Stacco: Differentially Analyzing Side-Channel Traces for Detecting SSL/TLS Vulnerabilities in Secure Enclaves

Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX) offers software applications enclave to protect their confidentiality and integrity from malicious operating systems. The SSL/TLS protocol, which is the de facto standard for protecting transport-layer network communications, has been broadly deployed for a secure communication channel. However, in this paper, we show that the marriage between SGX and SSL may not be smooth sailing. Particularly, we consider a category of side-channel attacks against SSL/TLS implementations in secure enclaves, which we call the control-flow inference attacks. In these attacks, the malicious operating system kernel may perform a powerful man-in-the-kernel attack to collect execution traces of the enclave programs at page, cacheline, or branch level, while positioning itself in the middle of the two communicating parties. At the center of our work is a differential analysis framework, dubbed Stacco, to dynamically analyze the SSL/TLS implementations and detect vulnerabilities that can be exploited as decryption oracles. Surprisingly, we found exploitable vulnerabilities in the latest versions of all the SSL/TLS libraries we have examined. To validate the detected vulnerabilities, we developed a man-in-the-kernel adversary to demonstrate Bleichenbacher attacks against the latest OpenSSL library running in the SGX enclave (with the help of Graphene) and completely broke the PreMasterSecret encrypted by a 4096-bit RSA public key with only 57286 queries. We also conducted CBC padding oracle attacks against the latest GnuTLS running in Graphene-SGX and an open-source SGX-implementation of mbedTLS (i.e., mbedTLS-SGX) that runs directly inside the enclave, and showed that it only needs 48388 and 25717 queries, respectively, to break one block of AES ciphertext. Empirical evaluation suggests these man-in-the-kernel attacks can be completed within 1 or 2 hours.Comment: CCS 17, October 30-November 3, 2017, Dallas, TX, US

An Energy-Efficient Reconfigurable DTLS Cryptographic Engine for End-to-End Security in IoT Applications

This paper presents a reconfigurable cryptographic engine that implements the DTLS protocol to enable end-to-end security for IoT. This implementation of the DTLS engine demonstrates 10x reduction in code size and 438x improvement in energy-efficiency over software. Our ECC primitive is 237x and 9x more energy-efficient compared to software and state-of-the-art hardware respectively. Pairing the DTLS engine with an on-chip RISC-V allows us to demonstrate applications beyond DTLS with up to 2 orders of magnitude energy savings.Comment: Published in 2018 IEEE International Solid-State Circuits Conference (ISSCC

An Energy-Efficient Reconfigurable DTLS Cryptographic Engine for End-to-End Security in IoT Applications

This paper presents a reconfigurable cryptographic engine that implements the DTLS protocol to enable end-to-end security for IoT. This implementation of the DTLS engine demonstrates 10x reduction in code size and 438x improvement in energy-efficiency over software. Our ECC primitive is 237x and 9x more energy-efficient compared to software and state-of-the-art hardware respectively. Pairing the DTLS engine with an on-chip RISC-V allows us to demonstrate applications beyond DTLS with up to 2 orders of magnitude energy savings.Comment: Published in 2018 IEEE International Solid-State Circuits Conference (ISSCC

Memory-Based High-Level Synthesis Optimizations Security Exploration on the Power Side-Channel

High-level synthesis (HLS) allows hardware designers to think algorithmically and not worry about low-level, cycle-by-cycle details. This provides the ability to quickly explore the architectural design space and tradeoffs between resource utilization and performance. Unfortunately, security evaluation is not a standard part of the HLS design flow. In this article, we aim to understand the effects of memory-based HLS optimizations on power side-channel leakage. We use Xilinx Vivado HLS to develop different cryptographic cores, implement them on a Spartan-6 FPGA, and collect power traces. We evaluate the designs with respect to resource utilization, performance, and information leakage through power consumption. We have two important observations and contributions. First, the choice of resource optimization directive results in different levels of side-channel vulnerabilities. Second, the partitioning optimization directive can greatly compromise the hardware cryptographic system through power side-channel leakage due to the deployment of memory control logic. We describe an evaluation procedure for power side-channel leakage and use it to make best-effort recommendations about how to design more secure architectures in the cryptographic domain