Representational geometry: integrating cognition, computation, and the brain

The cognitive concept of representation plays a key role in theories of brain information processing. However, linking neuronal activity to representational content and cognitive theory remains challenging. Recent studies have characterized the representational geometry of neural population codes by means of representational distance matrices, enabling researchers to compare representations across stages of processing and to test cognitive and computational theories. Representational geometry provides a useful intermediate level of description, capturing both the information represented in a neuronal population code and the format in which it is represented. We review recent insights gained with this approach in perception, memory, cognition, and action. Analyses of representational geometry can compare representations between models and the brain, and promise to explain brain computation as transformation of representational similarity structure

Making sense of real-world scenes

To interact with the world, we have to make sense of the continuous sensory input conveying information about our environment. A recent surge of studies has investigated the processes enabling scene understanding, using increasingly complex stimuli and sophisticated analyses to highlight the visual features and brain regions involved. However, there are two major challenges to producing a comprehensive framework for scene understanding. First, scene perception is highly dynamic, subserving multiple behavioral goals. Second, a multitude of different visual properties co-occur across scenes and may be correlated or independent. We synthesize the recent literature and argue that for a complete view of scene understanding, it is necessary to account for both differing observer goals and the contribution of diverse scene properties

Data-driven approaches in the investigation of social perception

The complexity of social perception poses a challenge to traditional approaches to understand its psychological and neurobiological underpinnings. Data-driven methods are particularly well suited to tackling the often high-dimensional nature of stimulus spaces and of neural representations that characterize social perception. Such methods are more exploratory, capitalize on rich and large datasets, and attempt to discover patterns often without strict hypothesis testing. We present four case studies here: behavioural studies on face judgements, two neuroimaging studies of movies, and eyetracking studies in autism. We conclude with suggestions for particular topics that seem ripe for data-driven approaches, as well as caveats and limitations

Towards a model of human body perception

Item does not contain fulltextFrom just a glimpse of another person, we make inferences about their current states and longstanding traits. These inferences are normally spontaneous and effortless, yet they are crucial in shaping our impressions and behaviours towards other people. What are the perceptual operations involved in the rapid extraction of socially relevant information? To answer this question, over the last decade the visual and cognitive neuroscience of social stimuli has received new inputs through emerging proposals of social vision approaches. Perhaps by function of these contributions, researchers have reached a certain degree of consensus over a standard model of face perception. This thesis aims to extend social vision approaches to the case of human body perception. In doing so, it establishes the building blocks for a perceptual model of the human body which integrates the extraction of socially relevant information from the appearance of the body. Using visual tasks, the data show that perceptual representations of the human body are sensitive to socially relevant information (e.g. sex, weight, emotional expression). Specifically, in the first empirical chapter I dissect the perceptual representations of body sex. Using a visual search paradigm, I demonstrate a differential and asymmetrical representation of sex from human body shape. In the second empirical chapter, using the Garner selective attention task, I show that the dimension of body sex is independent from the information of emotional body postures. Finally, in the third empirical chapter, I provide evidence that category selective visual brain regions, including the body selective region EBA, are directly involved in forming perceptual expectations towards incoming visual stimuli. Socially relevant information of the body might shape visual representations of the body by acting as a set of expectancies available to the observer during perceptual operations. In the general discussion I address how the findings of the empirical chapters inform us about the perceptual encoding of human body shape. Further, I propose how these results provide the initial steps for a unified social vision model of human body perception. Finally, I advance the hypothesis that rapid social categorisation during perception is explained by mechanisms generally affecting the perceptual analysis of objects under naturalistic conditions (e.g. expectations-expertise) operating within the social domain.Bangor University, 17 februari 2020Promotor : Downing, P.E. Co-promotor : Koldewyn, K.182 p

Change blindness: eradication of gestalt strategies

Arrays of eight, texture-defined rectangles were used as stimuli in a one-shot change blindness (CB) task where there was a 50% chance that one rectangle would change orientation between two successive presentations separated by an interval. CB was eliminated by cueing the target rectangle in the first stimulus, reduced by cueing in the interval and unaffected by cueing in the second presentation. This supports the idea that a representation was formed that persisted through the interval before being 'overwritten' by the second presentation (Landman et al, 2003 Vision Research 43149–164]. Another possibility is that participants used some kind of grouping or Gestalt strategy. To test this we changed the spatial position of the rectangles in the second presentation by shifting them along imaginary spokes (by ±1 degree) emanating from the central fixation point. There was no significant difference seen in performance between this and the standard task [F(1,4)=2.565, p=0.185]. This may suggest two things: (i) Gestalt grouping is not used as a strategy in these tasks, and (ii) it gives further weight to the argument that objects may be stored and retrieved from a pre-attentional store during this task

Event Structure In Vision And Language

Our visual experience is surprisingly rich: We do not only see low-level properties such as colors or contours; we also see events, or what is happening. Within linguistics, the examination of how we talk about events suggests that relatively abstract elements exist in the mind which pertain to the relational structure of events, including general thematic roles (e.g., Agent), Causation, Motion, and Transfer. For example, “Alex gave Jesse flowers” and “Jesse gave Alex flowers” both refer to an event of transfer, with the directionality of the transfer having different social consequences. The goal of the present research is to examine the extent to which abstract event information of this sort (event structure) is generated in visual perceptual processing. Do we perceive this information, just as we do with more ‘traditional’ visual properties like color and shape? In the first study (Chapter 2), I used a novel behavioral paradigm to show that event roles – who is acting on whom – are rapidly and automatically extracted from visual scenes, even when participants are engaged in an orthogonal task, such as color or gender identification. In the second study (Chapter 3), I provided functional magnetic resonance (fMRI) evidence for commonality in content between neural representations elicited by static snapshots of actions and by full, dynamic action sequences. These two studies suggest that relatively abstract representations of events are spontaneously extracted from sparse visual information. In the final study (Chapter 4), I return to language, the initial inspiration for my investigations of events in vision. Here I test the hypothesis that the human brain represents verbs in part via their associated event structures. Using a model of verbs based on event-structure semantic features (e.g., Cause, Motion, Transfer), it was possible to successfully predict fMRI responses in language-selective brain regions as people engaged in real-time comprehension of naturalistic speech. Taken together, my research reveals that in both perception and language, the mind rapidly constructs a representation of the world that includes events with relational structure

Category selectivity in human visual cortex:beyond visual object recognition

Item does not contain fulltextHuman ventral temporal cortex shows a categorical organization, with regions responding selectively to faces, bodies, tools, scenes, words, and other categories. Why is this? Traditional accounts explain category selectivity as arising within a hierarchical system dedicated to visual object recognition. For example, it has been proposed that category selectivity reflects the clustering of category-associated visual feature representations, or that it reflects category-specific computational algorithms needed to achieve view invariance. This visual object recognition framework has gained renewed interest with the success of deep neural network models trained to "recognize" objects: these hierarchical feed-forward networks show similarities to human visual cortex, including categorical separability. We argue that the object recognition framework is unlikely to fully account for category selectivity in visual cortex. Instead, we consider category selectivity in the context of other functions such as navigation, social cognition, tool use, and reading. Category-selective regions are activated during such tasks even in the absence of visual input and even in individuals with no prior visual experience. Further, they are engaged in close connections with broader domain-specific networks. Considering the diverse functions of these networks, category-selective regions likely encode their preferred stimuli in highly idiosyncratic formats; representations that are useful for navigation, social cognition, or reading are unlikely to be meaningfully similar to each other and to varying degrees may not be entirely visual. The demand for specific types of representations to support category-associated tasks may best account for category selectivity in visual cortex. This broader view invites new experimental and computational approaches.7 p

Getting aligned on representational alignment

Biological and artificial information processing systems form representations that they can use to categorize, reason, plan, navigate, and make decisions. How can we measure the extent to which the representations formed by these diverse systems agree? Do similarities in representations then translate into similar behavior? How can a system's representations be modified to better match those of another system? These questions pertaining to the study of representational alignment are at the heart of some of the most active research areas in cognitive science, neuroscience, and machine learning. For example, cognitive scientists measure the representational alignment of multiple individuals to identify shared cognitive priors, neuroscientists align fMRI responses from multiple individuals into a shared representational space for group-level analyses, and ML researchers distill knowledge from teacher models into student models by increasing their alignment. Unfortunately, there is limited knowledge transfer between research communities interested in representational alignment, so progress in one field often ends up being rediscovered independently in another. Thus, greater cross-field communication would be advantageous. To improve communication between these fields, we propose a unifying framework that can serve as a common language between researchers studying representational alignment. We survey the literature from all three fields and demonstrate how prior work fits into this framework. Finally, we lay out open problems in representational alignment where progress can benefit all three of these fields. We hope that our work can catalyze cross-disciplinary collaboration and accelerate progress for all communities studying and developing information processing systems. We note that this is a working paper and encourage readers to reach out with their suggestions for future revisions.Comment: Working paper, changes to be made in upcoming revision

Empiricism without Magic: Transformational Abstraction in Deep Convolutional Neural Networks

In artificial intelligence, recent research has demonstrated the remarkable potential of Deep Convolutional Neural Networks (DCNNs), which seem to exceed state-of-the-art performance in new domains weekly, especially on the sorts of very difficult perceptual discrimination tasks that skeptics thought would remain beyond the reach of artificial intelligence. However, it has proven difficult to explain why DCNNs perform so well. In philosophy of mind, empiricists have long suggested that complex cognition is based on information derived from sensory experience, often appealing to a faculty of abstraction. Rationalists have frequently complained, however, that empiricists never adequately explained how this faculty of abstraction actually works. In this paper, I tie these two questions together, to the mutual benefit of both disciplines. I argue that the architectural features that distinguish DCNNs from earlier neural networks allow them to implement a form of hierarchical processing that I call “transformational abstraction”. Transformational abstraction iteratively converts sensory-based representations of category exemplars into new formats that are increasingly tolerant to “nuisance variation” in input. Reflecting upon the way that DCNNs leverage a combination of linear and non-linear processing to efficiently accomplish this feat allows us to understand how the brain is capable of bi-directional travel between exemplars and abstractions, addressing longstanding problems in empiricist philosophy of mind. I end by considering the prospects for future research on DCNNs, arguing that rather than simply implementing 80s connectionism with more brute-force computation, transformational abstraction counts as a qualitatively distinct form of processing ripe with philosophical and psychological significance, because it is significantly better suited to depict the generic mechanism responsible for this important kind of psychological processing in the brain