Endogenous Reversals of Fortune

The phenomenon of systemic changes in the fortunes of social groups is hard to reconcile with traditional macroeconomic models of intergenerational mobility. This paper, therefore, proposes a theory of endogenous reversal of fortune, whereby instilling strict work norms is an instrument to address moral hazard in poor families more so than in rich families, which is consistent with empirical regularities pertaining to work attitudes. The mechanism implies that hard-working children of the poor may eventually overtake leisure-prone children of the rich. This evolution, in particular, of work norms, is endogenously determined and is, therefore a better explanation of the rise and the fall of population groups than existing theories that rely on exogenous ability variations.work norms, intergenerational income mobility

Intergenerational mobility : measurement and the role of borrowing constraints and inherited tastes

In this paper, I present some popular measures of mobility in economic outcomes within a family across generations. I also discuss two of the most important factors preventing intergenerational mobility: existence of financially constrained individuals and transmission of tastes from parents to children. Finally, I show how these two factors could give raise to dramatic reversals of fortune affecting successive generations of the same dynasty. I will cast the results of the different models I use in terms of the previous measures of intergenerational mobilit

Optimism and commitment: An elementary theory of bargaining and war

We propose an elementary theory of wars fought by fully rational contenders. Two parties play a Markov game that combines stages of bargaining with stages where one side has the ability to impose surrender on the other. Under uncertainty and incomplete information, in the unique equilibrium of the game, long confrontations occur: war arises when reality disappoints initial (rational) optimism, and it persist longer when both agents are optimists but reality proves both wrong. Bargaining proposals that are rejected initially might eventually be accepted after several periods of confrontation. We provide an explicit computation of the equilibrium, evaluating the probability of war, and its expected losses as a function of i) the costs of confrontation, ii) the asymmetry of the split imposed under surrender, and iii) the strengths of contenders at attack and defense. Changes in these parameters display non-monotonic effects.Conflict, Income redistribution, Natives, Immigrants.

The MetaCapitalism Cult.

Qu’il s’agisse de notre vie professionnelle ou de notre vie personnelle, la promesse d’immortalité exerce le même pouvoir de séduction. La promesse de salut délivrée à l’entreprise ne diffère guère de la promesse faite aux êtres humains. Cet idéal de salut, qui a exercé sa fascination sur toutes les époques, les religions ont promis de le réaliser. Les entreprises de conseil s’inscrivent dans la même logique, dans la mesure où elles constituent, pour les entreprises, l’équivalent contemporain d’une expérience religieuse. Les prophètes du conseil s’emploient à générer ce genre de sentiments en utilisant tout un vocabulaire symbolique tel que « reconfiguration des processus », « meilleures pratiques », etc, dans un rituel baptisé MétaCapitalisme, impliquant une communauté de croyants, en l’occurrence leurs clients. Ce rituel, par le biais du Culte du conseil, a des conséquences qui vont bien au-delà des seules entreprises clientes et affectent de manière importante de nombreux groupes de personnes et d’institutions dans notre société devenue globale. Ce constat justifie de procéder à un examen critique de ses mérites. Notre recherche explore la performance du MétaCapitalisme, un terme forgé par le géant du conseil, Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC), pour décrire sa vision de la « nouvelle économie », qui traite de l’utilisation des e-markets, des échanges en ligne et des communautés d’affaires en réseau, et a eu pour effet de démultiplier l’impact des développements technologiques et des principales améliorations de la vie des affaires issues des années 1990. Le MétaCapitalisme peut être appréhendé en analysant la conversion des leaders du MétaCapitalisme au modèle prôné. Notre étude, en appliquant des techniques de régression à un certain nombre d’indicateurs clés, identifie les tendances relatives à la performance de ces leaders et les compare avec les tendances observées pour les 100 premières entreprises du groupe Fortune. Il en ressort que les entreprises du MétaCapitalisme ont été incapables de maintenir la transformation apparemment brillante qu’elles avaient opérée en 1999 et que sur de nombreux points, les tendances présentent des retournements imprévus par rapport au maintien de la structure idéale du MétaCapitalisme. Une évaluation critique de ces observations est effectuée de manière à valider la possibilité de généralisation du modèle, afin d’être en mesure d’éviter une expérimentation sociale continue et préjudiciable. En conclusion, la stratégie du MétaCapitalisme présente d’indéniables similitudes avec les cultes religieux, ce qui amène à la question suivante : le MétaCapitalisme aura-t-il le même destin que la plupart de ces cultes, à savoir, le désenchantement est lié à des espérances déçues ?

Truth Contests and Talking Corpses

In diverse fictions from the second century Roman Empire, two parties with competing claims to truth hold a formal contest in a public place where, after a series of abrupt reversals, the issue is finally decided by the evidence of a dead, mutilated, or resurrected body. We can ask these corpses to tell us about the ways Roman society constructed truth. Furthermore, can we learn from the abrupt reversals in these narratives anything about the way Romans experienced shifts in truth-paradigms in “real life”? (This is, of course, a question of paramount importance for appreciating the religious change propelled by Christianity)

How robust is the evidence of an emerging or increasing female excess in physical morbidity between childhood and adolescence? Results of a systematic literature review and meta-analyses

For asthma and psychological morbidity, it is well established that higher prevalence among males in childhood is replaced by higher prevalence among females by adolescence. This review investigates whether there is evidence for a similar emerging female ‘excess’ in relation to a broad range of physical morbidity measures. Establishing whether this pattern is generalised or health outcome-specific will further understandings of the aetiology of gender differences in health. Databases (Medline; Embase; CINAHL; PsycINFO; ERIC) were searched for English language studies (published 1992–2010) presenting physical morbidity prevalence data for males and females, for at least two age-bands within the age-range 4–17 years. A three-stage screening process (initial sifting; detailed inspection; extraction of full papers), was followed by study quality appraisals. Of 11 245 identified studies, 41 met the inclusion criteria. Most (n = 31) presented self-report survey data (five longitudinal, 26 cross-sectional); 10 presented routinely collected data (GP/hospital statistics). Extracted data, supplemented by additional data obtained from authors of the included studies, were used to calculate odds ratios of a female excess, or female:male incident rate ratios as appropriate. To test whether these changed with age, the values were logged and regressed on age in random effects meta-regressions. These showed strongest evidence of an emerging/increasing female excess for self-reported measures of headache, abdominal pain, tiredness, migraine and self-assessed health. Type 1 diabetes and epilepsy, based on routinely collected data, did not show a significant emerging/increasing female excess. For most physical morbidity measures reviewed, the evidence broadly points towards an emerging/increasing female excess during the transition to adolescence, although results varied by morbidity measure and study design, and suggest that this may occur at a younger age than previously thought