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Memory-Based High-Level Synthesis Optimizations Security Exploration on the Power Side-Channel
High-level synthesis (HLS) allows hardware designers to think algorithmically and not worry about low-level, cycle-by-cycle details. This provides the ability to quickly explore the architectural design space and tradeoffs between resource utilization and performance. Unfortunately, security evaluation is not a standard part of the HLS design flow. In this article, we aim to understand the effects of memory-based HLS optimizations on power side-channel leakage. We use Xilinx Vivado HLS to develop different cryptographic cores, implement them on a Spartan-6 FPGA, and collect power traces. We evaluate the designs with respect to resource utilization, performance, and information leakage through power consumption. We have two important observations and contributions. First, the choice of resource optimization directive results in different levels of side-channel vulnerabilities. Second, the partitioning optimization directive can greatly compromise the hardware cryptographic system through power side-channel leakage due to the deployment of memory control logic. We describe an evaluation procedure for power side-channel leakage and use it to make best-effort recommendations about how to design more secure architectures in the cryptographic domain
A New Paradigm in Split Manufacturing: Lock the FEOL, Unlock at the BEOL
Split manufacturing was introduced as an effective countermeasure against
hardware-level threats such as IP piracy, overbuilding, and insertion of
hardware Trojans. Nevertheless, the security promise of split manufacturing has
been challenged by various attacks, which exploit the well-known working
principles of physical design tools to infer the missing BEOL interconnects. In
this work, we advocate a new paradigm to enhance the security for split
manufacturing. Based on Kerckhoff's principle, we protect the FEOL layout in a
formal and secure manner, by embedding keys. These keys are purposefully
implemented and routed through the BEOL in such a way that they become
indecipherable to the state-of-the-art FEOL-centric attacks. We provide our
secure physical design flow to the community. We also define the security of
split manufacturing formally and provide the associated proofs. At the same
time, our technique is competitive with current schemes in terms of layout
overhead, especially for practical, large-scale designs (ITC'99 benchmarks).Comment: DATE 2019 (https://www.date-conference.com/conference/session/4.5
A framework for automatic security controller generation
This paper concerns the study, the development and the synthesis of mechanisms for guaranteeing the security of complex systems, i.e., systems composed by several interactive components. A complex system under analysis is described as an open system, in which a certain component has an unspecified behavior (not fixed in advance). Regardless of the unspecified behavior, the system should work properly, e.g., should satisfy a certain property. Within this formal approach, we propose techniques to enforce properties and synthesize controller programs able to guarantee that, for all possible behaviors of the unspecified component, the overall system results secure. For performing this task, we use techniques able to provide us necessary and sufficient conditions on the behavior of this unspecified component to ensure the whole system is secure. Hence, we automatically synthesize the appropriate controller programs by exploiting satisfiability results for temporal logic. We contribute within the area of the enforcement of security properties by proposing a flexible and automated framework that goes beyond the definition of how a system should behave to work properly. Indeed, while the majority of related work focuses on the definition of monitoring mechanisms, we aid in the synthesis of enforcing techniques. Moreover, we present a tool for the synthesis of secure systems able to generate a controller program directly executable on real devices as smart phones
ARM2GC: Succinct Garbled Processor for Secure Computation
We present ARM2GC, a novel secure computation framework based on Yao's
Garbled Circuit (GC) protocol and the ARM processor. It allows users to develop
privacy-preserving applications using standard high-level programming languages
(e.g., C) and compile them using off-the-shelf ARM compilers (e.g., gcc-arm).
The main enabler of this framework is the introduction of SkipGate, an
algorithm that dynamically omits the communication and encryption cost of the
gates whose outputs are independent of the private data. SkipGate greatly
enhances the performance of ARM2GC by omitting costs of the gates associated
with the instructions of the compiled binary, which is known by both parties
involved in the computation. Our evaluation on benchmark functions demonstrates
that ARM2GC not only outperforms the current GC frameworks that support
high-level languages, it also achieves efficiency comparable to the best prior
solutions based on hardware description languages. Moreover, in contrast to
previous high-level frameworks with domain-specific languages and customized
compilers, ARM2GC relies on standard ARM compiler which is rigorously verified
and supports programs written in the standard syntax.Comment: 13 page
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