The necessity of metaphysics

The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate that metaphysics is a necessary discipline - necessary in the sense that all areas of philosophy, all areas of science, and in fact any type of rational activity at all would be impossible without a metaphysical background or metaphysical presuppositions. Because of the extremely strong nature of this claim, it is not possible to put forward a very simple argument, although I will attempt to construct one. A crucial issue here is what metaphysics in fact is - the nature of metaphysics. The conception of metaphysics which I support could be called Aristotelian, as opposed to Kantian: metaphysics is the first philosophy and the basis of all other philosophical and scientific inquiry. I will argue that this is indeed the most plausible conception of metaphysics. The thesis consists of a brief historical introduction of certain important views concerning the nature of metaphysics, namely Aristotle's, Kant's, Camap's and Quine's, and of a longer survey of the status of metaphysics in the context of contemporary analytic metaphysics. I make some critical observations of recent accounts by people like Hilary Putnam, Michael Dummett, Frank Jackson and Eli Hirsch before launching into a thorough analysis of the relationship between metaphysics and other philosophical and scientific disciplines. The central argument of the thesis is that our a priori capabilities, which I claim to be grounded in metaphysical modality and ultimately in essences, are necessary for rational inquiry. Detailed accounts of a priori knowledge and modality will be offered in support of this claim. In fact, my accounts of the a priori and modality are perhaps the most important contributions of the thesis, as given this basis, the 'necessary' role of metaphysics in other disciplines should be quite obvious. I also pursue topics like the metaphysical status of logic and the law of non-contradiction as well as truthmaking, the substance of metaphysical debates, and the methodology of metaphysics. There is, however, a distinct theme which connects the broad range of topics that I discuss: they are all analysed from a metaphilosophical point of view. Indeed, it could be said that this is a metametaphysical survey of the status of metaphysics. The upshot is an original account of the status of metaphysics in contemporary analytic philosophy - the conclusion that metaphysics is the core of all our rational activities, from natural science to logic, semantics and truth

Naturalising the a priori: reliabilism and experience-independent knowledge

The thesis defends the view that the concept of a priori knowledge can be naturalised without sacrificing the core aspects of the traditional conception of apriority. I proceed by arguing for three related claims.The first claim is that the adoption of naturalism in philosophy is not automatically inconsistent with belief in the existence of a priori knowledge. A widespread view to the contrary has come about through the joint influence of Quine and the logical empiricists. I hold that by rejecting a key assumption made by the logical empiricists (the assumption that apriority can be explained only by appeal to the concept of analyticity), we can develop an account of naturalism in philosophy which does not automatically rule out the possibility of a priori knowledge, and which retains Quine's proposals that philosophy be seen as continuous with the enterprise of natural science, and that the theory of knowledge be developed within the conceptual framework of psychology.The first attempt to provide a theory of a priori knowledge within such a framework was made by Philip Kitcher. Kitcher's strategy involves giving an account of the idea of "experience-independence" independently of the theory of knowledge in general (he assumes that an appropriate account of the latter will be reliabilist). Later authors in the tradition Kitcher inaugurated have followed him on this, while criticising him for adopting too strong a notion of experience-independence. The second claim I make is in qualified agreement with this: it is that only a weak notion of experienceindependence will give a viable account of a priori knowledge, but that the reasons why this is so have been obscured by Kitcher's segregation of the issues. Strong reasons for adopting a weak notion are provided by consideration of the theory of knowledge, but these same reasons also highlight severe problems for the project of providing a naturalistic theory of knowledge in general.The third claim is that a plausible naturalistic theory of knowledge in general can be given, and that it provides an appropriate framework within which to give an account of minimally experience-independent knowledge.I conclude with a consideration of some of the problems that an account of minimal a priori knowledge will have to address

Metaontological Studies relating to the Problem of Universals

My dissertation deals with metaontology or metametaphysics. This is the subdiscipline of philosophy that is concerned with the investigation of metaphysical concepts, statements, theories and problems on the metalevel. It analyses the meaning of metaphysical statements and theories and discusses how they are to be justified. The name "metaontology" is recently coined, but the task of metaontology is the same as Immanuel Kant already dealt with in his Critique of Pure Reason. As methods I use both historical research and logical (or rather semantical) analysis. In order to understand clearly what metaphysical terms or theories mean or should mean we must both look at how they have been characterized in the course of the history of philosophy and then analyse the meanings that have historically been given to them with the methods of modern formal semantics. Metaontological research would be worthless if it could not in the end be applied to solving some substantive ontological questions. In the end of my dissertation, therefore, I give arguments for a solution to the substantively ontological problem of universals, a form of realism about universals called promiscuous realism. To prepare the way for that argument, I argue that the metaontological considerations most relevant to the problem of universals are considerations concerning ontological commitment, as the American philosophers Quine and van Inwagen have argued, not those concerning truthmakers as such philosophers as the Australian realist D. M. Armstrong have argued or those concerning verification conditions as such philosophers as Michael Dummett have argued. To justify this conclusion, I go first through well-known objections to verificationism, and show that they apply also to current verificationist theories such as Dummett's theory and Field's deflationist theory of truth. In the process I also respond to opponents of metaphysics who try to show with the aid of verificationism or structuralism that metaphysical questions would be meaningless or illegitimate in some other way. Having justified the central role of ontological commitment, I try to develop a detailed theory of it. The core of my work is a rigorous formal development of a theory of ontological commitment. I construct it by combining Alonzo Church's theory of ontological commitment with Tarski's theory of truth.Väitöskirjani käsittelee metaontologiaa eli metametafysiikkaa. Tämä on se metafilosofian osa-alue, joka tutkii metafyysisten väitteiden ja termien merkitystä ja sitä, miten metafyysiset väitteet ja teoriat voitaisiin oikeuttaa. Metafysiikka tai ontologia on taas tiede, joka tutkii olevaa yleensä tai kaikkeutta kokonaisuutena. Menetelminä käytän sekä historiallista tutkimusta että loogista (tai pikemminkin semanttista) analyysiä. On olemassa kolme pääasiallista teoriaa siitä, mikä on metaontologian keskeisin käsite. Sellaiset filosofit kuin australialainen Armstrong ovat väittäneet, että se on totuustekijöiden (truthmakers) käsite. Sellaiset anti-realistiset filosofit kuin englantilainen filosofi Michael Dummett ovat taas väittäneet että se on todennettavuusehtojen (verification conditions) käsite. Argumentoin näitä kahta käsitystä vastaan ja kolmannen puolesta, jonka mukaan keskeisin käsite on ontologisten sitoumusten käsite, kuten amerikkalainen filosofi Quine on väittänyt. Argumentoin, että Quinen ontologisten sitoumusten teoria voidaan erottaa hänen muista ontologisista näkemyksistään, kuten hänen semanttisesta holismistaan, ontologisesta relativismistaan tai strukturalismistaan, mitkä ovat mielestäni virheellisiä. Väitöskirjani ydin on täsmällinen teoria ontologisista sitoumuksista, jonka rakennan yhdistämällä Alonzo Churchin teoriaa ontologisista sitoumuksista Alfred Tarskin totuusteoriaan. Metaontologinen tutkimus olisi arvotonta, ellei sitä voisi lopulta käyttää substantiivisten ontologisten kysymysten ratkaisemiseen. Käsittelen siksi väitöskirjani loppupuolella yhtä perinteistä ontologian ongelmaa, universaalien ongelmaa. Jo Aristoteles määritteli teoksessaan Tulkinnasta universaalien olevan olioita, jotka (Lauri Carlsonin käännöksen mukaan) luonnostaan predikoidaan (sanotaan) monesta. Universaaliongelma koskee sitä, ovatko tällaiset universaalit vain kielellisiä ilmauksia, kuten yleisnimet, verbit ja adjektiivit, tai ihmismielestä riippuvia olioita, kuten yleiskäsitteet, vai voidaanko myös sanoa, että maailmassa itsessään olevia olioita voidaan predikoida jostakin. Realistin mukaan vastaus on myöntävä. Esitän väitöskirjan lopussa alustavan argumentin universaaleja koskevan realismin puolesta

An examination of the analytic/synthetic distinction with special reference to W.V.O. Quine

The thesis takes a fresh look at the Analytic/Synthetic distinction and tries to assess the force of the attack launched against it by Quine, While, Waismann and others. First a brief history of the distinction is given, which traces it to its origins in the writings of Leibniz and Kant. The use and scope of the distinction in contemporary analytic philosophy is explained and criticized, and the part played by Wittgenstein's Tractatus is examined, Quine's views on the distinction are stated and discussed at some length. They are given a special attention; because they are seen to pose a profound challenge to the way in which the distinction is normally drawn and employed in modern philosophy. The debate between Quine and his opponents over the distinction is stated and assessed, and the opinion put forward that Quine's main contentions are not refuted by their answer. The related topic of the admissibility of intensional concepts is introduced. The disagreement of Quine with other philosophers concerning the nature of logical truth is considered. The opinions of Quine about the respective roles of experience and convention are contrasted with those of his opponents. Quine's suggested 'canonical notation' as a replacement of intensional language is briefly stated and discussed. The debatable character of some of Quine's contentions here does not crucially affect the essential part of his thesis about the graduation of analyticity. The writer sympathizes with Quine. However, the issue is still very much an open one in spite of the fact that Quine's views are not favourably received by the majority of philosophers

Intuitionism and logical revision.

The topic of this thesis is logical revision: should we revise the canons of classical reasoning in favour of a weaker logic, such as intuitionistic logic? In the first part of the thesis, I consider two metaphysical arguments against the classical Law of Excluded Middle-arguments whose main premise is the metaphysical claim that truth is knowable. I argue that the first argument, the Basic Revisionary Argument, validates a parallel argument for a conclusion that is unwelcome to classicists and intuitionists alike: that the dual of the Law of Excluded Middle, the Law of Non-Contradiction, is either unknown, or both known and not known to be true. As for the second argument, the Paradox of Knowability, I offer new reasons for thinking that adopting intuitionistic logic does not go to the heart of the matter. In the second part of the thesis, I motivate an inferentialist framework for assessing competing logics-one on which the meaning of the logical vocabulary is determined by the rules for its correct use. I defend the inferentialist account of understanding from the contention that it is inadequate in principle, and I offer reasons for thinking that the inferentialist approach to logic can help model theorists and proof-theorists alike justify their logical choices. I then scrutinize the main meaning-theoretic principles on which the inferentialist approach to logic rests: the requirements of harmony and separability. I show that these principles are motivated by the assumption that inference rules are complete, and that the kind of completeness that is necessary for imposing separability is strictly stronger than the completeness needed for requiring harmony. This allows me to reconcile the inferentialist assumption that inference rules are complete with the inherent incompleteness of higher-order logics-an apparent tension that has sometimes been thought to undermine the entire inferentialist project. I finally turn to the question whether the inferentialist framework is inhospitable in principle to classical logical principles. I compare three different regimentations of classical logic: two old, the multiple-conclusions and the bilateralist ones, and one new. Each of them satisfies the requirements of harmony and separability, but each of them also invokes structural principles that are not accepted by the intuitionist logician. I offer reasons for dismissing multiple-conclusions and bilateralist formalizations of logic, and I argue that we can nevertheless be in harmony with classical logic, if we are prepared to adopt classical rules for disjunction, and if we are willing to treat absurdity as a logical punctuation sign

Metaphysics or Modernity? Contributions to the Bamberg Summer School 2012

This collection of essays originated in the Summer School ‘Metaphysics or Modernity?’, which was held at the University of Bamberg in August 2012. Designed as a forum for graduate students in philosophy, the Summer School brought together a highly diverse group of young academics who – more often than not – came from utterly different schools and traditions of thought. This pluralism is reflected in the pages of this book. While the volume is roughly divided into two halves – one with a more historical focus, the other with a more systematic focus – the reader will find an unusually wide array of topics and questions treated here. Since the aforementioned pluralism was one of the main strengths of our Summer School, this is something in which we take much prid

Against a priori knowledge of non-trivial truths.

Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy. University of KwaZulu-Natal, Howard College 2014.This is a thesis in support of the conceptual yoking of analytic truth to a priori knowledge. My approach is a semantic one; the primary subject matter throughout the thesis is linguistic objects, such as propositions or sentences. I evaluate arguments, and also forward my own, about how such linguistic objects’ truth is determined, how their meaning is fixed and how we, respectively, know the conditions under which their truth and meaning are obtained. The strategy is to make explicit what is distinctive about analytic truths. The objective is to show that truths, known a priori, are trivial in a highly circumscribed way. My arguments are premised on a language-relative account of analytic truth. The language relative account which underwrites much of what I do has two central tenets: 1. Conventionalism about truth and, 2. Non-factualism about meaning. I argue that one decisive way of establishing conventionalism and non-factualism is to prioritise epistemological questions. Once it is established that some truths are not known empirically an account of truth must follow which precludes factual truths being known non-empirically. The function of Part 1 is, chiefly, to render Carnap’s language-relative account of analytic truth. I do not offer arguments in support of Carnap at this stage, but throughout Parts 2 and 3, by looking at more current literature on a priori knowledge and analytic truth, it becomes quickly evident that I take Carnap to be correct, and why. In order to illustrate the extent to which Carnap’s account is conventionalist and non-factualist I pose his arguments against those of his predecessors, Kant and Frege. Part 1 is a lightly retrospective background to the concepts of ‘analytic’ and ‘a priori’. The strategy therein is more mercenary than exegetical: I select the parts from Kant and Frege most relevant to Carnap’s eventual reaction to them. Hereby I give the reasons why Carnap foregoes a factual and objective basis for logical truth. The upshot of this is an account of analytic truth (i.e. logical truth, to him) which ensures its trivial nature. In opposition to accounts of a priori knowledge, which describe it as knowledge gained from rational apprehension, I argue that it is either knowledge from logical deduction or knowledge of stipulations. I therefore reject, in Part 2, three epistemologies for knowing linguistic conventions (e.g. implicit definitions): 1. intuition, 2. inferential a priori knowledge and, 3. a posteriori knowledge. At base, all three epistemologies are rejected because they are incompatible with conventionalism and non-factualism. I argue this point by signalling that such accounts of knowledge yield unsubstantiated second-order claims and/or they render the relevant linguistic conventions epistemically arrogant. For a convention to be arrogant it must be stipulated to be true. The stipulation is then considered arrogant when its meaning cannot be fixed, and its truth cannot be determined without empirical ‘work’. Once a working explication of ‘a priori’ has been given, partially in Part 1 (as inferential) and then in Part 2 (as non-inferential) I look, in Part 3, at an apriorist account of analytic truth, which, I argue, renders analytic truth non-trivial. The particular subject matter here is the implicit definitions of logical terms. The opposition’s argument holds that logical truths are known a priori (this is part of their identification criteria) and that their meaning is factually based. From here it follows that analytic truth, being determined by factually based meaning, is also factual. I oppose these arguments by exposing the internal inconsistencies; that implicit definition is premised on the arbitrary stipulation of truth which is inconsistent with saying that there are facts which determine the same truth. In doing so, I endorse the standard irrealist position about implicit definition and analytic truth (along with the “early friends of implicit definition” such as Wittgenstein and Carnap). What is it that I am trying to get at by doing all of the abovementioned? Here is a very abstracted explanation. The unmitigated realism of the rationalists of old, e.g. Plato, Descartes, Kant, have stoically borne the brunt of the allegation of yielding ‘synthetic a priori’ claims. The anti-rationalist phase of this accusation I am most interested in is that forwarded by the semantically driven empiricism of the early 20th century. It is here that the charge of the ‘synthetic a priori’ really takes hold. Since then new methods and accusatory terms are employed by, chiefly, non-realist positions. I plan to give these proper attention in due course. However, it seems to me that the reframing of the debate in these new terms has also created the illusion that current philosophical realism, whether naturalistic realism, realism in science, realism in logic and mathematics, is somehow not guilty of the same epistemological and semantic charges levelled against Plato, Descartes and Kant. It is of interest to me that in, particularly, current analytic philosophy (given its rationale) realism in many areas seems to escape the accusation of yielding synthetic priori claims. Yet yielding synthetic a priori claims is something which realism so easily falls prey to. Perhaps this is a function of the fact that the phrase, ‘synthetic a priori’, used as an allegation, is now outmoded. This thesis is nothing other than an indictment of metaphysics, or speculative philosophy (this being the crime), brought against a specific selection of realist arguments. I, therefore, ask of my reader to see my explicit, and perhaps outmoded, charge of the ‘synthetic a priori’ levelled against respective theorists as an attempt to draw a direct comparison with the speculative metaphysics so many analytic philosophers now love to hate. I think the phrase ‘synthetic a priori’ still does a lot of work in this regard, precisely because so many current theorists wrongly think they are immune to this charge. Consequently, I shall say much about what is not permitted. Such is, I suppose, the nature of arguing ‘against’ something. I’ll argue that it is not permitted to be a factualist about logical principles and say that they are known a priori. I’ll argue that it is not permitted to say linguistic conventions are a posteriori, when there is a complete failure in locating such a posteriori conventions. Both such philosophical claims are candidates for the synthetic a priori, for unmitigated rationalism. But on the positive side, we now have these two assets: Firstly, I do not ask us to abandon any of the linguistic practises discussed; merely to adopt the correct attitude towards them. For instance, where we use the laws of logic, let us remember that there are no known/knowable facts about logic. These laws are therefore, to the best of our knowledge, conventions not dissimilar to the rules of a game. And, secondly, once we pass sentence on knowing, a priori, anything but trivial truths we shall have at our disposal the sharpest of philosophical tools. A tool which can only proffer a better brand of empiricism

Theory and practice in the social sciences.

Thesis. 1976. Ph.D.--Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Political Science.Microfiche copy available in Archives and Dewey.Bibliography: leaves 602-615.Ph.D