Self-Reinforcing Market Dominance

Are initial competitive advantages self-reinforcing, so that markets exhibit an endogenous tendency to be dominated by only a few firms? Although this question is of great economic importance, no systematic empirical study has yet addressed it. Therefore, we examine experimentally whether firms with an initial cost advantage are more likely to invest in cost reductions than firms with higher initial costs. Wefind that the initial competitive advantages are indeed self-reinforcing, but subjects in the role of firms overinvest relative to the Nash equilibrium. However, the pattern of overinvestment even strengthens the tendency towards self-reinforcing cost advantages relative to the theoretical prediction. Further, as predicted by the Nash equilibrium, aggregate investment is not affected by the initial efficiency distribution. Finally, investment spillovers reduce investment, and investment is higher than the joint-profit maximizing benchmark for the case without spillovers and lower for the case with spillovers.Cost-reducing Investment, Asymmetric Oligopoly, Increasing Dominance, Experimental Study

Learning from the experience of others: an experiment on information contagion

Advances in stochastic system analysis have opened the way to a reconsideration of the processes through which behaviors spread in a population of individuals or organizations. One peculiar phenomenon affecting diffusion is information contagion (Arthur and Lane 1994). When agents have to choose on the basis of other people’s experience, rather than relying on their own direct observations, information externalities arise that drive towards the emergence of the arbitrary, stable dominance of one product over the competing one. We reproduced in controlled laboratory conditions the process of information contagion. The experiments show that when agents can only resort to the observation of other people’s experience in choosing between competing alternatives, the choice process generates some peculiar features: - information contagion among subjects generates self-reinforcing dynamics, amplifying initial asymmetries of products’ market shares; - this in turn produces path-dependent trajectories, highly dependent on early events in the choice sequence; - arbitrary asymmetric market shares tend to be stable in the long run, exhibiting lock-in phenomena; - agents choice criteria are heterogenous, giving rise to a mix of positive and negative feedback in the choice process, with the mix and the timing of such criteria affecting the final outcome

Sand in the wheels, or oiling the wheels, of international finance? : New Labour's appeal to a 'new Bretton Woods'

Tony Blair’s political instinct typically is to associate himself only with the future. As such, his explicit appeal to ‘the past’ in his references to New Labour’s desire to establish a “new Bretton Woods” is sufficient in itself to arouse some degree of analytical curiosity (see Blair 1998a). The fact that this appeal was made specifically in relation to Bretton Woods is even more interesting. The resonant image of the international economic context established by the original Bretton Woods agreements invokes a style and content of policy-making which Tony Blair typically dismisses as neither economically nor politically consistent with his preferred vision of the future (see Blair 2000c, 2001b)

Regimes and Resilience in the Modern Global Food System

Much public discourse surrounding the modern global food system operates on the assumption of the primary agency of individual consumers in ensuring an equitable and sustainable food supply. However, this approach fails to account for the larger structural forces of the system which frame the limits of how we interact with and are affected by our food system. Taking a closer look at the global economic, political, cultural, and environmental forces that have collectively shaped historical food regimes reveals the deeper structural patterns that currently determine how we produce, distribute, and consume food around the world. Due to the underlying structural processes of increasing distancing and standardization, we have become highly disembedded from our food system and will need to look for clues from past periods of transition between food regimes to better position ourselves to work towards a global restructuring of, and human reembedding in, the modern global food system

Self-tuning experience weighted attraction learning in games

Self-tuning experience weighted attraction (EWA) is a one-parameter theory of learning in games. It addresses a criticism that an earlier model (EWA) has too many parameters, by fixing some parameters at plausible values and replacing others with functions of experience so that they no longer need to be estimated. Consequently, it is econometrically simpler than the popular weighted fictitious play and reinforcement learning models. The functions of experience which replace free parameters “self-tune” over time, adjusting in a way that selects a sensible learning rule to capture subjects’ choice dynamics. For instance, the self-tuning EWA model can turn from a weighted fictitious play into an averaging reinforcement learning as subjects equilibrate and learn to ignore inferior foregone payoffs. The theory was tested on seven different games, and compared to the earlier parametric EWA model and a one-parameter stochastic equilibrium theory (QRE). Self-tuning EWA does as well as EWA in predicting behavior in new games, even though it has fewer parameters, and fits reliably better than the QRE equilibrium benchmark

Family Control and the Rent-Seeking Society

The small number of very large family-controlled corporate groups in many countries combined with their long continuity of control and ability to act discretely give these organizations a comparative advantage in political rent-seeking. This advantage is a key part of a self-reinforcing system whereby oligarchic family corporate control, political rent seeking, and low general levels of trust combine to stymie growth.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39971/3/wp585.pd

Negative externalities as the engine of growth in an evolutionary context

We present a simple growth model which has two original features: the strategic context considered, which is an evolutionary game, and the growth mechanism described, in which growth is caused by negative externalities. The emphasis in this growth mechanism is evidently different from that placed on positive externalities by current endogenous growth models. In this model welfare depends on three goods: leisure, a free environmental renewable resource, and a non-storable output. The environmental resource is subject to negative externalities, that is, it is deteriorated by the production of the output. Faced with a forced reduction of the resource, agents may react by increasing the labor supply in order to produce and consume substitutes for the diminishing resource, i. e. they can raise their defensive expenditures. The increase in production and consumption that follows, i.e. growth, generates a further deterioration of the environmental resource, thus giving rise to a self-feeding growth process. The conditions under which multiple equlibria and Pareto-worsening growth dynamics arise, are analysed. Beside showing the logical possibility that negative externalities are the engine of growth, we suggest that the case analysed may be of practical relevance, i.e., that negative externalities may play an important role in many episodes of growth. This role is widely recognized by social sciences other than economics. We suggest that the model may be interpreted as a push development model and that it may also contribute to explain some aspects of growth in advanced countries