The Contribution of Global Alliances to Airlines’ Environmental Performance

Global alliances have traditionally been related to improvements in the economic and operational performances of companies, particularly in the airline industry. However, we still do not know the effect of the participation in this kind of multilateral agreement on the environmental performance of airlines. The main aim of this work is to analyze whether the alliance membership of airlines has an effect upon their environmental performance, and if so, whether or not the characteristics of the global alliance, as well as the business model of the airline, may influence this relation to a greater or lesser extent. The results of regression and Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) in a sample of 252 airlines (58 included in one of the three global alliances: Star Alliance, Oneworld, and SkyTeam) show a strong and inverse relationship between environmental performance and belonging to an alliance. The paper also shows empirical evidence of the influence of the business model of the airline on environmental performance. These results suggest important implications for managers facing challenges regarding sustainability

Strategic Alliances in the Global Airline Industry

Strategic alliances are common to any industry. Their presence is felt quite significantly in the airline industry. Starting in the US in 1978 deregulation of airline industry has since brought about sea changes in functioning of the industry. This paper attempts to understand the developments and strategic alliances that have occurred in the airline industry since deregulation. These strategic alliances exist in various forms and differ widely in scope and no consensus on classification was found. The advantages and disadvantages of strategic alliances with respect to the airline industry have been discussed. It is felt that the industry is getting increasingly concentrated. However, no conclusive remarks can be made about consumer welfare.

Balancing competition and cooperation : evidence from transatlantic airline markets

In the last two decades, airline alliances were not only successful in extending the size of their networks, but also received approvals by public authorities to intensify their ooperation through to merger-like revenue-sharing joint ventures (JVs). We empirically investigate the impact of the implementation of such joint ventures on both the respective airlines’ competitive strategies as well as productive efficiency. Using U.S. DOT T100 International Segment data and applying airline-market fixed effects models, we find that joint ventures – compared to services with a lower degree of cooperation – lead to a 3-5 percent increase in capacity between the respective partner airlines’ hub airports; however, this is done at the expense of services elsewhere in the network. Productive efficiency, as measured by load factors, is found to be 0.5-5 percent lower for joint venture routes compared to routes operated under antitrust immunity only. We use our empirical results to discuss implications for the balancing of competition and cooperation in transatlantic airline markets

Sustainable Value Proposition Design in a Product-Service System

Many companies have started to add services to their tangible products in order to defend themselves from increased competition from low-cost economies. Research regarding the transition towards product-service systems (PSS) and how the PSS providers' business models are affected exists, but there is a lack of research regarding how the suppliers to the PSS providers are affected by the transition towards PSS. Therefore, this thesis studies the situation for a supplier/partner to an OEM that has changed their business model to a PSS providing one. As the first step in a development of a new business model aims this thesis to provide guidelines for how to set up value propositions suitable for a supplier/partner in this new environment. When technologically complex products, such as aircraft engines, are provided through PSS offerings it is hard to translate customer needs into quality parameters, which makes it hard to sustain the value to customer over time. Therefore, how to keep the value offering sustainable over time is also investigated in this thesis. The aim of this study was to investigate how a sustainable value proposition can be designed for a product and technology supplier/partner to an OEM that offers PSS solutions. The research has been performed through studying relevant literature and collecting empirical data from a case company through semi-structured interviews and a workshop. The case company in this research is Volvo Aero Corporation (VAC). The empirical findings show that VAC wants to offer product-service bundled solution, which fit the whole spectra of PSS value propositions, to their partners/customers. To be able to deliver these different types of product-service bundled solutions different value propositions that suit the different kinds of PSS offerings are needed. Requirements that must be fulfilled to be able to offer and deliver the different types of value propositions exist in terms of securing sufficient information access, aligning the incentives of all actors involved and achieving an internal consensus of what is delivered

Carve-Outs Under Airline Antitrust Immunity

This paper offers the first formal economic analysis of carve-outs under airline antitrust immunity. Carve-outs are designed to limit the potential anticompetitive effects of cooperation by alliance partners in hub-to-hub markets, where they provide overlapping nonstop service. While the paper shows that carve-outs are beneficial when the alliance does not involve full integration of the partners' operations on the hub-to-hub route, its key point is that a carve-out may be harmful when imposed on a joint-venture alliance. A JV alliance involves full exploitation of economies of traffic density on the hub-to-hub route, and a carve-out prevents the realization of these benefits. While a carve-out may limit anticompetitive incentives on the hub-to-hub route, welfare may be reduced if the resulting gains are overshadowed by the efficiency loss generated by the carve-out.Carve-out; Antitrust immunity; Airline alliances

Anti-Competitive Marketing Practices in the Airline Industry

Consumers, airlines and the economy as a whole have benefited from airline deregulation. Government regulation was replaced by competition as the protector of the consumers. Airlines continue to pursue marketing strategies which reduce competition and as act as barriers to new entrants. This paper reviews some of those strategies and suggest actions by which policy makers might encourage competition

Carve-Outs under Airline Antitrust Immunity

This paper offers the first formal economic analysis of carve-outs under airline antitrust im- munity. Carve-outs are designed to limit the potential anticompetitive effects of cooperation by alliance partners in hub-to-hub markets, where they provide overlapping nonstop service. While the paper shows that carve-outs are beneficial when the alliance does not involve full integration of the partners’ operations on the hub-to-hub route, its key point is that a carve-out may be harmful when imposed on a joint-venture alliance. A JV alliance involves full exploitation of economies of traffic density on the hub-to-hub route, and a carve-out prevents the realization of these benefits. While a carve-out may limit anticompetitive incentives on the hub-to-hub route, welfare may be reduced if the resulting gains are overshadowed by the efficiency loss generated by the carve-out.carve-out, alliance, antitrust immunity, airlines

Airline Alliances, Carve-Outs and Collusion

In this paper, we ask how antitrust immunity subject to a carve-out affects collusion incentives in international airline alliances. We show that the gains from economies of density due to higher interline traffic under the alliance strengthen the incentive to collude on the interhub segment, while the accompanying revenue gain heightens the incentive to defect from collusive behavior. These two effects exactly cancel in the case of linear demands and linear economies of density. Under this approximation, the incentives for interhub collusion are no different before and after the emergence of an airline alliance subject to a carve-out.collusion, carve-out