Multi-layer Defense Against Malware Attacks on Smartphone Wi-Fi Access Channel

AbstractWith increase in Smartphone users, uses have also increased such as email, gaming, internet banking etc. which requires it to always remain connected with Wi-Fi, thus making it vulnerable to numerous attacks. The endeavour in this paper is to explore Smartphone malware and combat challenges associated with it. Authors have proposed a novel three layer security model which detect and defence against the malware attack in network traffic and communication access point. Fine grained channel permission system is used to grant the permission to access the Wi-Fi access point thus providing security when any communication session takes place between Smartphone user and server though SSL handshake protocol. It also helps in detection of the interval time between packets sent and received which give impetus for threshold value used by TMM-HDT algorithm

Distributed reflection denial of service attack: A critical review

As the world becomes increasingly connected and the number of users grows exponentially and “things” go online, the prospect of cyberspace becoming a significant target for cybercriminals is a reality. Any host or device that is exposed on the internet is a prime target for cyberattacks. A denial-of-service (DoS) attack is accountable for the majority of these cyberattacks. Although various solutions have been proposed by researchers to mitigate this issue, cybercriminals always adapt their attack approach to circumvent countermeasures. One of the modified DoS attacks is known as distributed reflection denial-of-service attack (DRDoS). This type of attack is considered to be a more severe variant of the DoS attack and can be conducted in transmission control protocol (TCP) and user datagram protocol (UDP). However, this attack is not effective in the TCP protocol due to the three-way handshake approach that prevents this type of attack from passing through the network layer to the upper layers in the network stack. On the other hand, UDP is a connectionless protocol, so most of these DRDoS attacks pass through UDP. This study aims to examine and identify the differences between TCP-based and UDP-based DRDoS attacks

Lightweight Method for Detecting Fake Authentication Attack on Wi-Fi

Wireless networks, despite providing better access and flexibility, have vulnerabilities that are easier to realize compared to wired networks. Fake authentication attack can be taken by an attacker prior to carrying out a Man in the Middle attack to intercept the other party's communication. Such an attack is generally carried out in public places that provide free Wi-Fi access. Detection of fake authentication is necessary to maintain communication success. Several methods have been applied to detect fake authentication such as the use of Wireless Intrusion Detection System (WIDS) or certificates on Transport Layer Security (TLS). However, attackers can trick the use of WIDS or TLS. Moreover, the WIDS and TLS techniques require large costs and computations. In this study, a lightweight method based on the comparison of BSSID/MAC address for detecting fake authentication is proposed. The lightweight method is implemented by creating an application that runs on Android mobile phones, and Linux operating system. We compared the detection performance of the device with the proposed application and the one without the proposed application. It can be concluded that the proposed method using comparison of BSSID / MAC address is an effective way to detect fake authentication attacks on Wi-Fi networks

Evil-twin framework: a Wi-Fi intrusion testing framework for pentesters

In today’s world there is no scarcity of Wi-Fi hotspots. Although users are always recommended to join protected networks to ensure they are secure, this is by far not their only concern. The convenience of easily connecting to a Wi-Fi hotspot has left security holes wide open for attackers to abuse. This stresses the concern about the lack of security on the client side of Wi-Fi capable technologies. The Wi-Fi communications security has been a concern since it was first deployed. On one hand protocols like WPA2 have greatly increased the security of the communications between clients and access points, but how can one know if the access point is legitimate in the first place? Nowadays, with the help of open-source software and the great amount of free information it is easily possible for a malicious actor to create a Wi-Fi network with the purpose of attracting Wi-Fi users and tricking them into connecting to a illegitimate Wi-Fi access point. The risk of this vulnerability becomes clear when studying client side behaviour in Wi-Fi communications where these actively seek out to access points in order to connect to them automatically. In many situations they do this even if there is no way of verifying the legitimacy of the access point they are connecting to. Attacks on the Wi-Fi client side have been known for over a decade but there still aren’t any effective ways to properly protect users from falling victims to these. Based on the presented issues there is a clear need in both, securing the Wi-Fi client side communications as well as raising awareness of the Wi-Fi technologies everyday users about the risks they are constantly facing when using them. The main contribution from this project will be a Wi-Fi vulnerability analysis and exploitation framework. The framework will focus on client-side vulnerabilities but also on extensibility for any type of Wi-Fi attack. The tool is intended to be used by auditors (penetration testers - pentesters) when performing intrusion tests on Wi-Fi networks. It also serves as a proof-of-concept tool meant to teach and raise awareness about the risks involved when using Wi-Fi technologies.Actualmente existem inúmeros pontos de acesso Wi-Fi. Apesar dos utilizadores serem sempre recomendados a utilizar redes protegidas, esta não é a única preocupação que devem ter. A conveniência de nos ligarmos facilmente a um ponto de acesso deixou grandes falhas de segurança em aberto para atacantes explorarem. Isto acentua a preocupação em relação à carência de segurança do lado cliente em tecnologias Wi-Fi. A segurança nas comunicações Wi-Fi foi uma preocupação desde os dias em que esta tecnologia foi primeiramente lançada. Por um lado, protocolos como o WPA2 aumentaram consideravelmente a segurança das comunicações Wi-Fi entre os pontos de acesso e os seus clientes, mas como saber, em primeiro lugar, se o ponto de acesso é legítimo? Hoje em dia, com a ajuda de software de código aberto e a imensa quantidade de informação gratuita, é fácil para um atacante criar uma rede Wi-Fi falsa com o objetivo de atrair clientes. O risco desta vulnerabilidade torna-se óbvio ao estudar o comportamento do lado do cliente Wi-Fi. O cliente procura activamente redes conhecidas de forma a ligar-se automaticamente a estas. Em muitos casos os clientes ligam-se sem interação do utilizador mesmo em situações em que a legitimidade do ponto de acesso não é verificável. Ataques ao lado cliente das tecnologias Wi-Fi já foram descobertos há mais de uma década, porém continuam a não existirem formas eficazes de proteger os clientes deste tipo de ataques. Com base nos problemas apresentados existe uma necessidade clara de proteger o lado cliente das comunicações Wi-Fi e ao mesmo tempo sensibilizar e educar os utilizadores de tecnologias Wi-Fi dos perigos que advêm da utilização destas tecnologias. A contribuição mais relevante deste projeto será a publicação de uma ferramenta para análise de vulnerabilidades e ataques em comunicações WiFi. A ferramenta irá focar-se em ataques ao cliente mas permitirá extensibilidade de funcionalidades de forma a possibilitar a implementação de qualquer tipo de ataques sobre Wi-Fi. A ferramenta deverá ser utilizada por auditores de segurança durante testes de intrusão Wi-Fi. Tem também como objetivo ser uma ferramenta educacional e de prova de conceitos de forma a sensibilizar os utilizadores das tecnologias Wi-Fi em relação aos riscos e falhas de segurança destas

The Other Way Round

There have always been sexy subjects, and there always will be. Some topics are sexy for a time and then fade into obscurity or become quaint anachronisms; the now-omnipresent Y2K problem is sure to meet some such fate. But there are other topics, such as, the connection between identical twins, incest, extraterrestrial life, dinosaurs, the American Civil War and evil, which just stay in vogue. Topics guaranteed to draw a crowd. I am just as likely to be in that crowd as the next person. Having spent part of this afternoon watching a History Channel presentation on the Lizzie Borden case, I am all too aware of my own attraction to these crowd-pleasing topics. But in writing and speaking about ethics, I have made a point of going another way, of avoiding the crowd-pleasers, the overtly sexy subjects: the criminal defendant who wants to lie on the stand, the lawyer whose client tells him where the bodies of missing people may be located, the client who walks in and confesses to a crime for which another is to be executed at dawn and the morality of questioning a rape victim about her past sexual encounters. Writing about lawyers collaborating with systems of evil was not something I wanted to do. Before going any further with the problems I have with the subject matter of this Symposium, I do, however, want to take a moment to say that I found the papers delivered very interesting. I received the papers in advance and not only did I enjoy reading them, but I learned a good deal. I learned about trials in Vichy France that I had no idea took place. 2 I learned about Justice Lamar, who I did not know had sat on the United States Supreme Court, and I even looked up some of his opinions, which, as Professor Carrington would have predicted, I found uninteresting and unimpressive, in contrast to the Justice\u27s background, which Professor Carrington\u27s paper illuminates, and which I found fascinating.3 I am most familiar with Professor Daynard\u27s topic, lawyer participation in the tobacco companies\u27 wrongdoing, but as always I learned much I did not know from Professor Daynard, whose knowledge of these matters is vast and insight, great. 4 And, as a death penalty opponent, I was pleased to see that topic included in the Symposium and was impressed by the thoughtfulness Professor Cottrol brought to the topic. 5 And as for Professor Burt\u27s concept of wrong yesterday and tomorrow but not today, I found it not just cleverly put, but a concept that captured a phenomenon well worth naming and exploring.6 So what\u27s my problem? Why was I so reluctant to participate in this event? First, I thought getting a bunch of lawyers, judges, students and academics to sit around and talk about lawyer participation in systems of evil was unlikely to do any good. Now, I\u27m not suggesting that conferences only be held when they are likely to do some good; there would be precious few conferences to attend, if that were the standard. But I have a limited amount of time that I am prepared to devote to speaking to large groups of lawyers and associated professionals, and I\u27d much rather spend that time talking to these real-world actors about problems they might actually do something about. However intellectually stimulating or fun it might be for real-world actors to take a break from practical matters to contemplate the dilemmas of the past or the difficulties of situations they are unlikely to ever encounter, to put it bluntly, I am simply not interested in spending my time providing them with that break from the grind. But having little interest in performing this service for lawyers and judges was not the only reason I was so reluctant to participate. I had another concern. I was not just afraid this Symposium would do little real-world good; I thought it might actually do some harm

Fighting Back: Crime, Self-Defense, and the Right to Carry a Handgun

Ten years ago this month, a controversial "concealed- carry" law went into effect in the state of Florida. In a sharp break from the conventional wisdom of the time, that law allowed adult citizens to carry concealed firearms in public. Many people feared the law would quickly lead to disaster: blood would literally be running in the streets. Now, 10 years later, it is safe to say that those dire predictions were completely unfounded. Indeed, the debate today over concealed-carry laws centers on the extent to which such laws can actually reduce the crime rate.To the shock and dismay of gun control proponents, concealed-carry reform has proven to be wildly popular among state lawmakers. Since Florida launched its experiment with concealed-carry in October 1987, 23 states have enacted similar laws, with positive results.Prior to 1987, almost every state in America either prohibited the carrying of concealed handguns or permitted concealed-carry under a licensing system that granted government officials broad discretionary power over the decision to grant a permit. The key feature of the new concealed-carry laws is that the government must grant the permit as soon as any citizen can satisfy objective licensing criteria.Concealed-carry reform reaffirms the basic idea that citizens have the right to defend themselves against criminal attack. And since criminals can strike almost anywhere at any time, the last thing government ought to be doing is stripping citizens of the most effective means of defending themselves. Carrying a handgun in public may not be for everyone, but it is a right that government ought to respect

Defensive killing by police: analyzing uncertain threat scenarios

In the United States, police use of force experts often maintain that controversial police shootings where an unarmed person’s hand gesture was interpreted as their “going for a gun” are justifiable. If an officer waits to confirm that a weapon is indeed being pulled from a jacket pocket or waistband, it may be too late to defend against a lethal attack. This article examines police policy norms for self-defense against “uncertain threats” in three contexts: (1) known in-progress violent crimes, (2) interactions with civilians behaving non-aggressively, and (3) interactions with civilians behaving aggressively. It is argued that the context of a known in-progress violent crime gives rise to threat probability-, fairness-, and lesser evil-based reasons for a norm permitting police officers to use lethal force. However, in the contexts of civilians behaving non-aggressively and civilians behaving aggressively, such a norm is not justifiable. In the former case, I introduce two conditions, the Justification condition and the Valuing Civilian Lives condition, which I argue are not presently met. In the latter case, these two conditions again not met; aggression may moreover be excused or justified due to background injustices around race and the criminal justice system

A taxonomy of attacks and a survey of defence mechanisms for semantic social engineering attacks

Social engineering is used as an umbrella term for a broad spectrum of computer exploitations that employ a variety of attack vectors and strategies to psychologically manipulate a user. Semantic attacks are the specific type of social engineering attacks that bypass technical defences by actively manipulating object characteristics, such as platform or system applications, to deceive rather than directly attack the user. Commonly observed examples include obfuscated URLs, phishing emails, drive-by downloads, spoofed web- sites and scareware to name a few. This paper presents a taxonomy of semantic attacks, as well as a survey of applicable defences. By contrasting the threat landscape and the associated mitigation techniques in a single comparative matrix, we identify the areas where further research can be particularly beneficial