netlist is changed

SCHEDULING INPUTS WITH PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS: OPTIMAL NITROGEN PROGRAMS FOR RICE

The problem of scheduling input applications can be examined by extending conventional production function analysis. Using appropriately designed agricultural experiments, it is possible to estimate production function parameters with alternative specifications for input timing (and amount). A study of nitrogen applications to rice is employed to illustrate scheduling via production functions. Alternative specifications and functional forms are simultaneously examined to determine the sensitivity of economic results to these factors. Sensitivity is found to be high, and this finding is hypothesized to be critical for other approaches to input scheduling as well.Crop Production/Industries,

Do Children Stabilize Marriages?

In this paper we study the relationship between fertility behavior and the process of marriage duration. The potential endogeneity of fertility on marriage behavior is taken into account by modeling fertility and divorce jointly. We apply the âtiming-of-eventâ method (Abbring & van den Berg (2002)) to identify the causal effect of births on the divorce hazard. We show that couples who are less prone to divorce are more prone to invest in children, and therefore one might (mistakenly) conclude that children tend to stabilize marriages. However, when correcting for the selectivity bias arising from the fertility decision, we conclude that children themselves do not have a positive effect on marriage duration.Marriage; divorce; children

Selection and stabilization of endocytic sites by Ede1, a yeast functional homologue of human Eps15.

During clathrin-mediated endocytosis (CME), endocytic-site maturation can be divided into two stages corresponding to the arrival of the early and late proteins at the plasma membrane. The early proteins are required to capture cargo and position the late machinery, which includes proteins involved in actin assembly and membrane scission. However, the mechanism by which early-arriving proteins select and stabilize endocytic sites is not known. Ede1, one of the earliest proteins recruited to endocytic sites, facilitates site initiation and stabilization. Deletion of EDE1 results in fewer CME initiations and defects in the timing of vesicle maturation. Here we made truncation mutants of Ede1 to better understand how different domains contribute to its recruitment to CME sites, site selection, and site maturation. We found that the minimal domains required for efficient Ede1 localization at CME sites are the third EH domain, the proline-rich region, and the coiled-coil region. We also found that many strains expressing ede1 truncations could support a normal rate of site initiation but still had defects in site-maturation timing, indicating separation of Ede1 functions. When expressed in yeast, human Eps15 localized to the plasma membrane, where it recruited late-phase CME proteins and supported productive endocytosis, identifying it as an Ede1 functional homologue

Leadership in Public Good Provision: a Timing Game Perspective

We address in this paper the issue of leadership when two governments provide public goods to their constituencies with cross border externalities as both public goods are valued by consumers in both countries. We study a timing game between two different countries: before providing public goods, the two policymakers non-cooperatively decide their preferred sequence of moves. We establish conditions under which a first- or second-mover advantage emerges for each country, highlighting the role of spillovers and the strategic complementarity or substitutability of public goods. As a result we are able to prove that there is no leader when, for both countries, public goods are substitutable. When public goods are complements for both countries, both countries may emerge as the leader in the game. Hence a coordination issue arises. We use the notion of risk-dominance to select the leading government. Lastly, in the mixed case, the government for whom public goods are substitutable becomes the leader.public good, Spillovers, Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, Strategic Complements, Stackelberg, Pareto Dominance, Risk Dominance

On a foundation for Cournot equilibrium

We show in the context of a bilateral oligopoly where all agents are allowed to behave strategically the unexpected result that when the number of buyers becomes large the outcomes in a strategic market game do not converge to those at the Cournot equilibrium. However, convergence to Cournot outcomes is restored if the game is sequential: sellers move simultaneously as do buyers, but the former always move before the latter. This suggests that the ability to commit to supply decisions is an essential feature of Cournot equilibrium

Leadership in Public Good Provision: a Timing Game Perspective

We address in this paper the issue of leadership when two governments provide public goods to their constituencies with cross border externalities as both public goods are valued by consumers in both countries. We study a timing game between two different countries: before providing public goods, the two policymakers non-cooperatively decide their preferred sequence of moves. We establish conditions under which a first- or second-mover advantage emerges for each country, highlighting the role of spillovers and the strategic complementarity or substitutability of public goods. As a result we are able to prove that there is no leader when, for both countries, public goods are substitutable. When public goods are complements for both countries, both countries may emerge as the leader in the game. Hence a coordination issue arises. We use the notion of risk-dominance to select the leading government. Lastly, in the mixed case, the government for whom public goods are substitutable becomes the leader.public good;Spillovers;Subgame Perfect Equilibrium;Strategic Complements;Stackelberg;Pareto Dominance;Risk Dominance

Do Children Stabilize Danish Marriages?

In this paper we study the relationship between fertility behavior and the process of marriage duration. The potential endogeneity of fertility on marriage behavior is taken into account by modeling fertility and divorce jointly. We apply the ”timing-of-event” method (Abbring & van den Berg (2003)) to identify the causal effect of births on the divorce hazard. We show that couples who are less prone to divorce are more prone to invest in children, and therefore one might (mistakenly) conclude that children tend to stabilize marriages. However, when correcting for this selectivity bias arising from the fertility decision, we conclude that children themselves do not have a positive effect on marriage durationmarriage; divorce; children