3 research outputs found
Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems: Comment
The contest-theoretic literature on the attack and defense of networks of targets focuses primarily on pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Hausken\u27s 2008 European Journal of Operational Research article typifies this approach, and many of the models in this literature either build upon this model or utilize similar techniques. We show that Hausken\u27s characterization of Nash equilibrium is invalid for much of the parameter space examined and provides necessary conditions for his solution to hold. The complete characterization of mixed-strategy equilibria remains an open problem, although there exist solutions in the literature for special prominent cases
Shield versus sword resource distribution in K-round duels
The final publication is available at link.springer.com.The paper considers optimal resource distribution between offense and
defense in a duel. In each round of the duel two actors exchange attacks distributing
the offense resources equally across K rounds. The offense resources are expendable
(e.g. missiles), whereas the defense resources are not expendable (e.g. bunkers). The
outcomes of each round are determined by a contest success functions which depend
on the offensive and defensive resources. The game ends when at least one target is
destroyed or after K rounds. We show that when each actor maximizes its own survivability,
then both actors allocate all their resources defensively. Conversely, when
each actor minimizes the survivability of the other actor, then both actors allocate all
their resources offensively. We then consider two cases of battle for a single target
in which one of the actors minimizes the survivability of its counterpart whereas the
counterpart maximizes its own survivability. It is shown that in these two cases the
minmax survivabilities of the two actors are the same, and the sum of their resource
fractions allocated to offense is equal to 1. However, their resource distributions are
different. In the symmetric situation when the actors are equally resourceful and the
two contest intensities are equal, then the actor that fights for the destruction of its
counterpart allocates more resources to offense. We demonstrate a methodology of
game analysis by illustrating how the resources, contest intensities and number of
rounds in the duels impact the survivabilities and resource distributions
Risk-attitude-based defense strategy considering proactive strike, preventive strike and imperfect false targets
This paper analyzes the optimal strategies for the attacker and the defender in an attack–defense game, considering the risk attitudes of both parties. The defender moves first, allocating its limited resources to three different measures: launching a proactive strike or preventive strike, building false targets, and protecting its genuine object. It is assumed that (a) launching a proactive strike has limited effectiveness on its rival and does not expose the genuine object itself, (b) a false target might be correctly identified as false, and (c) launching a preventive strike consumes less resources than a proactive strike and might expose the genuine object. The attacker moves after observing the defender's movements, allocating its limited resources to three measures: protecting its own base from a proactive strike or preventive strike, building false bases, and attacking the defender's genuine object. For each of the defender's given strategies, the attacker chooses the attack strategy that maximizes its cumulative prospect value, which accounts for the players’ risk attitudes. Similarly, the defender maximizes its cumulative prospect value by anticipating that the attacker will always choose the strategy combination that maximizes its own cumulative prospect value. Backward induction is used to obtain the optimal defense, attack strategies, and their corresponding cumulative prospect values. Our results show that the introduction of risk attitudes leads the game to a lose-lose situation under some circumstances and benefits one party in other cases