Responsibility and Cross-Subsidization in Cost Sharing

We propose two axiomatic theories of cost sharing with the common premise that individual demands are comparable, though perhaps different, commodities, and that agents are responsible for their own demand. Under partial responsibility the agents are not responsible for the asymmetries of the cost function: two agents consuming the same amount of output always pay the same price; this holds true under full responsibility only if the cost function is symmetric in all individual demands. If the cost function is additively separable, each agent pays his/her stand alone cost under full responsibility; this holds true under partial responsibility only if, in addition, the cost function is symmetric. By generalizing Moulin and Shenker.s (1999) Distributivity axiom to cost- sharing methods for heterogeneous goods, we identify in each of our two theories a different serial method. The subsidy-free serial method (Moulin, 1995) is essentially the only distributive method meeting Ranking and Dummy. The cross-subsidizing serial method (Sprumont, 1998) is the only distributive method satisfying Separability and Strong Ranking. Finally, we propose an alternative characterization of the latter method based on a strengthening of Distributivity.

On Demand Responsiveness in Additive Cost Sharing

We propose two new axioms of demand responsiveness for additive cost sharing with variable demands. Group Monotonicity requires that if a group of agents increase their demands, not all of them pay less. Solidarity says that if agent i demands more, j should not pay more if k pays less. Both axioms are compatible in the partial responsibility theory postulating Strong Ranking, i.e., the ranking of cost shares should never contradict that of demands. The combination of Strong Ranking , Solidarity and Monotonicity characterizes the quasi-proportional methods, under which cost shares are proportional to 'rescaled' demands. The alternative full responsibility theory is based on Separability, ruling out cross-subsidization when costs are additively separable. Neither the Aumann-Shapley nor the Shapley-Shubik method is group monotonic. On the otherhand, convex combinations of "nearby" fixed-path methods are group-monotonic: the subsidy-free serial method is the main example. No separable method meets Solidarity, yet restricting the axiom to submodular (or supermodular) cost functions leads to a characterization of the fixed-flow methods, containing the Shapley-Shubik and serial methods.

FACTORS AND CHALLENGES OF REGIONALIZATION IN THE WATER AND WASTEWATER SECTOR

This paper investigates some general issues related to the opportunity of regionalization, involving the aggregation of several towns for the provision of drinking water and wastewater services, as well as some particular features and challenges of the process in Romania. The main driver for the aggregation/regionalization of utilities is usually the potential to realize economies of scale by providing services to a larger customer base and at a lower cost, also increasing the size and efficiency of new investments by sharing infrastructure projects and accessing international funding.Regionalization, aggregation, water supply and wastewater services

Shapley compensation scheme

We study a particular class of cost sharing games – "data games" – covering situations wheresome players own data which are useful for a project pursued by the set of all players. Theproblem is to set up compensations between players. Data games are subadditive butgenerally not concave, and have a nonempty core. We characterize the core and compute thecompensation scheme derived from the Shapley value. We then compare it to the nucleolus.Although we use the term "data" our analysis actually applies to any good characterized bynon rivalry and excludability.cost sharing, Shapley value, nucleolus

Governance in India’s Public Transport Systems - Comparing Indian Railways and Airlines

The paper examines the basic reasons and feasible remedies for organizational weakness, and the possible contribution of ownership, industry and management structure, leadership, social norms, and institutional incentives to alleviating the weaknesses in the Indian context. The arguments are illustrated with reference to the public rail and air services and help to understand why some public sector transport undertakings performed better than others. The most effective changes are those that create incentives, broadly defined, for individuals to improve productivity.public services, Governance, social norms, incentives

“Almost” subsidy-free spatial pricing in a multi-dimensional setting

Consider a population of citizens uniformly spread over the entire plane, that faces a problem of locating public facilities to be used by its members. The cost of every facility is financed by its users, who also face an idiosyncratic private access cost to the facility. We assume that the facilities' cost is independent of location and access costs are linear with respect to the Euclidean distance. We show that an external intervention that covers 0.19% of the facility cost is sufficient to guarantee secession-proofness or no cross-subsidization, where no group of individuals is charged more than its stand alone cost incurred if it had acted on its own. Moreover, we demonstrate that in this case the Rawlsian access pricing is the only secession-proof allocation.secession-proofness, optimal jurisdictions, Rawlsian allocation, hexagonal partition, cross-subsidization

European Community--Sugar : cross-subsidization and the World Trade Organization

An important recent World Trade Organization dispute settlement case for many developing countries concerned European Union exports of sugar. Brazil, Thailand, and Australia alleged that the exports have substantially exceeded permitted levels as established by European Union commitments in the WTO. This case had major implications for both European Union sugar producers and developing countries that benefited from preferential access to the European Union market. It was also noteworthy in the use of economic arguments by the WTO dispute settlement panel, which held that the excess sugar exports were in part a reflection of illegal de facto cross-subsidization-rents from production that benefited from high support prices being used to cover losses associated with exports of sugar to the world market. Although in principle the economic arguments of the panel could apply to many other policy areas, in practice WTO provisions greatly limit the scope to bring similar arguments for trade in products that are not subject to explicit export subsidy reduction commitments of the type that were made for sugar and other agricultural commodities.Economic Theory&Research,Trade Law,Tax Law,Food&Beverage Industry,Agribusiness&Markets

On the Fuzzy Boundaries between Public and Private in Health Care Organization and Funding Systems

The paper proposes a survey of health care organization and funding systems in order to underline and discuss, in this specific field of social assistance, the combination public versus private provision and production of services. The survey then examines the present features of various National health services focusing on the efficiency and equity of public intervention and on the industrial organization of the institutional design of health care. In this context, it treats the rationale of cost-benefit of vertical integration of structures, devoted respectively to purchasing and providing health care services. Further, the paper considers the advantages and disadvantages of managed competition in quasi-markets and, finally, it deals with insurance systems, social as well private and supplementary ones. From the survey it turns out that the main distinctions of health care regimes in industrialised countries are not in terms of private versus public ownership of providers, rather in terms of industrial organization setting and in terms of the proportion of public versus private expenditure.Health care organization, health care funding, social insurance, private and public provision.

"Financing Long-Term Care: Options for Policy"

The nation is ill-prepared to finance the quantum jump in long-term care spending that is on its way as the baby boom ages. By default rather than by design, Medicaid has become the main source of funds for long-term care. But reliance on Medicaid has fostered the institutionalization of the disabled elderly, has given rise to a two-tier care system, and has yielded the bizarre outcome of use of limited welfare funds by middle- and even high-income Americans who have succeeded in sheltering assets from Medicaid's spend-down requirements. Insurance would be a greatly better answer to the nation's long-term care needs. But the market will remain small and underdeveloped as long as Americans can make easy claim on Medicaid. The paper puts forth a plan for universal long-term care insurance, supported by income-scaled tax credits, to replace Medicaid in its current role. That would make for "honest government"--one that not only does not fund inheritance protection but also genuinely protects those with greatest need.