A computational model of the Capgras delusion

A brief outline of a computational model to explain the formation of delusional beliefs in Capgras syndrome

Self-Deception as Affective Coping. An Empirical Perspective on Philosophical Issues

In the philosophical literature, self-deception is mainly approached through the analysis of paradoxes. Yet, it is agreed that self-deception is motivated by protection from distress. In this paper, we argue, with the help of findings from cognitive neuroscience and psychology, that self-deception is a type of affective coping. First, we criticize the main solutions to the paradoxes of self-deception. We then present a new approach to self-deception. Self-deception, we argue, involves three appraisals of the distressing evidence: (a) appraisal of the strength of evidence as uncertain, (b) low coping potential and (c) negative anticipation along the lines of Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis. At the same time, desire impacts the treatment of flattering evidence via dopamine. Our main proposal is that self-deception involves emotional mechanisms provoking a preference for immediate reward despite possible long-term negative repercussions. In the last part, we use this emotional model to revisit the philosophical paradoxes

Self-Deception and Agential Authority . Constitutivist Account

This article takes a constitutivist approach to self-deception, and argues that this phenomenon should be evaluated under several dimensions ofrationality. The constitutivist approach has the merit of explaining theselective nature of self-deception as well as its being subject to moralsanction. Self-deception is a pragmatic strategy for maintaining thestability of the self, hence continuous with other rational activities ofself-constitution. However, its success is limited, and it costs are high: itprotects the agent\u2019s self by undermining the authority she has on hermental life. To this extent, self-deception is akin to alienation andestrangement. Its morally disturbing feature is its self-serving partiality.The self-deceptive agent settles on standards of justification that arelower than any rational agent would adopt, and thus loses grip on heragency. To capture the moral dimension of self-deception, I defend aKantian account of the constraints that bear on self-constitution, andargue that it warrants more discriminating standards of agentialautonomy than other contemporary minimalist views of selfgovernment

Double Standards In Self-Deception: The Development Of The Self-Other Double Standards Scale

Self-Deception creates a mental state in which an individual unquestioningly maintains a belief that has clearly been refuted and proven faulty by some information which the self-deceiver has come to possess. However, aside from personality trait measures, no measurement techniques have been developed which capture the act of Self-Deception in a laboratory setting. In order to fill this need, the current research sought to examine the relationship between self-deception and cognitive dissonance, and used this relationship to create the Double Standards scale. In the current research, participants completed several surveys online. They then came into the lab, where they were be randomly assigned to Affirmed and Deaffirmed conditions. It was found that asking participants to recall their past behaviors condom use caused those participants to significantly lower their estimation of the average person\u27s likelihood to use condoms, but not to change their ratings of their own likelihood. It was also found that Affirmed participants did not lower their ratings of others as much as participants in the Deaffirmed condition. The implications for these findings are discussed

El producto del autoengaño: Un análisis crítico de la propuesta de N. Van Leeuwen.

Self-deception is an intriguing and complex phenomenon, which has been extensively discussed in the philosophical field. There is a widespread lack of consensus regarding most of its aspects; however, there is one thesis which is widely accepted: the idea according to which the product of self-deception is a belief. Many of the authors who have accepted this thesis implicitly take for granted that it is not necessary to carry out a systematic analysis of the characteristics of this propositional attitude. This seems to be due to the fact that they judge that it consists on a folk-psychological concept and that, as such, it can be intuitively and automatically comprehended. We consider that this constitutes an argumentative deficit, and we present a possible source of this deficit. Afterwards, we analyze the ideas advanced by a prolific contemporary author, N. Van Leeuwen, because we consider that his proposal overcomes this deficit. However, his perspective is affected by some difficulties; we identify and examine them, and we conclude that, because of them, Van Leeuwen is not able to satisfactorily answer the question about the product of self-deception. Finally, we present three possible answers to this question, highlighting the virtues of the third answer.El autoengaño es un fenómeno intrigante y complejo, que ha sido extensamente discutido en el ámbito filosófico. Impera el disenso en el abordaje de la mayoría de sus aspectos; empero, existe una tesis que sí goza de amplio consenso: aquella según la cual el producto del autoengaño consiste en una creencia. Muchos de los autores que han aceptado esta tesis dan por sentado, implícitamente, que no se requiere un análisis sistemático sobre las características de dicha actitud proposicional. Esto parece deberse a que juzgan que se trata de un concepto folk-psicológico y que, en tanto que tal, se lo comprende intuitiva y automáticamente de manera adecuada. Consideramos que esto constituye una falencia argumentativa, y presentamos un posible origen de dicha falencia. Posteriormente, analizamos los planteos de un prolífico autor contemporáneo, N. Van Leeuwen, puesto que consideramos que su propuesta supera la falencia en cuestión. Sin embargo, su perspectiva presenta ciertos inconvenientes; identificamos y examinamos dichos inconvenientes, y concluimos que, como resultado de éstos, Van Leeuwen no logra responder satisfactoriamente la pregunta acerca de cuál es el producto del autoengaño. Finalmente, presentamos tres respuestas posibles ante este interrogante, y resaltamos el carácter superador de la tercera de ellas

Modos de autoengaño y de razonamiento: teorías de proceso dual

In this paper I discuss the phenomenon of self-deception and its connection with the notion of rationality linked to the dual process theories. I present the intentionalist and nonintentionalist accounts of self-deception and aim to show how the debate between them can be resolved in a more comprehensive and satisfactory manner, if it is placed in the frame of the dual process theories. The dual model usually accepts two kinds of reasoning processes, heuristic and analytic, referred to two different systems, S1 and S2. These processes compete for control of our inferences and actions, but sometimes they interact and collaborate. It is suggested that in a dual model, the evaluations in terms of the rationality of the process will depend on the way in which self-deception participates in the reasoning process and on the system from which the evaluation takes place.En este artículo me ocupo de la cuestión de cómo en las teorías de proceso dual se puede dar cuenta del autoengaño y su conexión con la racionalidad. Presento las versiones intencionalista y no intencionalista del autoengaño y muestro cómo el debate entre ellas puede dirimirse de manera más completa y satisfactoria en el marco de una teoría dual. En éste suelen aceptarse dos sistemas de razonamiento, uno heurístico (S1) y otro analítico (S2), que compiten por el control de nuestras inferencias y acciones, pero a veces interactúan y colaboran entre sí. Se defiende que si predomina la respuesta de S1, se puede ver el patrón del autoengaño como una forma de razonamiento heurístico y no únicamente como un vínculo causal. Se sugiere que las evaluaciones en cuanto a la racionalidad del proceso del autoengaño, dependerá del modo en que intervenga en el patrón de razonamiento y del sistema desde el cual se lleve a cab