Online Auctions

The economic literature on online auctions is rapidly growing because of the enormous amount of freely available field data. Moreover, numerous innovations in auction-design features on platforms such as eBay have created excellent research opportunities. In this article, we survey the theoretical, empirical, and experimental research on bidder strategies (including the timing of bids and winner's-curse effects) and seller strategies (including reserve-price policies and the use of buy-now options) in online auctions, as well as some of the literature dealing with online-auction design (including stopping rules and multi-object pricing rules).

Core-Selecting Auctions for Dynamically Allocating Heterogeneous VMs in Cloud Computing

In a cloud market, the cloud provider provisions heterogeneous virtual machine (VM) instances from its resource pool, for allocation to cloud users. Auction-based allocations are efficient in assigning VMs to users who value them the most. Existing auction design often overlooks the heterogeneity of VMs, and does not consider dynamic, demand-driven VM provisioning. Moreover, the classic VCG auction leads to unsatisfactory seller revenues and vulnerability to a strategic bidding behavior known as shill bidding. This work presents a new type of core-selecting VM auctions, which are combinatorial auctions that always select bidder charges from the core of the price vector space, with guaranteed economic efficiency under truthful bidding. These auctions represent a comprehensive three-phase mechanism that instructs the cloud provider to judiciously assemble, allocate, and price VM bundles. They are proof against shills, can improve seller revenue over existing auction mechanisms, and can be tailored to maximize truthfulness.published_or_final_versio

Online English Auction Scheme

Online English auction is most familiar and mostly used online auction process in the present scenario. It is the most efficient auction process which gives most desirable results in terms of revenue. Our scheme involves three parties, namely the Registration Manager(RM), Auction Manager(AM), and Bidder(B). The Registration Manager publicizes the parameters to register the bidders, allowing them to participate in the bidding process. It also protects the bidding rights and manages the information on the key. The Auction Manager is responsible for conducting the bidding after the registration is over. Our proposed scheme satisfies the following features such as anonymity, no framing, unforgeability, non-repudiation, fairness, public verifiability, one-time registration, and easy revocation. The scheme uses Discrete Logarithmic Problem (DLP) and Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1) as hash function

An Online English Auction Scheme

Online English auction is most familiar and mostly used online auction process in the present scenario. It is the most efficient auction process which gives most desirable results in terms of revenue . Our scheme involves three parties, namely the Registration Manager(RM), Auction Manager(AM), and Bidder(B). The Registration Manager publicizes the parameters to register the bidders, allowing them to participate in the bidding process. It also protects the bidding rights and manages the information on the key. The Auction Manager is responsible for conducting the bidding after the registration is over. Our proposed scheme satisfies the following features such as anonymity, no framing, unforgeability, non-repudiation, fairness, public verifiability, one-time registration, and easy revocation. The scheme uses Discrete Logarithmic Problem (DLP) and Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1) as hash function

Online English Auction Scheme

Online English auction is most familiar and mostly used online auction process in the present scenario. It is the most efficient auction process which gives most desirable results in terms of revenue. Our scheme involves three parties, namely the Registration Manager(RM), Auction Manager(AM), and Bidder(B). The Registration Manager publicizes the parameters to register the bidders, allowing them to participate in the bidding process. It also protects the bidding rights and manages the information on the key. The Auction Manager is responsible for conducting the bidding after the registration is over. Our proposed scheme satisfies the following features such as anonymity, no framing, unforgeability, non-repudiation, fairness, public verifiability, one-time registration, and easy revocation. The scheme uses Discrete Logarithmic Problem (DLP) and Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1) as hash function

Auctions and bidding: A guide for computer scientists

There is a veritable menagerie of auctions-single-dimensional, multi-dimensional, single-sided, double-sided, first-price, second-price, English, Dutch, Japanese, sealed-bid-and these have been extensively discussed and analyzed in the economics literature. The main purpose of this article is to survey this literature from a computer science perspective, primarily from the viewpoint of computer scientists who are interested in learning about auction theory, and to provide pointers into the economics literature for those who want a deeper technical understanding. In addition, since auctions are an increasingly important topic in computer science, we also look at work on auctions from the computer science literature. Overall, our aim is to identifying what both these bodies of work these tell us about creating electronic auctions. © 2011 ACM.This work was funded in part by HP under the “Always on” grant, by NSF IIS-0329037 “Tools and Techniques for Automated Mechanism Design”, and by IEA (TIN2006-15662-C02-01), OK (IST-4-027253-STP), eREP(EC-FP6-CIT5-28575) and Agreement Technologies (CONSOLIDER CSD2007-0022, INGENIO 2010).Peer Reviewe

06461 Abstracts Collection -- Negotiation and Market Engineering

From 12.11.06 to 17.11.06, the Dagstuhl Seminar 06461 ``Negotiation and Market Engineering\u27\u27 was held in the International Conference and Research Center (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl. During the seminar, several participants presented their current research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of the presentations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of seminar results and ideas are put together in this paper. The first section describes the seminar topics and goals in general. Links to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if available