Hypersonic Research Vehicle (HRV) real-time flight test support feasibility and requirements study. Part 2: Remote computation support for flight systems functions

The requirements are assessed for the use of remote computation to support HRV flight testing. First, remote computational requirements were developed to support functions that will eventually be performed onboard operational vehicles of this type. These functions which either cannot be performed onboard in the time frame of initial HRV flight test programs because the technology of airborne computers will not be sufficiently advanced to support the computational loads required, or it is not desirable to perform the functions onboard in the flight test program for other reasons. Second, remote computational support either required or highly desirable to conduct flight testing itself was addressed. The use is proposed of an Automated Flight Management System which is described in conceptual detail. Third, autonomous operations is discussed and finally, unmanned operations

Real-time Adaptive Sensor Attack Detection and Recovery in Autonomous Cyber-physical Systems

Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) tightly couple information technology with physical processes, which rises new vulnerabilities such as physical attacks that are beyond conventional cyber attacks.Attackers may non-invasively compromise sensors and spoof the controller to perform unsafe actions. This issue is even emphasized with the increasing autonomy in CPS. While this fact has motivated many defense mechanisms against sensor attacks, a clear vision of the timing and usability (or the false alarm rate) of attack detection still remains elusive. Existing works tend to pursue an unachievable goal of minimizing the detection delay and false alarm rate at the same time, while there is a clear trade-off between the two metrics. Instead, this dissertation argues that attack detection should bias different metrics (detection delay and false alarm) when a system sits in different states. For example, if the system is close to unsafe states, reducing the detection delay is preferable to lowering the false alarm rate, and vice versa. This dissertation proposes two real-time adaptive sensor attack detection frameworks. The frameworks can dynamically adapt the detection delay and false alarm rate so as to meet a detection deadline and improve usability according to different system statuses. We design and implement the proposed frameworks and validate them using realistic sensor data of automotive CPS to demonstrate its efficiency and efficacy. Further, this dissertation proposes \textit{Recovery-by-Learning}, a data-driven attack recovery framework that restores CPS from sensor attacks. The importance of attack recovery is emphasized by the need to mitigate the attack\u27s impact on a system and restore it to continue functioning. We propose a double sliding window-based checkpointing protocol to remove compromised data and keep trustful data for state estimation. Together, the proposed solutions enable a holistic attack resilient solution for automotive cyber-physical systems

Unsupervised anomaly detection for underwater gliders using generative adversarial networks

An effective anomaly detection system is critical for marine autonomous systems operating in complex and dynamic marine environments to reduce operational costs and achieve concurrent large-scale fleet deployments. However, developing an automated fault detection system remains challenging for several reasons including limited data transmission via satellite services. Currently, most anomaly detection for marine autonomous systems, such as underwater gliders, rely on intensive analysis by pilots. This study proposes an unsupervised anomaly detection system using bidirectional generative adversarial networks guided by assistive hints for marine autonomous systems with time series data collected by multiple sensors. In this study, the anomaly detection system for a fleet of underwater gliders is trained on two healthy deployment datasets and tested on other nine deployment datasets collected by a selection of vehicles operating in a range of locations and environmental conditions. The system is successfully applied to detect anomalies in the nine test deployments, which include several different types of anomalies as well as healthy behaviour. Also, a sensitivity study of the data decimation settings suggests the proposed system is robust for Near Real-Time anomaly detection for underwater gliders

Real-time Adaptive Detection and Recovery against Sensor Attacks in Cyber-physical Systems

Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) utilize computation to control physical objects in real-world environments, and an increasing number of CPS-based applications have been designed for life-critical purposes. Sensor attacks, which manipulate sensor readings to deceive CPSs into performing dangerous actions, can result in severe consequences. This urgent need has motivated significant research into reactive defense. In this dissertation, we present an adaptive detection method capable of identifying sensor attacks before the system reaches unsafe states. Once the attacks are detected, a recovery approach that we propose can guide the physical plant to a desired safe state before a safety deadline.Existing detection approaches tend to minimize detection delay and false alarms simultaneously, despite a clear trade-off between these two metrics. We argue that attack detection should dynamically balance these metrics according to the physical system\u27s current state. In line with this argument, we propose an adaptive sensor attack detection system comprising three components: an adaptive detector, a detection deadline estimator, and a data logger. This system can adapt the detection delay and thus false alarms in real-time to meet a varying detection deadline, thereby improving usability. We implement our detection system and validate it using multiple CPS simulators and a reduced-scale autonomous vehicle testbed. After identifying sensor attacks, it is essential to extend the benefits of attack detection. In this dissertation, we investigate how to eliminate the impact of these attacks and propose novel real-time recovery methods for securing CPSs. Initially, we target sensor attack recovery in linear CPSs. By employing formal methods, we are able to reconstruct state estimates and calculate a conservative safety deadline. With these constraints, we formulate the recovery problem as either a linear programming or a quadratic programming problem. By solving this problem, we obtain a recovery control sequence that can smoothly steer a physical system back to a target state set before a safe deadline and maintain the system state within the set once reached. Subsequently, to make recovery practical for complex CPSs, we adapt our recovery method for nonlinear systems and explore the use of uncorrupted sensors to alleviate uncertainty accumulation. Ultimately, we implement our approach and showcase its effectiveness and efficiency through an extensive set of experiments. For linear CPSs, we evaluate the approach using 5 CPS simulators and 3 types of sensor attacks. For nonlinear CPSs, we assess our method on 3 nonlinear benchmarks