Is Internet Voting Trustworthy? The Science and the Policy Battles

According to clear scientific consensus, no known technology can make internet voting secure. In some applications—such as e-pollbooks (voter sign-in), voter registration, and absentee ballot request—it is appropriate to use the internet, as the inherent insecurity can be mitigated by other means. But the insecurity of paperless transmission of a voted ballot through the internet cannot be mitigated. The law recognizes this in several ways. Courts have enjoined the use of certain paperless or internet-connected voting systems. Federal law requires states to allow voters to use the internet to request absentee ballots but carefully stops short of internet ballot return (i.e., voting). But many U.S. states and a few countries go beyond what is safe: they have adopted internet voting for citizens living abroad and (in some cases) for voters with disabilities. Most internet voting systems have an essentially common architecture, and they are insecure at least at the same key point: after the voter has reviewed the ballot but before it is transmitted. I review six internet voting systems deployed between 2006 and 2021 that were insecure in practice, just as predicted by theory—of which some were also insecure in surprising new ways, “unforced errors”. We cannot get along without the assistance of computers. U.S. ballots are too long to count entirely by hand unless the special circumstances of a recount require it. So computer-counted paper ballots play a critical role in the security and auditability of our elections. But audits cannot be used to secure internet voting systems, which have no paper ballots that form an auditable paper trail. There are policy controversies: trustworthiness versus convenience, and security versus accessibility. From 2019 to 2022 there were lawsuits in Virginia, New Jersey, New York, New Hampshire, and North Carolina; legislation enacted in Rhode Island and withdrawn in California. There is a common pattern to these disputes, which have mostly resolved in a way that provides remote accessible vote by mail (RAVBM) but stops short of permitting electronic ballot return (internet voting). What would it take to thoroughly review a proposed internet voting system to be assured whether it delivers the security it promises? Switzerland provides a case study. In Switzerland, after a few years of internet voting pilot projects, the Federal Chancellery commissioned several extremely thorough expert studies of their deployed system. These reports teach us not only about their internet voting system itself but about how to study those systems before making policy decisions. Accessibility of election systems to voters with disabilities is a genuine problem. Disability-rights groups have been among those lobbying for internet voting (which is not securable) and other forms of remote accessible vote by mail (which can be adequately securable). I review statistics showing that internet voting is probably not the most effective way to serve voters with disabilities

Internet voting in Australian election systems

This paper explores how internet voting could offer potential improvements in the way elections are managed and delivered in Australia. Aims The issue of internet voting is one of the more testing ones currently faced by election administrators, not least because of the diversity of views which it generates. Proponents of such a use of the internet see it as a potentially powerful, and perhaps inevitable, way of enabling electors, or certain categories of electors, to vote in a convenient and efficient way. In the long term, it holds out the revolutionary prospect that the classical vision of direct democracy could be realised, with voters being able to make fast collective decisions on a wide range of issues. Opponents of internet voting see it as giving rise to major risks to the integrity of electoral processes. There is a large and rapidly growing literature on the subject. The aims of this paper are: to explore a range of significant issues relevant to community consideration of the appropriate role for internet voting in Australia; and to identify some areas where internet voting may have potential value (subject to the satisfactory resolution of outstanding technical issues and a determination that any residual risks can be mitigated or deemed acceptable), and therefore to warrant more detailed consideration

Upgrading Democracy: Improving America's Elections by Modernizing States' Voter Registration Systems

Outlines the challenges of maintaining accurate voter registration lists in a transient society. Details how states can compare lists with multiple data sources, use proven data-matching techniques and security protocols, and minimize manual data entry

Seventh International Joint Conference on Electronic Voting

This volume contains papers presented at E-Vote-ID 2022, the Seventh International JointConference on Electronic Voting, held during October 4–7, 2022. This was the first in-personconference following the COVID-19 pandemic, and, as such, it was a very special event forthe community since we returned to the traditional venue in Bregenz, Austria. The E-Vote-IDconference resulted from merging EVOTE and Vote-ID, and 18 years have now elapsed sincethe first EVOTE conference in Austria.Since that conference in 2004, over 1500 experts have attended the venue, including scholars,practitioners, authorities, electoral managers, vendors, and PhD students. E-Vote-ID collectsthe most relevant debates on the development of electronic voting, from aspects relating tosecurity and usability through to practical experiences and applications of voting systems, alsoincluding legal, social, or political aspects, amongst others, turning out to be an importantglobal referent on these issues

Election Integrity: A Pro-Voter Agenda

President Trump recently claimed millions voted illegally in the 2016 election, and called for a "major investigation" into fraud in our election system. His remarks come after years of battles in the states over voting laws that make it harder for many citizens to participate in our elections. Yet the clamor over voter suppression should not obscure a fundamental shared truth: American elections should be secure and free of misconduct. This paper outlines a six-part agenda to target fraud risks as they actually exist -- without unduly disenfranchising eligible citizens