A model for assessing the impact of electronic procurement forms

This paper aims to contribute to the development of a model for assessing the direct and indirect impact of various forms of electronic procurement (EP) on a firm¿s integral purchasing (-related) costs. The model builds on existing classifications of purchasing costs and benefits and is illustrated by means of a number of empirical cases

Allocating Risks in a Domestic Greenhouse Gas Trading System

As tradeable permit programmes mature, two inter-related issues are becoming more critical in creating viable responses to a long-term, highly uncertain environmental problem such as climate change. First, we need to update policies in response to new information; and second, we need to design policies so that they can be updated without creating adverse strategic incentives for either government or regulated entities. Consideration of both exogenous risk (uncontrollable) and endogenous risk (concerns about policy credibility) suggests that permits should be auctioned several years in advance of use, and each permit should be defined as a percentage of a possibly varying target. For exogenous risks, this system allows all risk to be pooled and managed as efficiently as possible within the private sector. For endogenous risk, it creates a vested interest that will pressure government to maintain or strengthen targets to offset the obvious pressures to weaken regulation. It also reduces the ability of government to reallocate rents without cost to itself, or to gain revenue by altering targets. In addition, policy should be made as complete and as transparent as possible, and its key elements should be embedded in legislation to limit prospects for capricious changes in the future.

Allocating Risks in a Domestic Greenhouse Gas Trading System

As tradeable permit programmes mature, two inter-related issues are becoming more critical in creating viable responses to a long-term, highly uncertain environmental problem such as climate change. First, we need to update policies in response to new information; and second, we need to design policies so that they can be updated without creating adverse strategic incentives for either government or regulated entities. Consideration of both exogenous risk (uncontrollable) and endogenous risk (concerns about policy credibility) suggests that permits should be auctioned several years in advance of use, and each permit should be defined as a percentage of a possibly varying target. For exogenous risks, this system allows all risk to be pooled and managed as efficiently as possible within the private sector. For endogenous risk, it creates a vested interest that will pressure government to maintain or strengthen targets to offset the obvious pressures to weaken regulation. It also reduces the ability of government to reallocate rents without cost to itself, or to gain revenue by altering targets. In addition, policy should be made as complete and as transparent as possible, and its key elements should be embedded in legislation to limit prospects for capricious changes in the future.tradeable permits, climate change, risk

Electronic Reverse Auctions: Spawning Procurement Innovation in the Context of Arab Culture

Government e-procurement initiatives have the potential to transform local institutions, but few studies have been published of strategies for implementing specific e-procurement tools, particularly involving procurement by a foreign government adapting to local culture in the Middle East/North Africa (MENA). This case describes procurement at a forward operating base (FOB) in Kuwait in support of operations in Iraq. The government procurers had to deal with a phenomenon unique to the MENA region: wasta. Wasta is a form of social capital that bestows power, influence, and connection to those who possess it, similar to guanxi in China. This study explores the value proposition and limitations of electronic reverse auctions (eRA) with the purpose of sharing best practices and lessons learned for government procurement in a MENA country. The public value framework provides valuable theoretical insights for the implementation of a new government e-procurement tool in a foreign country. In a culture dominated by wasta, the suppliers enjoyed the transparency and merit-based virtues of eRA’s that transferred successfully into the new cultural milieu: potential to increase transparency, competition, efficiency, and taxpayer savings. The practices provided herein are designed specifically to help buyers overcome structural barriers including training, organizational inertia, and a lack of eRA policy and guidance while implementing a new e-procurement tool in a foreign country

Online Auctions

The economic literature on online auctions is rapidly growing because of the enormous amount of freely available field data. Moreover, numerous innovations in auction-design features on platforms such as eBay have created excellent research opportunities. In this article, we survey the theoretical, empirical, and experimental research on bidder strategies (including the timing of bids and winner's-curse effects) and seller strategies (including reserve-price policies and the use of buy-now options) in online auctions, as well as some of the literature dealing with online-auction design (including stopping rules and multi-object pricing rules).

Analyzing Policy Risk and Accounting for Strategy: Auctions in the National Airspace System

We examine the potential for simple auction mechanisms to efficiently allocate arrival and departure slots during Ground Delay Programs (GDPs). The analysis is conducted using a new approach to predicting strategic behavior called Predictive Game Theory (PGT). The difference between PGT and the familiar Equilibrium Concept Approach (ECA) is that PGT models produce distribution-valued solut tion concepts rather than set-valued ones. The advantages of PGT over ECA in policy analysis and design are that PGT allows for decision-theoretic prediction and policy evaluation. Furthermore, PGT allows for a comprehensive account of risk, including two types of risk, systematic and modeling, that cannot be considered with the ECA. The results show that the second price auction dominates the first price auction in many decision-relevant categories, including higher expected efficiency, lower variance in efficiency, lower probability of significant efficiency loss and higher probability of significant efficiency gain. These findings are despite the fact that there is no a priori reason to expect the second price auction to be more efficient because none of the conventional reasons for preferring second price over first price auctions, i.e. dominant strategy implementability, apply to the GDP slot auction setting.auction, ground delay program, entropy, predictive game theory, strategic risk

Risk Management of Daily Tourist Tax Revenues for the Maldives

International tourism is the principal economic activity for Small Island Tourism Economies (SITEs). There is a strongly predictable component of international tourism, specifically the government revenue received from taxes on international tourists, but it is difficult to predict the number of international tourist arrivals which, in turn, determines the magnitude of tax revenue receipts. A framework is presented for risk management of daily tourist tax revenues for the Maldives, which is a unique SITE because it relies entirely on tourism for its economic and social development. As these receipts from international tourism are significant financial assets to the economies of SITEs, the time-varying volatility of international tourist arrivals and their growth rate is analogous to the volatility (or dynamic risk) in financial returns. In this paper, the volatility in the levels and growth rates of daily international tourist arrivals is investigated.Small Island Tourism Economies (SITEs), International tourist arrivals, Tourism tax, Volatility, Risk, Value-at-Risk (VaR), Sustainable Tourism-@-Risk (ST@R)

Technology market intermediaries to facilitate external technology exploitation: The case of IP auctions

Recently the phenomena of external technology exploitation (ETE) has started to attract attention from scholars, businesses and politicians likewise alongside with a growth of the markets for technology. However, the markets for technology are still characterized by inhibiting obstacles that lead to high transaction costs, thus prohibit efficient transactions and result in market failure. Although, on the one hand the presence of obstacles lead to high transaction costs, the large market potential on the other hand provides incentives for technology market intermediaries (TMI) to develop new exploitation models to facilitate ETE transactions by reducing transaction costs. Throughout this paper we address the general research question of whether and how new exploitation models can actually facilitate ETE. To address this question, in a first step we generate insights into TMIs acting on the markets for technology and derived a conceptual basis for a further understanding of TMIs. Having carried out a detailed review of the literature, we develop a theory based typology for six TMI archetypes. Throughout this exercise we gain insights into the variety of different functions TMIs have on the markets for technology and various new ways how TMIs try to facilitate ETE transactions. Throughout the second part of this paper, we focus on IP auctions as one particular business model of the archetype “IP Broker”. We investigate this “young” business model presenting first insights into two qualitative studies. In a first step we derive a generic IP auction process based on a qualitative, empirical analysis of IP auction processes. We then translate these results into a theory based process view and derive a generic IP auction process as a specific type of an ETE process. Having thus generated a close understanding of the transaction process, we presented results from four cases of successful transactions, i.e. where patents were sold for particular high prices from two SMEs and two MNCs. The case studies are analyzed according to four main aspects including characteristics of the companies that exploited patented technologies (including motives and selection processes), the patented technology as such, the organization of the transaction and the companies’ perceptions regarding the success of the transactions. --

Price Floors for Emissions Trading

Price floors in greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes can have advantages for technological innovation, price volatility, and management of cost uncertainty, but implementation has potential pitfalls. We argue that the best mechanism for implementing a price floor is to have firms pay an extra fee or tax. This has budgetary advantages and is more compatible with international permit trading than alternative approaches that dominate the academic and policy debate. The fee approach can also be used to implement more general hybrid approaches to emissions pricing.Price Floor, Price Ceiling, Carbon Tax, Emissions Trading, Carbon Pricing, Price and Quantity Controls, Waxman-Markey Bill