Analyzing Social Network Structures in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Choice and Refusal

The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Choice and Refusal (IPD/CR) is an extension of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with evolution that allows players to choose and to refuse their game partners. From individual behaviors, behavioral population structures emerge. In this report, we examine one particular IPD/CR environment and document the social network methods used to identify population behaviors found within this complex adaptive system. In contrast to the standard homogeneous population of nice cooperators, we have also found metastable populations of mixed strategies within this environment. In particular, the social networks of interesting populations and their evolution are examined.Comment: 37 pages, uuencoded gzip'd Postscript (1.1Mb when gunzip'd) also available via WWW at http://www.cs.wisc.edu/~smucker/ipd-cr/ipd-cr.htm

Cooperative Strategies in Groups of Strangers: An Experiment

We study cooperation in four-person economies of indefinite duration. Subjects interact anonymously playing a prisoner’s dilemma. We identify and characterize the strategies employed at the aggregate and at the individual level. We find that (i) grim trigger well describes aggregate play, but not individual play; (ii) individual behavior is persistently heterogeneous; (iii) coordination on cooperative strategies does not improve with experience; (iv) systematic defection does not crowd-out systematic cooperation.repeated games, equilibrium selection, prisoners’ dilemma, random matching

Common Knowledge and Interactive Behaviors: A Survey

This paper surveys the notion of common knowledge taken from game theory and computer science. It studies and illustrates more generally the effects of interactive knowledge in economic and social problems. First of all, common knowledge is shown to be a central concept and often a necessary condition for coordination, equilibrium achievement, agreement, and consensus. We present how common knowledge can be practically generated, for example, by particular advertisements or leadership. Secondly, we prove that common knowledge can be harmful, essentially in various cooperation and negotiation problems, and more generally when there are con icts of interest. Finally, in some asymmetric relationships, common knowledge is shown to be preferable for some players, but not for all. The ambiguous welfare effects of higher-order knowledge on interactive behaviors leads us to analyze the role of decentralized communication in order to deal with dynamic or endogenous information structures.Interactive knowledge, common knowledge, information structure, communication.

Preferential partner selection in an evolutionary study of Prisoner\u27s Dilemma

Partner selection is an important process in many social interactions, permitting individuals to decrease the risks associated with cooperation. In large populations, defectors may escape punishment by roving from partner to partner, but defectors in smaller populations risk social isolation. We investigate these possibilities for an evolutionary Prisoner\u27s Dilemma in which agents use expected payoffs to choose and refuse partners. In comparison to random or round-robin partner matching, we find that the average payoffs attained with preferential partner selection tend to be more narrowly confined to a few isolated payoff regions. Most ecologies evolve to essentially full cooperative behavior, but when agents are intolerant of defections, or when the costs of refusal and social isolation are small, we also see the emergence of wallflower ecologies in which all agents are socially isolated. Between these two extremes, we see the emergence of ecologies whose agents tend to engage in a small number of defections followed by cooperation thereafter. The latter ecologies exhibit a plethora of interesting social interaction patterns

Preferential Partner Selection in an Evolutionary Study of Prisoner\u27s Dilemma

Partner selection is an important process in many social interactions, permitting individuals to decrease the risks associated with cooperation. In large populations, defectors may escape punishment by roving from partner to partner, but defectors in smaller populations risk social isolation. We investigate these possibilities for an evolutionary prisoner\u27s dilemma in which agents use expected payoffs to choose and refuse partners. In comparison to random or round-robin partner matching, we find that the average payoffs attained with preferential partner selection tend to be more narrowly confined to a few isolated payoff regions. Most ecologies evolve to essentially full cooperative behavior, but when agents are intolerant of defections, or when the costs of refusal and social isolation are small, we also see the emergence of wallflower ecologies in which all agents are socially isolated. In between these two extremes, we see the emergence of ecologies whose agents tend to engage in a small number of defections followed by cooperation thereafter. The latter ecologies exhibit a plethora of interesting social interaction patterns

Self-Organizing Traffic at a Malfunctioning Intersection

Traffic signals and traffic flow models have been studied extensively in the past and have provided valuable insights on the design of signalling systems, congestion control, and punitive policies. This paper takes a slightly different tack and describes what happens at an intersection where the traffic signals are malfunctioning and stuck in some configuration. By modelling individual vehicles as agents, we were able to replicate the surprisingly organized traffic flow that we observed at a real malfunctioning intersection in urban India. Counter-intuitively, the very lawlessness that normally causes jams was causing traffic to flow smoothly at this intersection. We situate this research in the context of other research on emergent complex phenomena in traffic, and suggest further lines of research that could benefit from the analysis and modelling of rule-breaking behaviour.Self-Organizing Systems, Complex Systems, Traffic, Emergent Behaviour, Agent-Based Modelling, Rule-Breaking

An exploration and validation of computer modeling of evolution, natural selection, and evolutionary biology with cellular automata for secondary students.

The Evolutionary Tool Kit, a new software package, is the prototype of a concept simulator providing an environment for students to create microworlds of populations of artificial organisms. Its function is to model processes, concepts and arguments in natural selection and evolutionary biology, using either Mendelian asexual or sexual reproduction, or counterfactual systems such as \u27paint pot\u27 or blending inheritance. In this environment students can explore a conceptual What if? in evolutionary biology, test misconceptions and deepen understanding of inheritance and changes in populations. Populations can be defined either with typological, or with populational thinking, to inquire into the role and necessity of variation in natural selection. The approach is generative not tutorial. The interface is highly graphic with twenty traits set as icons that are moved onto the \u27phenotypes\u27. Activities include investigations of evolutionary theory of aging, reproductive advantage, sexual selection and mimicry. Design of the activities incorporates Howard Gardner\u27s Theory of Multiple Intelligences. Draft of a teacher and student manual are included

Abstracts 2014: Highlights of Student Research and Creative Endeavors

https://csuepress.columbusstate.edu/abstracts/1006/thumbnail.jp

Risk, rationality, and resilience

Improving our ability to cope with large risks is one of the key challenges for humankind in this century. This article outlines a research program in this perspective. Starting with a concrete example of a relatively small disaster, it questions simplistic ideas of rationality. It then proposes a fresh look at the concepts of probability and utility in the context of socio-ecological systems. This leads first to an emphasis on the problem of equilibrium selection, and then to a distinction between three kinds of resilience that matter both for theory and practice of risk management. They can be investigated by paying attention to the transitions into and out of actual disasters