15 research outputs found
Defensive Approaches on SQL Injection and Cross-Site Scripting Attacks
SQL Injection attacks are the most common attacks on the web applications Statistical analysis says that so many web sites which interact with the database are prone to SQL Injection XSS attacks Different kinds of vulnerability detection system and attack detection systems exist there is no efficient system for detecting these kinds of attacks SQL Injection attacks are possible due to the design drawbacks of the websites which interact with back-end databases Successful attacks may damage more The state-of-art web application input validation echniques fails to identify the proper SQL XSS Vulnerabilities accurately because of the systems correctness of sanity checking capability proper placement of valuators on the applications The systems fail while processing HTTP Parameter pollution attacks An extensive survey on the SQL Injection attacks is conducted to present various detection and prevension mechanism
Augmented attack tree modeling of SQL injection attacks
The SQL injection attacks (SQLIAs) vulnerability is extremely widespread and poses a serious security threat to web applications with built-in access to databases. The SQLIA adversary intelligently exploits the SQL statement parsing operation by web servers via specially constructed SQL statements that subtly lead to non-explicit executions or modifications of corresponding database tables. In this paper, we present a formal and methodical way of modeling SQLIAs by way of augmented attack trees. This modeling explicitly captures the particular subtle incidents triggered by SQLIA adversaries and corresponding state transitions. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first known attack tree modelling of SQL injection attacks
Augmented attack tree modeling of SQL injection attacks
The SQL injection attacks (SQLIAs) vulnerability is extremely widespread and poses a serious security threat to web applications with built-in access to databases. The SQLIA adversary intelligently exploits the SQL statement parsing operation by web servers via specially constructed SQL statements that subtly lead to non-explicit executions or modifications of corresponding database tables. In this paper, we present a formal and methodical way of modeling SQLIAs by way of augmented attack trees. This modeling explicitly captures the particular subtle incidents triggered by SQLIA adversaries and corresponding state transitions. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first known attack tree modelling of SQL injection attacks
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How TalkTalk did the walk-walk: strategic reputational repair in a cyber-attack
Purpose:
Cyber-attacks that generate technical disruptions in organisational operations and damage the reputation of organisations have become all too common in the contemporary organisation. This paper explores the reputation repair strategies undertaken by organisations in the event of becoming victims of cyber-attacks.
Design/methodology/approach:
For developing the authors’ contribution in the context of the Internet service providers' industry, the authors draw on a qualitative case study of TalkTalk, a British telecommunications company providing business to business (B2B) and business to customer (B2C) Internet services, which was a victim of a “significant and sustained” cyber-attack in October 2015. Data for the enquiry is sourced from publicly available archival documents such as newspaper articles, press releases, podcasts and parliamentary hearings on the TalkTalk cyber-attack.
Findings:
The findings suggest a dynamic interplay of technical and rhetorical responses in dealing with cyber-attacks. This plays out in the form of marshalling communication and mortification techniques, bolstering image and riding on leader reputation, which serially combine to strategically orchestrate reputational repair and stigma erasure in the event of a cyber-attack.
Originality/value:
Analysing a prototypical case of an organisation in dire straits following a cyber-attack, the paper provides a systematic characterisation of the setting-in-motion of strategic responses to manage, revamp and ameliorate damaged reputation during cyber-attacks, which tend to negatively shape the evaluative perceptions of the organisation's salient audience
Toward least-privilege isolation for software
Hackers leverage software vulnerabilities to disclose, tamper with, or destroy sensitive
data. To protect sensitive data, programmers can adhere to the principle of
least-privilege, which entails giving software the minimal privilege it needs to operate,
which ensures that sensitive data is only available to software components on a
strictly need-to-know basis. Unfortunately, applying this principle in practice is dif-
�cult, as current operating systems tend to provide coarse-grained mechanisms for
limiting privilege. Thus, most applications today run with greater-than-necessary
privileges. We propose sthreads, a set of operating system primitives that allows
�ne-grained isolation of software to approximate the least-privilege ideal. sthreads
enforce a default-deny model, where software components have no privileges by default,
so all privileges must be explicitly granted by the programmer.
Experience introducing sthreads into previously monolithic applications|thus,
partitioning them|reveals that enumerating privileges for sthreads is di�cult in
practice. To ease the introduction of sthreads into existing code, we include Crowbar,
a tool that can be used to learn the privileges required by a compartment. We
show that only a few changes are necessary to existing code in order to partition
applications with sthreads, and that Crowbar can guide the programmer through
these changes. We show that applying sthreads to applications successfully narrows
the attack surface by reducing the amount of code that can access sensitive data.
Finally, we show that applications using sthreads pay only a small performance
overhead. We applied sthreads to a range of applications. Most notably, an SSL
web server, where we show that sthreads are powerful enough to protect sensitive
data even against a strong adversary that can act as a man-in-the-middle in the
network, and also exploit most code in the web server; a threat model not addressed
to date
Reality Hackers: The Next Wave of Media Revolutionaries
Just as the printing press gave rise to the nation-state, emerging technologies are reshaping collective identities and challenging our understanding of what it means to be human.
Should citizens have the right to be truly anonymous on-line? Should we be concerned about the fact that so many people are choosing to migrate to virtual worlds? Are injectible microscopic radio-frequency ID chips a blessing or a curse? Is the use of cognitive enhancing nootropics a human right or an unforgivable transgression? Should genomic data about human beings be hidden away with commercial patents or open-sourced like software? Should hobbyists known as biohackers be allowed to experiment with genetic engineering in their home laboratories?
The time-frame for acting on such questions is relatively short, and these decisions are too important to be left up to a small handful of scientists and policymakers. If democracy is to continue as a viable alternative to technocracy, the average citizen must become more involved in these debates. To borrow a line from the computer visionary Ted Nelson, all of us can -- and must -- understand technology now.
Challenging the popular stereotype of hackers as ciminal sociopaths, reality hackers uphold the basic tenets of what Steven Levy (1984) terms the hacker ethic. These core principles include a commitment to: sharing, openness, decentralization, public access to information, and the use of new technologies to make the world a better place.https://digitalcommons.trinity.edu/mono/1000/thumbnail.jp
Computer science: the hardware software and heart of IT
1st edition, 201