Rethinking Economic Capital Management through the Integrated Derivative-based Treatment of Interest Rate and Credit Risk

This research revisits the economic capital management regarding banking books of financial institutions exposed to the emerging market sovereign debt. We develop a derivative-based integrated approach to quantify economic capital requirements for considered jointly interest rate and credit risk. Our framework represents a major contribution to the empirical aspects of capital management. The proposed innovative modeling allows applying standard historic value-at-risk techniques developed for stand-alone risk factors to evaluate aggregate impacts of several risks. We use the time-series of credit default swap spreads and interest rate swap rates as proxy measures for credit risk and interest rate risk, respectively. An elasticity of interest rate risk and credit risk, considered a function of the business cycle phases, maturity of instruments, creditworthiness, and other macroeconomic parameters, is gauged by means of numerical modeling. Our contribution to the new economic thinking regarding the interest rate risk and credit rate risk management consists in their integrated treatment as the dynamics of interest rate and credit spreads is found to demonstrate the features of automatic stabilizers of each other. This research sheds light on how financial institutions may address hedge strategies against downside risks. It is of special importance for emerging markets heavily dependent on foreign capital as it potentially allows emerging market banks to improve risk management practices in terms of capital adequacy and Basel III rules. From the regulatory perspective, by taking into account inter-risk diversification effects it allows enhancing financial stability through jointly optimizing Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 economic capital.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Proliferation of risk and policy responses in the EU financial markets

Summary for non-specialistsThis study draws attention to the proliferation of tail risks in financial markets prior to and during the course of the recent global financial crisis. It examines the level of tail risks in selected equity, interbank lending and foreign exchange markets in selected EU Member States in relation to the United States. The extent of tail risks is assessed by applying general error distribution (GED) parameterization in GARCH volatility tests of the examined variables. The empirical tests prove that tail risks were pronounced across all of the examined European financial markets throughout the crisis. They were also significant prior to the crisis outbreak. The analyzed interbank lending markets exhibited more extreme volatility outbursts than the equity and foreign exchange markets. Several countercyclical monetary and macroprudential policies aimed at abating tail risks are identified and discussed. Flexible capital adequacy and contingent capital requirements for financial institutions are advocated.Global financial crisis equity markets foreign exchange markets monetary policies macroprudential policies Orlowski

Paradigm shift? A critique of the IMF’s new approach to capital controls

The global financial crisis forcefully highlighted the importance of developing mechanisms to curb the effects of large and volatile capital inflows on growth and financial stability in developing countries. It led the IMF to reconsider its long-standing rejection of capital controls. This paper explores the analytical framework underlying the IMF’s new position, arguing that its sequencing strategy offers a formulaic solution that neglects the institutional make-up of money and currency markets, is asymmetric in its emphasis on the upturn of the liquidity cycle and sanctions capital-controls only as a last-resort solution. The new approach can have perverse impacts, increasing vulnerability where banks play an important role in the intermediation of capital inflows. The paper offers alternative policy solutions that focus on realigning bank incentives towards longer horizons and sustainable growth models, combining carefully designed central bank liquidity strategies and institutional changes in the banking sector.IMF, capital controls, financial crisis, global liquidity, shadow banks, sterilizations, central banks.

The regulation and supervision of domestic financial conglomerates

Financial conglomerates are groups of financial institutions related by ownership or control. Specific regulatory and supervisory issues arise when financial services -- such as commercial and retail banking, securities underwriting and trading, investment management, and insurance underwriting -- are provided by a financial conglomerate structure. The author provides a handbook for authorities responsible for financial conglomerate regulation and supervision, identifying key issues, spelling out regulatory and supervisory alternatives, and describing both preferred solutions and alternatives. He makes reference to the regulatory framework adopted in the European Economic Community. Among the main tools available to the authorities are prudential regulations, accounting consolidation, and consolidated supervision. Prudential regulation for financial conglomerates preferably would be applied on a uniform and fully consolidated basis. Alternatively, existing regulations applicable to different financial sectors can be modified, in particular to mitigate the potential that intragroup transactions overstate capital or earnings. Accounting consolidation of the financial entities in a group is a prerequisite for consolidated prudential regulation and improves the transparency of the group's financial position. The authorities should use consolidated supervision to ensure that the risks from all group entities are identified and assessed.Insurance&Risk Mitigation,Banks&Banking Reform,Financial Intermediation,National Governance,Environmental Economics&Policies

Structural Causes of the Global Financial Crisis: A Critical Assessment of the ‘New Financial Architecture’

This PERI Working Paper argues that the ultimate cause of the current global financial crisis is to be found in the deeply flawed institutions and practices of what is often referred to as the New Financial Architecture (NFA) – a globally integrated system of giant bank conglomerates and the so-called ‘shadow banking system’ of investment banks, hedge funds and bank-created Special Investment Vehicles. These institutions are either lightly and badly regulated or not regulated at all, an arrangement defended by and celebrated in the dominant financial economics theoretical paradigm – the theory of efficient capital markets. The NFA has generated a series of ever-bigger financial crises that have been met by larger and larger government bailouts. After a brief review of the historical evolution of the NFA, this paper analyses its structural flaws: 1) the theoretical foundation of the NFA – the theory of efficient capital markets – is very weak and the celebratory narrative of the NFA accepted by regulators is seriously misleading; 2) widespread perverse incentives embedded in the NFA generated excessive risk-taking throughout financial markets; 3) mortgage-backed securities central to the boom were so complex and nontransparent that they could not possibly be priced correctly; their prices were bound to collapse once the excessive optimism of the boom faded; 4) contrary to the narrative, excessive risk built up in giant banks during the boom; and 5) the NFA generated high leverage and high systemic risk, with channels of contagion that transmitted problems in the US subprime mortgage market around the world. Understanding the profound problems of the NFA is a necessary step toward the creation of a new and improved set of financial institutions and practices likely to achieve core policy objectives such as faster real sector growth with lower inequality.

Structural Causes of the Global Financial Crisis: A Critical Assessment of the ‘New Financial Architecture’

The main thesis of this paper is that the ultimate cause of the current global financial crisis is to be found in the deeply flawed institutions and practices of what is often referred to as the New Financial Architecture (NFA) – a globally integrated system of giant bank conglomerates and the so-called ‘shadow banking system’ of investment banks, hedge funds and bank-created Special Investment Vehicles. The institutions are either lightly and badly regulated or not regulated at all, an arrangement defended by and celebrated in the dominant financial economics theoretical paradigm – the theory of efficient capital markets. The NFA has generated a series of ever-bigger financial crises that have been met by larger and larger government bailouts. After a brief review of the historical evolution of the NFA, the paper analyses its structural flaws. The problems discussed in order are: 1) the theoretical foundation of the NFA – the theory of efficient capital markets – is very weak and the celebratory narrative of the NFA accepted by regulators is seriously misleading; 2) widespread perverse incentives embedded in the NFA generated excessive risk-taking throughout financial markets; 3) mortgage-backed securities central to the boom were so complex and nontransparent that they could not possibly be priced correctly; their prices were bound to collapse once the excessive optimism of the boom faded; 4) contrary to the narrative, excessive risk built up in giant banks during the boom; and 5) the NFA generated high leverage and high systemic risk, with channels of contagion that transmitted problems in the US subprime mortgage market around the world. Understanding the profound problems of the NFA is a necessary step toward the creation of a new and improved set of financial institutions and practices likely to achieve core policy objectives such as faster real sector growth with lower inequality. JEL Categories:

Financial sector pro-cyclicality: lessons from the crisis

We analyze the main forces affecting financial system pro-cyclicality (the fact that developments in the financial sector can amplify business cycle fluctuations). We first review some major structural developments in financial markets that may influence pro-cyclicality and that have been overlooked in earlier analyses. We then examine three issues that are center stage in the current debate: capital regulation, accounting standards and managers’ incentives. After reviewing the institutional set-up and the key mechanisms at work, we critically examine a series of proposals designed to mitigate pro-cyclicality.pro-cyclicality, financial accelerator, capital requirements, leverage, accounting standards, incentives

Counterparty credit risk management in industrial corporates

Ever since the financial crisis of the banking system of 2008 - 2010 the paradigm that deposits or other exposures towards major banks are safe has been fundamentally questioned. This put industrial corporates, who to support their business usually need to manage significant cash holdings or incur counterparty credit risk via derivatives, in the situation to develop or extend their resources for counterparty credit risk management. This paper provides a comprehensive overview over the practical issues into the subject benefitting largely from the findings of an interview series conducted with the respective heads of counterparty and customer credit risk management in the time period April - September 2011 of 25 large european enterprises with a large subset being members of the German DAX Index.Financial Risk Management; Credit Risk; Counterparty Credit Risk; CCR Management; Organisation; Financial Controlling; Financial Institutions; Banks

lessons from Brazil and South Korea

As emerging economies experience a boom in capital inflows, governments are increasingly concerned about the downsides of these inflows. Even the IMF (International Monetary Fund), long a stalwart proponent of financial liberalization, is engaging in a new debate on capital flow management. Drawing lessons from empirical case studies on Brazil and South Korea, this paper finds that the new IMF approach remains insufficient in three key respects. First, the organization’s proposed distinction between measures, especially between permanent prudential regulation and temporary policies to shield the exchange rate, is unsustainable, especially in countries with highly sophisticated and internationally integrated financial markets. Second, country-specific factors matter. In the case of Brazil, the most important measures are those that directly address the specific institutions within its derivative market. Third, in order to provide sufficient policy space for emerging markets, the management of international capital flows, including the measures taken by advanced economies, should be permanent and bilateral