28 research outputs found
Routing Games over Time with FIFO policy
We study atomic routing games where every agent travels both along its
decided edges and through time. The agents arriving on an edge are first lined
up in a \emph{first-in-first-out} queue and may wait: an edge is associated
with a capacity, which defines how many agents-per-time-step can pop from the
queue's head and enter the edge, to transit for a fixed delay. We show that the
best-response optimization problem is not approximable, and that deciding the
existence of a Nash equilibrium is complete for the second level of the
polynomial hierarchy. Then, we drop the rationality assumption, introduce a
behavioral concept based on GPS navigation, and study its worst-case efficiency
ratio to coordination.Comment: Submission to WINE-2017 Deadline was August 2nd AoE, 201
On the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Integer-Splittable Weighted Congestion Games
We study the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) in integerâsplittable weighted congestion games (ISWCGs), where agents can strategically assign different amounts of demand to different resources, but must distribute this demand in fixed-size parts. Such scenarios arise in a wide range of application domains, including job scheduling and network routing, where agents have to allocate multiple tasks and can assign a number of tasks to a particular selected resource. Specifically, in an ISWCG, an agent has a certain total demand (aka weight) that it needs to satisfy, and can do so by requesting one or more integer units of each resource from an element of a given collection of feasible subsets. Each resource is associated with a unitâcost function of its level of congestion; as such, the cost to an agent for using a particular resource is the product of the resource unitâcost and the number of units the agent requests.While general ISWCGs do not admit PSNE [(Rosenthal, 1973b)], the restricted subclass of these games with linear unitâcost functions has been shown to possess a potential function [(Meyers, 2006)], and hence, PSNE. However, the linearity of costs may not be necessary for the existence of equilibria in pure strategies. Thus, in this paper we prove that PSNE always exist for a larger class of convex and monotonically increasing unitâcosts. On the other hand, our result is accompanied by a limiting assumption on the structure of agentsâ strategy sets: specifically, each agent is associated with its set of accessible resources, and can distribute its demand across any subset of these resources.Importantly, we show that neither monotonicity nor convexity on its own guarantees this result. Moreover, we give a counterexample with monotone and semiâconvex cost functions, thus distinguishing ISWCGs from the class of infinitelyâsplittable congestion games for which the conditions of monotonicity and semiâconvexity have been shown to be sufficient for PSNE existence [(Rosen, 1965)]. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the finite improvement path property (FIP) does not hold for convex increasing ISWCGs. Thus, in contrast to the case with linear costs, a potential function argument cannot be used to prove our result. Instead, we provide a procedure that converges to an equilibrium from an arbitrary initial strategy profile, and in doing so show that ISWCGs with convex increasing unitâcost functions are weakly acyclic
Congestion Games with Multisets of Resources and Applications in Synthesis
In classical congestion games, players\u27 strategies are subsets of resources. We introduce and study multiset congestion games, where players\u27 strategies are multisets of resources. Thus, in each strategy a player may need to use each resource a different number of times, and his cost for using the resource depends on the load that he and the other players generate on the resource.
Beyond the theoretical interest in examining the effect of a repeated use of resources, our study enables better understanding of non-cooperative systems and environments whose behavior is not covered by previously studied models. Indeed, congestion games with multiset-strategies arise, for example, in production planing
and network formation with tasks that are more involved than reachability. We study in detail the application of synthesis from component libraries: different users synthesize systems by gluing together components from a component library. A component may be used in several systems and may be used several times in a system. The performance of a component and hence the system\u27s quality depends on the load on it.
Our results reveal how the richer setting of multisets congestion games affects the stability and equilibrium efficiency compared to standard congestion games. In particular, while we present very simple instances with no pure Nash equilibrium and prove tighter and simpler lower bounds for equilibrium inefficiency, we are also able to show that some of the positive results known for affine and weighted congestion games apply to the richer setting of multisets
Trade & Cap: A Customer-Managed, Market-Based System for Trading Bandwidth Allowances at a Shared Link
We propose Trade & Cap (T&C), an economics-inspired mechanism that incentivizes users to voluntarily coordinate their consumption of the bandwidth of a shared resource (e.g., a DSLAM link) so as to converge on what they perceive to be an equitable allocation, while ensuring efficient resource utilization. Under T&C, rather than acting as an arbiter, an Internet Service Provider (ISP) acts as an enforcer of what the community of rational users sharing the resource decides is a fair allocation of that resource. Our T&C mechanism proceeds in two phases. In the first, software agents acting on behalf of users engage in a strategic trading game in which each user agent selfishly chooses bandwidth slots to reserve in support of primary, interactive network usage activities. In the second phase, each user is allowed to acquire additional bandwidth slots in support of presumed open-ended need for fluid bandwidth, catering to secondary applications. The acquisition of this fluid bandwidth is subject to the remaining "buying power" of each user and by prevalent "market prices" â both of which are determined by the results of the trading phase and a desirable aggregate cap on link utilization. We present analytical results that establish the underpinnings of our T&C mechanism, including game-theoretic results pertaining to the trading phase, and pricing of fluid bandwidth allocation pertaining to the capping phase. Using real network traces, we present extensive experimental results that demonstrate the benefits of our scheme, which we also show to be practical by highlighting the salient features of an efficient implementation architecture.National Science Foundation (CCF-0820138, CSR-0720604, EFRI-0735974, CNS-0524477, and CNS-0520166); Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana and COLCIENCIASâInstituto Colombiano para el Desarrollo de la Ciencia y la TecnologĂa âFrancisco Jose Ě de Caldasâ
The complexity of pure nash equilibria in max-congestion games
We study Network Max-Congestion Games (NMC games, for short), a
class of network games where each player tries to minimize the most congested
edge along the path he uses as strategy. We focus our study on the complexity
of computing a pure Nash equilibria in this kind of games. We show that, for
single-commodity games with non-decreasing delay functions, this problem
is in P when either all the paths from the source to the target node are
disjoint or all the delay functions are equal. For the general case, we prove
that the computation of a PNE belongs to the complexity class PLS through a
new technique based on generalized ordinal potential functions and a slightly
modified definition of the usual local search neighborhood. We further apply
this technique to a different class of games (which we call Pareto-efficient)
with restricted cost functions. Finally, we also prove some PLS-hardness
results, showing that computing a PNE for Pareto-efficient NMC games is
indeed a PLS-complete problem
A new model for coalition formation games
We present two broad categories of games, namely, group matching games and bottleneck routing games on grids. Borrowing ideas from coalition formation games, we introduce a new category of games which we call group matching games. We investigate how these games perform when agents are allowed to make selfish decisions that increase their individual payoffs versus when agents act towards the social benefit of the game as a whole. The Price of Anarchy (PoA) and Price of Stability (PoS) metrics are used to quantify these comparisons. We show that the PoA for a group matching game is at most kι and the PoS is at most k/ι where k is the maximum size of a group and ι is a switching cost. Furthermore we show that the PoA and PoS of the games do not change significantly even if we increase γ, the number of groups that an agent is allowed to join. We also consider routing games on grid network topologies. The social cost is the worst congestion in any of the network edges (bottleneck congestion). Each player\u27s objective is to find a path that minimizes the bottleneck congestion in its path. We show that the price of anarchy in bottleneck games in grids is proportional to the number of bends β that the paths are allowed to take in the grids\u27 space. We present games where the PoA is O(β). We also give a respective lower bound of Ί(β) which shows that our upper bound is within only a poly-log factor from the best achievable price of anarchy. A significant impact of our analysis is that there exist bottleneck routing games with small number of bends which give a poly-log approximation to the optimal coordinated solution that may use an arbitrary number of bends. To our knowledge, this is the first tight analysis of bottleneck games on grids
Signalisierte NetzwerkflĂźsse - Optimierung von Lichtsignalanlagen und Vorwegweisern und daraus resultierende Netzwerkflussprobleme
Guideposts and traffic signals are important devices for controlling inner-city traffic and their optimized operation is essential for efficient traffic flow without congestion. In this thesis, we develop a mathematical model for guideposts and traffic signals in the context of network flow theory. Guideposts lead to confluent flows where each node in the network may have at most one outgoing flow-carrying arc. The complexity of finding maximum confluent flows is studied and several polynomial time algorithms for special graph classes are developed. For traffic signal optimization, a cyclically time-expanded model is suggested which provides the possibility of the simultaneous optimization of offsets and traffic assignment. Thus, the influence of offsets on travel times can be accounted directly. The potential of the presented approach is demonstrated by simulation of real-world instances.Vorwegweiser und Lichtsignalanlagen sind wichtige Elemente zur Steuerung innerstädtischen Verkehrs und ihre optimale Nutzung ist von entscheidender Bedeutung fßr einen staufreien Verkehrsfluss. In dieser Arbeit werden Vorwegweiser und Lichtsignalanlagen mittels der Netzwerkflusstheorie mathematisch modelliert. Vorwegweiser fßhren dabei zu konfluenten Flßssen, bei denen Fluss einen Knoten des Netzwerks nur gebßndelt auf einer einzigen Kante verlassen darf. Diese konfluenten Flßsse werden hinsichtlich ihrer Komplexität untersucht und es werden Polynomialzeitalgorithmen fßr das Finden maximaler Flßsse auf ausgewählten Graphenklassen vorgestellt. Fßr die Versatzzeitoptimierung von Lichtsignalanlagen wird ein zyklisch zeitexpandiertes Modell entwickelt, das die gleichzeitige Optimierung der Verkehrsumlegung ermÜglicht. So kann der Einfluss geänderter Versatzzeiten auf die Fahrzeiten direkt berßcksichtigt werden. Die Leistungsfähigkeit dieses Ansatzes wird mit Hilfe von Simulationen realistischer Szenarien nachgewiesen