COORDINATION, COOPERATION, AND THE EXTENDED COASEAN APPROACH TO ECONOMIC POLICY

The Coasean way to deal with the cooperation failure that is implicit in Pareto inefficiency is to remove or lessen the obstacles to cooperation through the attribution of property rights and the elimination or reduction of transaction costs. The relevance of this approach is however undermined by some intrinsic difficulties to its application in a real world context, such as those arising from the number and indeterminacy of the interested parties, as well as from the free rider problem. A way to extend the Coasean approach taking into account those real life limitations is to consider the local authorities as representatives of the interest of their local constituencies and, through the provision of an adequate institutional framework, to enhance the opportunities for cooperation through voluntary agreements involving private and public parties. Thus the extent of cooperation could be widened, as opposite to traditional remedial actions relying on non- contractual, or direct entrepreneurial action by the state. With the reduction in the appeal of direct and coercive action by the state a number of institutions emphasising the contractual cooperation between public and private parties have effectively grown of importance, as wide apart as the township and village enterprises in China, or the “programmazione negoziata” in Italy. In the final part of the paper the lattercoase theorem, economic policy, transition, property rights, cooperation, coordination

The Massachusetts Health Plan: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly

In spring 2006, Massachusetts enacted legislation to ensure universal health insurance coverage to all residents. The legislation was a hybrid of ideas from across the political spectrum, promoted by a moderately conservative Republican governor with national political aspirations, and passed by a liberal Democratic state House and Senate. Groups from across the political spectrum supported the plan, from the Heritage Foundation on the right to Families USA on the left, although the plan had detractors from across the political spectrum as well. This study briefly describes the basic structure of the Massachusetts plan and identifies the good, the bad, and the ugly. Although the legislation, as Stuart Altman put it, "is not a typical Massachusetts -- Taxachusetts, oh -- just -- crazy -- liberal plan," there is enough "bad" and "ugly" in the mix to raise serious concerns, particularly when the desire to overregulate the health insurance market appears to be hard -- wired into Massachusetts policymakers' DNA. If we want to make health insurance more affordable and avoid the "bad" and the "ugly" of the Massachusetts plan, Congress -- or, barring that, individual states -- should consider a "regulatory federalism" approach. Under such an approach, insurers and insurance purchasers would be required to subject themselves to the laws and regulations of a single state but allowed to select the state. As with corporate charters, this system would allow employers and insurers to select the regulatory regime that most efficiently and cost -- effectively matches the needs of their risk pools. The ability of purchasers and insurers to exit from the state's regulatory oversight (taking their premium taxes with them) would temper opportunistic behavior by legislators and regulators, including the temptation to impose inefficient mandates and otherwise overregulate

Research Highlights

Research Highlights was a newsletter highlighting the research being done at the Boston University School of Management (Questrom School of Business)

The Perfect Crime? FIFA and the Absence of Accountability in Switzerland

Article published in the Md. J. International Law

THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF ETHICS

This Article looks at the importance of teaching law graduates to be ethical lawyers. The author hypothesizes that the current versions of the ethical rules and the structure of law firms have the potential to encourage the professionalization of ethics rather than connecting all practitioners to the values of professional responsibility. This Article sets out the factors that contribute to the increased professionalization of professional responsibility in large law firms. These factors are the need for lawyers to always be accessible, the pressure to specialize in a specific field, and the complexity of the ethics rules as written. The author argues that as a whole the ethics rules need to be more accessible to the ordinary, non-expert practitioner, would be a valuable contribution. The three specific proposals are the creation of specialty-specific ethics education, acknowledge the contribution of the ethics specialists, and to draft the ethics rules differently. The goal of this new approach is to “de-professionalize” ethics and remind each lawyer of her obligation to be an ethical practitione

Reluctant leaders : an analysis of middle managers' perceptions of leadership in further education in England

The research that forms the basis for this article draws attention to a group of middle managers who are reluctant to become leaders because they seek more space and autonomy to stay in touch with their subject, their students, and their own pedagogic values and identities, family commitments and the balance between work and life. This reluctance is reinforced by their scepticism that leadership in Further Education (FE) is becoming less hierarchical and more participative. In a sector that has had more than its fair share of reformist intervention, there is some scepticism of the latest fad of distributed and transformative leadership as a new panacea to cure all the accumulated 'ills' of Further Education in England. Although focused primarily on this one sector in an English context, the article draws some inferences where there are parallels with wider sectors of public sector reform and where the uneasy (and incomplete) transitions from 'old' to 'new' public management have been underpinned by invasive audit, inspection and performance cultures

Public Choice, Constitutional Political Economy and Law and Economics

The various subdisciplines within the emerging ‘new institutionalism’ in economics all draw special attention to the legal-political constraints within which economic and political agents choose and therefore represent a return of economics to its appropriate legal foundations. By changing the name of his research program to constitutional political economy Buchanan distanced himself from those parts of the public choice literature that remained too close to the traditional welfare economics approach. This chapter draws lessons for law and economics from recent developments in the re-emerging field of constitutional political economy. CPE compares alternative sets of institutional arrangements, in markets and the polity, and their outcomes, using ‘democratic consent’ as an internal standard of comparison. The chapter discusses the methodological foundation of the CPE approach, presents Buchanan’s reconstruction of the Coase theorem along subjectivist-contractarian lines and gives an overview of recent contributions to the literature. JEL classification: B41, D70, H10, K; Keywords: Constitutional Economics, Constitutional Political Economy, Public Choice, James M. Buchanan, Methodological FoundationLaw and Economics, Constitutional Economics

TRANSACTION COSTS AND FISHERIES CO-MANAGEMENT

Fisheries co-management as an alternative to centralized command and control fisheries management is often suggested as a solution to the problems of fisheries resource use conflicts and overexploitation. This paper highlights some elements of the transaction costs under a fisheries co-management system. The transaction costs can be categorized into three major cost items: (i) information costs, (ii) collective fisheries decision-making costs, and (iii) collective operational costs. An approach to measuring transaction costs of fisheries co-management systems both in static and dynamic processes is also proposed. There is a need to empirically evaluate the nature of the transaction costs involved in fisheries co-management institutions as a basis for evaluating the efficiency or net benefits of co-managed fisheries compared to centrally managed fisheries.Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,