99 research outputs found

    Power measures derived from the sequential query process

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    We study a basic sequential model for the discovery of winning coalitions in a simple game, well known from its use in defining the Shapley-Shubik power index. We derive in a uniform way a family of measures of collective and individual power in simple games, and show that, as for the Shapley-Shubik index, they extend naturally to measures for TU-games. In particular, the individual measures include all weighted semivalues. We single out the simplest measure in our family for more investigation, as it is new to the literature as far as we know. Although it is very different from the Shapley value, it is closely related in several ways, and is the natural analogue of the Shapley value under a nonstandard, but natural, definition of simple game. We illustrate this new measure by calculating its values on some standard examples.Comment: 13 pages, to appear in Mathematical Social Science

    On the Complexity of the Inverse Semivalue Problem for Weighted Voting Games

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    Weighted voting games are a family of cooperative games, typically used to model voting situations where a number of agents (players) vote against or for a proposal. In such games, a proposal is accepted if an appropriately weighted sum of the votes exceeds a prespecified threshold. As the influence of a player over the voting outcome is not in general proportional to her assigned weight, various power indices have been proposed to measure each player's influence. The inverse power index problem is the problem of designing a weighted voting game that achieves a set of target influences according to a predefined power index. In this work, we study the computational complexity of the inverse problem when the power index belongs to the class of semivalues. We prove that the inverse problem is computationally intractable for a broad family of semivalues, including all regular semivalues. As a special case of our general result, we establish computational hardness of the inverse problem for the Banzhaf indices and the Shapley values, arguably the most popular power indices.Comment: To appear in AAAI 201

    POTENTIAL, VALUE AND PROBABILITY

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    This paper focuses on the probabilistic point of view and proposes a extremely simple probabilistic model that provides a single and simple story to account for several extensions of the Shapley value, as weighted Shapley values, semivalues, and weak (weighted or not) semivalues, and the Shapley value itself. Moreover, some of the most interesting conditions or notions that have been introduced in the search of alternatives to Shapley's seminal characterization, as 'balanced contributions' and the 'potential', are reinterpreted from this same point of view. In this new light these notions and some results lose their 'mystery' and acquire a clear and simple meaning. These illuminating reinterpretations strongly vindicate the complementariness of the probabilistic and the axiomatic approaches, and shed serious doubts about the achievements of the axiomatic approach since Nash's and Shapley's seminal papers in connection with the genuine notion of value.Coalition games, value, potential

    Bisemivalues for bicooperative games

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    We introduce bisemivalues for bicooperative games and we also provide an interesting characterization of this kind of values by means of weighting coefficients in a similar way as it was given for semivalues in the context of cooperative games. Moreover, the notion of induced bisemivalues on lower cardinalities also makes sense and an adaptation of Dragan’s recurrence formula is obtained. For the particular case of (p, q)-bisemivalues, a computational procedure in terms of the multilinear extension of the game is given.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

    The Prediction value

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    We introduce the prediction value (PV) as a measure of players' informational importance in probabilistic TU games. The latter combine a standard TU game and a probability distribution over the set of coalitions. Player ii's prediction value equals the difference between the conditional expectations of v(S)v(S) when ii cooperates or not. We characterize the prediction value as a special member of the class of (extended) values which satisfy anonymity, linearity and a consistency property. Every nn-player binomial semivalue coincides with the PV for a particular family of probability distributions over coalitions. The PV can thus be regarded as a power index in specific cases. Conversely, some semivalues -- including the Banzhaf but not the Shapley value -- can be interpreted in terms of informational importance.Comment: 26 pages, 2 table

    Separability by semivalues modified for games with coalition structure

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    The original publication is available at www.rairo-ro.orgTwo games are inseparable by semivalues if both games obtain the same allocation whatever semivalue is considered. The problem of separability by semivalues reduces to separability from the null game. For four or more players, the vector subspace of games inseparable from the null game by semivalues contains games different to zero-game. Now, for five or more players, the consideration of a priori coalition blocks in the player set allows us to reduce in a significant way the dimension of the vector subspace of games inseparable from the null game. For these subspaces we provide basis formed by games of a particular type.Postprint (published version

    A CRITICAL REAPPRAISAL OF SOME VOTING POWER PARADOXES

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    Power indices are meant to assess the power that a voting rule confers a priori to each of the decision makers who use it. In order to test and compare them, some authors have proposed "natural" postulates that a measure of a priori voting power "should" satisfy, the violations of which are called "voting power paradoxes". In this paper two general measures of factual success and decisiveness based on the voting rule and the voters' behavior, and some of these postulates/paradoxes test each other. As a result serious doubts on the discriminating power of most voting power postulates are cast.Voting power, decisiveness, success, voting rules, voting behavior, postulates, paradoxes.

    Power indices expressed in terms of minimal winning coalitions

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    A voting situation is given by a set of voters and the rules of legislation that determine minimal requirements for a group of voters to pass a motion. A priori measures of voting power, such as the Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf value, show the influence of the individual players. We used to calculate them by looking at marginal contributions in a simple game consisting of winning and losing coalitions derived from the rules of the legislation. We introduce a new way to calculate these measures directly from the set of minimal winning coalitions. This new approach logically appealing as it writes measures as functions of the rules of the legislation. For certain classes of games that arise naturally in applications the logical shortcut drastically simplifies calculations. The technique generalises directly to all semivalues. Keywords. Shapley-Shubik index, Banzhaf index, semivalue, minimal winning coalition, Möbius transform.Shapley-Shubik index, Banzhaf index, semivalue, minimal winning coalition, Möbius transform.

    ASSESSMENT OF VOTING SITUATIONS: THE PROBABILISTIC FOUNDATIONS

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    In this paper we revise the probabilistic foundations of the theory of the measurement of 'voting power' either as success or decisiveness. For an assessment of these features two inputs are claimed to be necessary: the voting procedure and the voters' behavior. We propose a simple model in which the voters' behavior is summarized by a probability distribution over all vote configurations. This basic model, at once simpler and more general that other probabilistic models, provides a clear conceptual common basis to reinterpret coherently from a unified point of view di.erent power indices and some related game theoretic notions, as well as a wider perspective for a dispassionate assessment of the power indices themselves, their merits and their limitations.Voting rules, voting power, decisiveness, success, power indices
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