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Constraint rule-based programming of norms for electronic institutions
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Semantics and Ontology:\ud On the Modal Structure of an Epistemic Theory of Meaning
In this paper I shall confront three basic questions.\ud
First, the relevance of epistemic structures, as formalized\ud
and dealt with by current epistemic logics, for a\ud
general Theory of meaning. Here I acknowledge M. Dummett"s\ud
idea that a systematic account of what is meaning of\ud
an arbitrary language subsystem must especially take into\ud
account the inferential components of meaning itself. That\ud
is, an analysis of meaning comprehension processes,\ud
given in terms of epistemic logics and semantics for epistemic\ud
notions.\ud
The second and third questions relate to the ontological\ud
and epistemological framework for this approach.\ud
Concerning the epistemological aspects of an epistemic\ud
theory of meaning, the question is: how epistemic logics\ud
can eventually account for the informative character of\ud
meaning comprehension processes. "InformationĆ¢ā¬? seems\ud
to be built in the very formal structure of epistemic processes,\ud
and should be exhibited in modal and possibleworld\ud
semantics for propositional knowledge and belief.\ud
However, it is not yet clear what is e.g. a possible world.\ud
That is: how it can be defined semantically, other than by\ud
accessibility rules which merely define it by considering its\ud
set-theoretic relations with other sets-possible worlds.\ud
Therefore, it is not clear which is the epistemological status\ud
of propositional information contained in the structural\ud
aspects of possible world semantics. The problem here\ud
seems to be what kind of meaning one attributes to the\ud
modal notion of possibility, thus allowing semantical and\ud
synctactical selectors for possibilities. This is a typically\ud
Dummett-style problem.\ud
The third question is linked with this epistemological\ud
problem, since it is its ontological counterpart. It concerns\ud
the limits of the logical space and of logical semantics for a\ud
of meaning. That is, it is concerned with the kind of\ud
structure described by inferential processes, thought, in a\ud
fregean perspective, as pre-conditions of estentional\ud
treatment of meaning itself. The second and third questions\ud
relate to some observations in Wittgenstein"s Tractatus.\ud
I shall also try to show how their behaviour limits the\ud
explicative power of some semantics for epistemic logics\ud
(Konolige"s and Levesque"s for knowledge and belief)
Moderate Modal Skepticism
This paper examines "moderate modal skepticism", a form of skepticism about
metaphysical modality defended by Peter van Inwagen in order to blunt the force of certain modal
arguments in the philosophy of religion. Van Inwagenās argument for moderate modal skepticism
assumes Yablo's (1993) influential world-based epistemology of possibility. We raise two problems
for this epistemology of possibility, which undermine van Inwagen's argument. We then consider how one might motivate moderate modal skepticism by relying on a different epistemology of possibility, which does not face these problems: Williamsonās (2007: ch. 5) counterfactual-based epistemology. Two ways of motivating moderate modal skepticism within that framework are found unpromising. Nevertheless, we also find a way of vindicating an epistemological thesis that, while weaker than moderate modal skepticism, is strong enough to support the methodological moral van Inwagen wishes to draw
Categories of First-Order Quantifiers
One well known problem regarding quantifiers, in particular the 1storder
quantifiers, is connected with their syntactic categories and denotations.
The unsatisfactory efforts to establish the syntactic and ontological categories
of quantifiers in formalized first-order languages can be solved by means of the
so called principle of categorial compatibility formulated by Roman Suszko,
referring to some innovative ideas of Gottlob Frege and visible in syntactic
and semantic compatibility of language expressions. In the paper the principle
is introduced for categorial languages generated by the Ajdukiewiczās classical
categorial grammar. The 1st-order quantifiers are typically ambiguous. Every
1st-order quantifier of the type k \u3e 0 is treated as a two-argument functorfunction
defined on the variable standing at this quantifier and its scope (the
sentential function with exactly k free variables, including the variable bound
by this quantifier); a binary function defined on denotations of its two arguments
is its denotation. Denotations of sentential functions, and hence also
quantifiers, are defined separately in Fregean and in situational semantics.
They belong to the ontological categories that correspond to the syntactic
categories of these sentential functions and the considered quantifiers. The
main result of the paper is a solution of the problem of categories of the
1st-order quantifiers based on the principle of categorial compatibility
A cognitive view of relevant implication
Relevant logics provide an alternative to classical implication
that is capable of accounting for the relationship between the antecedent
and the consequence of a valid implication. Relevant implication is usually
explained in terms of information required to assess a proposition.
By doing so, relevant implication introduces a number of cognitively relevant
aspects in the denition of logical operators. In this paper, we
aim to take a closer look at the cognitive feature of relevant implication.
For this purpose, we develop a cognitively-oriented interpretation of the
semantics of relevant logics. In particular, we provide an interpretation
of Routley-Meyer semantics in terms of conceptual spaces and we show
that it meets the constraints of the algebraic semantics of relevant logic
Betting on Quantum Objects
Dutch book arguments have been applied to beliefs about the outcomes of
measurements of quantum systems, but not to beliefs about quantum objects prior
to measurement. In this paper, we prove a quantum version of the probabilists'
Dutch book theorem that applies to both sorts of beliefs: roughly, if ideal
beliefs are given by vector states, all and only Born-rule probabilities avoid
Dutch books. This theorem and associated results have implications for
operational and realist interpretations of the logic of a Hilbert lattice. In
the latter case, we show that the defenders of the eigenstate-value orthodoxy
face a trilemma. Those who favor vague properties avoid the trilemma, admitting
all and only those beliefs about quantum objects that avoid Dutch books.Comment: 26 pages, 3 figures, 1 table; improved operational semantics, results
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