Useful by Nature, Defensive on Demand: Topography and Sieges of Rome in the Gothic War

This project shows how the use of topographical elements impacted the development of siege warfare during the Gothic Wars in the 6th century A.D. Scholars studied topography and archaeology within the context of warfare in Late Antique Italy but they omit non-natural topographical features such as tombs, bridges, and aqueducts. Analyses undertaken include comparison and contrast of the sieges that the city of Rome endured during the Gothic Wars of a contemporary eye-witness, the Greek historian Procopius of Caesarea. The analysis includes other sieges such as Ravenna and Rimini. Christopher Lillington-Martin’s essay Procopius on the Struggle for Dara in 530 and Rome in 537-38: Reconciling Texts and Landscapes (2013) is a critical source because it sets the framework for the role of topography during the wars. Use of topography created different outcomes for the various sieges of the Gothic Wars and can be expressed in a narrative history

Gardens of the Devil A Report from Western Egypt

Sometimes the creation of a new policy or international initiative can produce unexpected results. Such is the case in the desert of Western Egypt where the legacy of mine warfare of World War II warriors is only now being assessed seriously through the focus of current mine action activities. Despite the fact that the great armies of Field Marshals Montgomery and Rommel fought in North Africa almost sixty years ago, the legacy of those surges and counter surges, sieges and counter sieges, is still being felt by the inhabitants and Bedouins who live or travel there

Virtual prototyping of medieval weapons for historical reconstruction of siege scenarios starting from topography and archaeological investigations

Chronicles of sieges to castles or fortresses, using “machinae”, can often be found in historical sources. Moreover, archaeological excavations of castles or fortresses has brought to light rocks or projectiles whose carving suggests a military usage. Nevertheless, chronicles and discoveries alone, are seldom enough to propose a faithful reconstruction of these machines. Therefore, the aim of this research is the development of methodologies for reconstructing virtual scenarios of sieges, starting from the scarce information available. In order to achieve it, a procedure for the virtual reconstruction of the siege machine has been set up, focusing on typology and dimensions of the machines, also investigating possible fire positions according to topography. The entire procedure has been developed using the siege of Cervara di Roma’s Rocca as a case study. Late medieval chronicles (end of 13th Century) report the siege brought by the papal army in order to restore the jurisdiction on the Cervara’s stronghold, following the insurrection of a group of vassals headed by a monk named Pelagio. The discovery, in the area of the Rocca, of a stone that could have been used as a projectile confirms what reported. The proposed methodology is composed of two parts. The first one is connected to the study of the “internal ballistics”, to understand the performances and to build virtual models of siege machines. The second part is the study of the “external ballistics”, then to the positioning and shooting ability of possible machines, analysing the topography of the area. In this paper, we present the feasibility of this methodology through the preliminary results achieved correlating internal and external ballistics

Samuel Holland: From Gunner and Sapper to Surveyor-General 1755-1764

The British Army engaged, in 1755, the young Dutch officer, Samuel Holland (whose patron was already the Third Duke of Richmond), to serve in North America as an artillery and engineering subaltern. Following many months’ service directly under the field commander, Holland became deeply involved in the siege of Louisbourg (1758) as the engineering assistant to James Wolfe. The latter warmly commended Holland to Richmond for his superior efficiency and his bravery under constantly heavy enemy fire. After the siege, Holland drew an accurate plan of the fortified port, illustrating the steps of the siege-attack and defence. He became busy in 1758 and 1759 in the preparation of the British attack on Quebec, during which he met the famous British navigator, James Cook, with whom he exchanged expertise. At the siege of Quebec he continued to serve Wolfe until the latter’s death in the battle of September 1759. From then until 1762 Holland served James Murray, first as part of a team of engineers participating in the defence of Quebec against a French siege, during which he was named acting chief engineer in place of a wounded officer and eventually confined in the city with the rest of the garrison until the siege was raised by the Royal Navy. Thereafter, under Murray’s command, Holland’s main achievement was his part in the surveying and mapping of the St. Lawrence valley, leading to the production of the “Murray Map”, an immense contribution to eighteenth-century cartography. Murray vehemently held, in the face of claims by officers of the Royal Engineers, that Samuel Holland deserved the most credit for the success and high quality of the product. During the Seven Years War, Holland had been promoted Captain. Excluded from the Royal Engineers, he was therefor quite independent of the bureaucracy of that corps when in 1763 he sought-in new American colonies ceded by France-an appointment in surveying and cartography. As a guest in the London house of the Duke of Richmond he had the opportunity of meeting influential politicians, where the recognition by Wolfe and Murray of the high quality of his professional competence finally led the British government to appoint him Surveyor General in North America

A critical assessment of Sir John Thomas Jones’ ‘Journals of the Sieges undertaken by the allies in Spain in the years 1811 and 1812’

During the Peninsular War (1808-1814) the Anglo-Portuguese army conducted seven major sieges in its struggle with the French invaders. In 1814 brevet Lieutenant-Colonel John Thomas Jones published Journals of the Sieges undertaken by the allies in Spain in the years 1811 and 1812 about the conduct of the sieges. Because Jones was a high-ranking Royal Engineer who had served in five sieges Journals of the Sieges … became the yardstick by which all other accounts were judged. In the 200 years since its publication more and more sources of information about the sieges have become available to researchers, from the publication of personal diaries or memoirs to the opening of various archives to the public. Yet despite this wealth of information many British (English language) historians still have an uncritical view of Journals of the Sieges and have made no attempt to check on the accuracy of its contents. This thesis is a critical assessment of Jones’ Journals of the Sieges, to examine how it became to be regarded in such an uncritical light, if Jones is a reliable historian of the sieges and are his conclusions valid? Much of this thesis is an examination of the evidence presented by Jones in Journals of the Sieges compared with evidence gleaned from a variety of other sources that include Jones’s personal journal, journals of other engineers present at the sieges and several French sources. However, because not many people are au fait with the details of early C19th fortifications or the processes involved in siege-warfare my thesis contains a chapter, which covers these issues. It also discusses the history, training and practical experience of both the French military engineers and their British counterparts. Such a comparison underlines the gulf in training and practical between the different sets of engineers. Besides literary sources, I decided to examine the physical remains at Badajoz and Ciudad Rodrigo to see if I could learn anything that had been omitted from the written accounts and to check whether the breach sites chosen by the engineers were the best available options. As Wellington was in overall command it was felt necessary to examine his role in the decisions made during the sieges, to see if they had a positive or negative impact on the sieges. At the conclusion of this thesis, I will draw together all the evidence from the literary sources, the field survey data and the exploration of Wellington’s involvement with the decisions made during the sieges to answer the three questions I set out in the introduction

Isolating dissent, punishing the masses: siege warfare as counter-insurgency

In Isolating Dissent, Punishing the Masses: Siege Warfare as Counter-Insurgency, Will Todman analyses the intricate relationship between the nature of the Syrian regime and the military tactics it opted to use to supress those opposed to it, both during the insurgency phase, and the subsequent civil war. Sieges were effective because they allowed the regime to make optimal use of its military advantage. Once you have a segment of the population in a restricted area, you not only control food and medical supplies, but you can also unleash an indiscriminate bombardment campaign, as the regime indeed did. Todman provides a historic context to the use of these tactics by the Syrian regime (i.e. Hama), and addresses the important question of whether or not siege warfare helped the regime surive.Publisher PD

“TAKE PITY OF YOUR TOWN AND OF YOUR PEOPLE”

It has been argued that the practice of siege warfare is at the very limit of legality under the terms of International Humanitarian Law.[1] The question addressed in this essay might be rephrased: how do the laws of armed conflict permitsieges to become humanitarian disasters? More precisely, can military doctrine regarding the efficacy of siege warfare operations to induce surrender of besieged forces comply in real world terms with the laws of armed conflict? Since February, 2022 it is alleged that Russian armed forces perpetrated a number of crimes against humanity in Ukraine during sieges of cities such as Mariupol. These alleged crimes include indiscriminate targeting of civilian habitation and attacks on evacuation corridors.[2] In the 1990s, siege warfare in the former Yugoslavia provoked international censure and criminal prosecution of perpetrators. Nevertheless, siege operations in Syria and Kashmir today show no sign of respecting the rights of civilian populations despite international censure. The core legal issue regarding sieges is the principle of distinction between combatants and non-combatant civilians and thus decisions regarding targeting and proportionality. The essay will show that distinction is a recent innovation in International Humanitarian Law and uncertainly embodied in military doctrine. The first part reviews evolving IHL norms pertinent to modern sieges. In the second, the essay examines modern jurisprudence regarding the conduct of siege warfare derived from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) prosecution of Major General Stanislav Galić and Major General Dragomir Milosević.[3]    [1] Riordan, K., ‘Shelling, Sniping and Starvation: the Law of Armed Conflict and the Lessons of the Siege of Sarajevo’, Victoria University of Wellington Law Review, 41 (2), p.150; Watts, S., Under Siege: International Humanitarian Law and Security Council Practice Concerning Urban Siege Operations’, Research and Policy Paper, CHE Project, May 2014. [2] https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2022/03/17/armed-conflict-in-ukraine-a-recap-of-basic-ihl-rules/ [3] https://www.icty.org/case/gali