Foraging as an evidence accumulation process

A canonical foraging task is the patch-leaving problem, in which a forager must decide to leave a current resource in search for another. Theoretical work has derived optimal strategies for when to leave a patch, and experiments have tested for conditions where animals do or do not follow an optimal strategy. Nevertheless, models of patch-leaving decisions do not consider the imperfect and noisy sampling process through which an animal gathers information, and how this process is constrained by neurobiological mechanisms. In this theoretical study, we formulate an evidence accumulation model of patch-leaving decisions where the animal averages over noisy measurements to estimate the state of the current patch and the overall environment. Evidence accumulation models belong to the class of drift diffusion processes and have been used to model decision making in different contexts. We solve the model for conditions where foraging decisions are optimal and equivalent to the marginal value theorem, and perform simulations to analyze deviations from optimal when these conditions are not met. By adjusting the drift rate and decision threshold, the model can represent different strategies, for example an increment-decrement or counting strategy. These strategies yield identical decisions in the limiting case but differ in how patch residence times adapt when the foraging environment is uncertain. To account for sub-optimal decisions, we introduce an energy-dependent utility function that predicts longer than optimal patch residence times when food is plentiful. Our model provides a quantitative connection between ecological models of foraging behavior and evidence accumulation models of decision making. Moreover, it provides a theoretical framework for potential experiments which seek to identify neural circuits underlying patch leaving decisions

A reliability-based approach for influence maximization using the evidence theory

The influence maximization is the problem of finding a set of social network users, called influencers, that can trigger a large cascade of propagation. Influencers are very beneficial to make a marketing campaign goes viral through social networks for example. In this paper, we propose an influence measure that combines many influence indicators. Besides, we consider the reliability of each influence indicator and we present a distance-based process that allows to estimate the reliability of each indicator. The proposed measure is defined under the framework of the theory of belief functions. Furthermore, the reliability-based influence measure is used with an influence maximization model to select a set of users that are able to maximize the influence in the network. Finally, we present a set of experiments on a dataset collected from Twitter. These experiments show the performance of the proposed solution in detecting social influencers with good quality.Comment: 14 pages, 8 figures, DaWak 2017 conferenc

Automated Bilateral Bargaining about Multiple Attributes in a One­ to ­Many Setting

Negotiations are an important way of reaching agreements between selfish autonomous agents. In this paper we focus on one-to-many bargaining within the context of agent-mediated electronic commerce. We consider an approach where a seller agent negotiates over multiple interdependent attributes with many buyer agents in a bilateral fashion. In this setting, "fairness", which corresponds to the notion of envy-freeness in auctions, may be an important business constraint. For the case of virtually unlimited supply (such as information goods), we present a number of one-to-many bargaining strategies for the seller agent, which take into account the fairness constraint, and consider multiple attributes simultaneously. We compare the performance of the bargaining strategies using an evolutionary simulation, especially for the case of impatient buyers. Several of the developed strategies are able to extract almost all the surplus; they utilize the fact that the setting is one-to-many, even though bargaining is bilateral

The case of muddled units in temporal discounting

While parameters are crucial components of cognitive models, relatively little importance has been given to their units. We show that this has lead to some parameters to be contaminated, introducing an artifactual correlation between them. We also show that this has led to the illegal comparison of parameters with different units of measurement – this may invalidate parameter comparisons across participants, conditions, groups, or studies. We demonstrate that this problem affects two related models: Stevens' power law and Rachlin's delay discounting model. We show that it may even affect models which superficially avoid the incompatible units problem, such as hyperbolic discounting. We present simulation results to demonstrate the extent of the issues caused by the muddled units problem. We offer solutions in order to avoid the problem in the future or to aid in re-interpreting existing datasets

Analysis of a Reputation System for Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks with Liars

The application of decentralized reputation systems is a promising approach to ensure cooperation and fairness, as well as to address random failures and malicious attacks in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks. However, they are potentially vulnerable to liars. With our work, we provide a first step to analyzing robustness of a reputation system based on a deviation test. Using a mean-field approach to our stochastic process model, we show that liars have no impact unless their number exceeds a certain threshold (phase transition). We give precise formulae for the critical values and thus provide guidelines for an optimal choice of parameters.Comment: 17 pages, 6 figure