An integrated theory of language production and comprehension

Currently, production and comprehension are regarded as quite distinct in accounts of language processing. In rejecting this dichotomy, we instead assert that producing and understanding are interwoven, and that this interweaving is what enables people to predict themselves and each other. We start by noting that production and comprehension are forms of action and action perception. We then consider the evidence for interweaving in action, action perception, and joint action, and explain such evidence in terms of prediction. Specifically, we assume that actors construct forward models of their actions before they execute those actions, and that perceivers of others' actions covertly imitate those actions, then construct forward models of those actions. We use these accounts of action, action perception, and joint action to develop accounts of production, comprehension, and interactive language. Importantly, they incorporate well-defined levels of linguistic representation (such as semantics, syntax, and phonology). We show (a) how speakers and comprehenders use covert imitation and forward modeling to make predictions at these levels of representation, (b) how they interweave production and comprehension processes, and (c) how they use these predictions to monitor the upcoming utterances. We show how these accounts explain a range of behavioral and neuroscientific data on language processing and discuss some of the implications of our proposal

Towards a complete multiple-mechanism account of predictive language processing [Commentary on Pickering & Garrod]

Although we agree with Pickering & Garrod (P&G) that prediction-by-simulation and prediction-by-association are important mechanisms of anticipatory language processing, this commentary suggests that they: (1) overlook other potential mechanisms that might underlie prediction in language processing, (2) overestimate the importance of prediction-by-association in early childhood, and (3) underestimate the complexity and significance of several factors that might mediate prediction during language processing

Understanding Anthropological Understanding: for a merological anthropology

In this paper I argue for a merological anthropology in which ideas of ‘partiality’ and ‘practical adequacy’ provide a way out of the impasse of relativism which is implied by post-modernism and the related abandonment of a concern with ‘truth’. Ideas such as ‘aptness’ and ‘faithfulness’ enable us to re-establish empirical foundations without having to espouse a simple realism which has been rightly criticised. Ideas taken from ethnomethodology, particularly the way we bootstrap from ‘practical adequacy’ to ‘warrants for confidence’ point to a merological anthropology in which we recognize that we do not and cannot know everything, but that we can have reasons for being confident in the little we know

Constructing an understanding of mind : the development of children's social understanding within social interaction

Theories of children's developing understanding of mind tend to emphasize either individualistic processes of theory formation, maturation, or introspection, or the process of enculturation. However, such theories must be able to account for the accumulating evidence of the role of social interaction in the development of social understanding. We propose an alternative account, according to which the development of children's social understanding occurs within triadic interaction involving the child's experience of the world as well as communicative interaction with others about their experience and beliefs (Chapman 1991; 1999). It is through such triadic interaction that children gradually construct knowledge of the world as well as knowledge of other people. We contend that the extent and nature of the social interaction children experience will influence the development of children's social understanding. Increased opportunity to engage in cooperative social interaction and exposure to talk about mental states should facilitate the development of social understanding. We review evidence suggesting that children's understanding of mind develops gradually in the context of social interaction. Therefore, we need a theory of development in this area that accords a fundamental role to social interaction, yet does not assume that children simply adopt socially available knowledge but rather that children construct an understanding of mind within social interaction

Resistance to change. Exploring the convergence of institutions, organizations and the mind toward a common phenomenon

Resistance to change is not a new concept in economic literature (Coch and French 1948, Boulding 1956). However, in the last few decades it has acquired specific connotations and meanings that deserve attention. The first aim of the paper is to analyze how the concept has evolved since its introduction by Lewin (1946) and how it has diversified. Having acknowledged that resistance characterizes institutions, organizations and the mind, we suggest that the convergence toward such phenomenon is not surprising. Indeed, it may be explained by taking the bounds that affect the cognitive and emotional counterparts of economic behavior into account. We finally reinterpret resistance to change as a heuristic that helps manage the natural tendency of human beings to fear, uncertainty and its expected effects.Change - cognitive economics - heuristic - emotions - resistance

Cognitivism and Innovation in Economics - Two Lectures

This issue of the Department W.P. reproduces two lectures by Professor Loasby organized by the CISEPS (Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology and the Social Sciences at Bicocca) in collaboration with the IEP, the Istituto di Economia Politica of the Bocconi University in Milan. The first lecture was delivered at the University of Milano-Bicocca on 13 October 2003 and the second was staged the day after at the Bocconi University. The lectures are reproduced here together with a comment by dr. Stefano Brusoni of Bocconi and SPRU. Two further comments were presented at the time by Professor Richard Arena of the University of Nice and by Professor Pier Luigi Sacco of the University of Venice. Both of them deserve gratitude for active participation to the initiative. Unfortunately it has not been possible to include their comments in the printed form. In these lectures Brian Loasby opens under the title of Psychology of Wealth (a title echoing a famous essay by Carlo Cattaneo) and he develops an argument in cognitive economics which is based on Hayek’s theory of the human mind with significant complements and extensions, mainly from Smith and Marshall. The second lecture provides a discussion on organization and the human mind. It can be read independently although it is linked to the former. Indeed, in Professor Loasby’s words, “the psychology of wealth leads to a particular perspective on this problem of organization”. The gist of the argument lies in the need to appreciate the significance of an appropriate “balance between apparently conflicting principles: the coherence, and therefore the effectiveness, of this differentiated system requires some degree of compatibility between its elements, but the creation of differentiated knowledge and skills depends on the freedom to make idiosyncratic patterns by thinking and acting in ways which may be radically different from those of many other people”. This dilemma of compatibility vs. independence can find solution in a variety of contexts, as Loasby’s analysis shows. In his comments Richard Arena had focussed on the rationality issues, so prominent in Loasby’s text. For example, he had suggested that the cleavage between rational choice equilibrium and evolutionary order offers ground to new forms of self-organization. Pier Luigi Sacco had emphasized that Loasby’s approach breaks new ground on the economics of culture and paves the way to less simplistic conceptions of endogenous growth than is suggested by the conventional wisdom of current models. Unfortunately, as hinted above, is has proved impossible to include those comments in the present booklet along with Loasby’s lectures. A special obligation must be recorded to Dr. Stefano Brusoni, who has prepared a written version of his own comment which has been printed in this booklet and can be offered to the reader. Among other participants Roberto Scazzieri, of the University of Bologna, Tiziano Raffaelli, of the University of Pisa, Luigino Bruni of Bicocca, Riccardo Cappellin of Rome ‘Tor Vergata’ and others were able to offer significant comments during the two sessions of the initiative. The organizers are particularly grateful to Professor Brian Loasby for the active and generous support of the initiative. Together with our colleagues and students we have been able to admire his enthusiasm and intellectual creativity in treating some of the more fascinating topics of contemporary economics.

Cognitive science and epistemic openness

Recent findings in cognitive science suggest that the epistemic subject is more complex and epistemically porous than is generally pictured. Human knowers are open to the world via multiple channels, each operating for particular purposes and according to its own logic. These findings need to be understood and addressed by the philosophical community. The current essay argues that one consequence of the new findings is to invalidate certain arguments for epistemic anti-realism