The modal logic of set-theoretic potentialism and the potentialist maximality principles

We analyze the precise modal commitments of several natural varieties of set-theoretic potentialism, using tools we develop for a general model-theoretic account of potentialism, building on those of Hamkins, Leibman and L\"owe, including the use of buttons, switches, dials and ratchets. Among the potentialist conceptions we consider are: rank potentialism (true in all larger $V_\beta$); Grothendieck-Zermelo potentialism (true in all larger $V_\kappa$ for inaccessible cardinals $\kappa$); transitive-set potentialism (true in all larger transitive sets); forcing potentialism (true in all forcing extensions); countable-transitive-model potentialism (true in all larger countable transitive models of ZFC); countable-model potentialism (true in all larger countable models of ZFC); and others. In each case, we identify lower bounds for the modal validities, which are generally either S4.2 or S4.3, and an upper bound of S5, proving in each case that these bounds are optimal. The validity of S5 in a world is a potentialist maximality principle, an interesting set-theoretic principle of its own. The results can be viewed as providing an analysis of the modal commitments of the various set-theoretic multiverse conceptions corresponding to each potentialist account.Comment: 36 pages. Commentary can be made about this article at http://jdh.hamkins.org/set-theoretic-potentialism. Minor revisions in v2; further minor revisions in v

In search of a “true” logic of knowledge: the nonmonotonic perspective

AbstractModal logics are currently widely accepted as a suitable tool of knowledge representation, and the question what logics are better suited for representing knowledge is of particular importance. Usually, some axiom list is given, and arguments are presented justifying that suggested axioms agree with intuition. The question why the suggested axioms describe all the desired properties of knowledge remains answered only partially, by showing that the most obvious and popular additional axioms would violate the intuition.We suggest the general paradigm of maximal logics and demonstrate how it can work for nonmonotonic modal logics. Technically, we prove that each of the modal logics KD45, SW5, S4F and S4.2 is the strongest modal logic among the logics generating the same nonmonotonic logic. These logics have already found important applications in knowledge representation, and the obtained results contribute to the explanation of this fact

The modal logic of forcing

What are the most general principles in set theory relating forceability and truth? As with Solovay's celebrated analysis of provability, both this question and its answer are naturally formulated with modal logic. We aim to do for forceability what Solovay did for provability. A set theoretical assertion psi is forceable or possible, if psi holds in some forcing extension, and necessary, if psi holds in all forcing extensions. In this forcing interpretation of modal logic, we establish that if ZFC is consistent, then the ZFC-provable principles of forcing are exactly those in the modal theory known as S4.2.Comment: 31 page

Knowledge-wh and False Belief Sensitivity: A Logical Study (An Extended Abstract)

In epistemic logic, a way to deal with knowledge-wh is to interpret them as a kind of mention-some knowledge (MS-knowledge). But philosophers and linguists have challenged both the sufficiency and necessity of such an account: some argue that knowledge-wh has, in addition to MS-knowledge, also a sensitivity to false belief (FS); others argue that knowledge-wh might only imply mention-some true belief (MS-true belief). In this paper, we offer a logical study for all these different accounts. We apply the technique of bundled operators, and introduce four different bundled operators: $[\mathsf{tB}^\mathtt{MS}]^x \phi := \exists x (\mathsf{[B]} \phi \wedge \phi)$, $[\mathsf{tB}^\mathtt{MS}_\mathtt{FS}]^x \phi := \exists x (\mathsf{[B]} \phi \wedge \phi) \wedge \forall x (\mathsf{[B]} \phi \to \phi)$, $[\mathsf{K}^\mathtt{MS}]^x \phi := \exists x \mathsf{[K]} \phi$ and $[\mathsf{K}^\mathtt{MS}_\mathtt{FS}]^x \phi := \exists x \mathsf{[K]} \phi \wedge \forall x (\mathsf{[B]} \phi \to \phi)$, which characterize the notions of MS-true belief, MS-true belief with FS, MS-knowledge and MS-knowledge with FS respectively. We axiomatize the four logics which take the above operators (as well as $\mathsf{[K]}$) as primitive modalities on the class of $S4.2$-constant-domain models, and compare the patterns of reasoning in the obtained logics, in order to show how the four accounts of knowledge-wh differ from each other, as well as what they have in common.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2023, arXiv:2307.0400

Logic and Topology for Knowledge, Knowability, and Belief - Extended Abstract

In recent work, Stalnaker proposes a logical framework in which belief is realized as a weakened form of knowledge. Building on Stalnaker's core insights, and using frameworks developed by Bjorndahl and Baltag et al., we employ topological tools to refine and, we argue, improve on this analysis. The structure of topological subset spaces allows for a natural distinction between what is known and (roughly speaking) what is knowable; we argue that the foundational axioms of Stalnaker's system rely intuitively on both of these notions. More precisely, we argue that the plausibility of the principles Stalnaker proposes relating knowledge and belief relies on a subtle equivocation between an "evidence-in-hand" conception of knowledge and a weaker "evidence-out-there" notion of what could come to be known. Our analysis leads to a trimodal logic of knowledge, knowability, and belief interpreted in topological subset spaces in which belief is definable in terms of knowledge and knowability. We provide a sound and complete axiomatization for this logic as well as its uni-modal belief fragment. We then consider weaker logics that preserve suitable translations of Stalnaker's postulates, yet do not allow for any reduction of belief. We propose novel topological semantics for these irreducible notions of belief, generalizing our previous semantics, and provide sound and complete axiomatizations for the corresponding logics.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2017, arXiv:1707.08250. The full version of this paper, including the longer proofs, is at arXiv:1612.0205

Intuitionistic implication makes model checking hard

We investigate the complexity of the model checking problem for intuitionistic and modal propositional logics over transitive Kripke models. More specific, we consider intuitionistic logic IPC, basic propositional logic BPL, formal propositional logic FPL, and Jankov's logic KC. We show that the model checking problem is P-complete for the implicational fragments of all these intuitionistic logics. For BPL and FPL we reach P-hardness even on the implicational fragment with only one variable. The same hardness results are obtained for the strictly implicational fragments of their modal companions. Moreover, we investigate whether formulas with less variables and additional connectives make model checking easier. Whereas for variable free formulas outside of the implicational fragment, FPL model checking is shown to be in LOGCFL, the problem remains P-complete for BPL.Comment: 29 pages, 10 figure

Topic-Sensitive Epistemic 2D Truthmaker ZFC and Absolute Decidability

This paper aims to contribute to the analysis of the nature of mathematical modality, and to the applications of the latter to unrestricted quantification and absolute decidability. Rather than countenancing the interpretational type of mathematical modality as a primitive, I argue that the interpretational type of mathematical modality is a species of epistemic modality. I argue, then, that the framework of two-dimensional semantics ought to be applied to the mathematical setting. The framework permits of a formally precise account of the priority and relation between epistemic mathematical modality and metaphysical mathematical modality. The discrepancy between the modal systems governing the parameters in the two-dimensional intensional setting provides an explanation of the difference between the metaphysical possibility of absolute decidability and our knowledge thereof. I also advance an epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics, if hyperintenisonal approaches are to be preferred to possible worlds semantics. I examine the relation between epistemic truthmakers and epistemic set theory