A Survey on Wireless Sensor Network Security

Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have recently attracted a lot of interest in the research community due their wide range of applications. Due to distributed nature of these networks and their deployment in remote areas, these networks are vulnerable to numerous security threats that can adversely affect their proper functioning. This problem is more critical if the network is deployed for some mission-critical applications such as in a tactical battlefield. Random failure of nodes is also very likely in real-life deployment scenarios. Due to resource constraints in the sensor nodes, traditional security mechanisms with large overhead of computation and communication are infeasible in WSNs. Security in sensor networks is, therefore, a particularly challenging task. This paper discusses the current state of the art in security mechanisms for WSNs. Various types of attacks are discussed and their countermeasures presented. A brief discussion on the future direction of research in WSN security is also included.Comment: 24 pages, 4 figures, 2 table

Issues in providing a reliable multicast facility

Issues involved in point-to-multipoint communication are presented and the literature for proposed solutions and approaches surveyed. Particular attention is focused on the ideas and implementations that align with the requirements of the environment of interest. The attributes of multicast receiver groups that might lead to useful classifications, what the functionality of a management scheme should be, and how the group management module can be implemented are examined. The services that multicasting facilities can offer are presented, followed by mechanisms within the communications protocol that implements these services. The metrics of interest when evaluating a reliable multicast facility are identified and applied to four transport layer protocols that incorporate reliable multicast

Reliable broadcast protocols

A number of broadcast protocols that are reliable subject to a variety of ordering and delivery guarantees are considered. Developing applications that are distributed over a number of sites and/or must tolerate the failures of some of them becomes a considerably simpler task when such protocols are available for communication. Without such protocols the kinds of distributed applications that can reasonably be built will have a very limited scope. As the trend towards distribution and decentralization continues, it will not be surprising if reliable broadcast protocols have the same role in distributed operating systems of the future that message passing mechanisms have in the operating systems of today. On the other hand, the problems of engineering such a system remain large. For example, deciding which protocol is the most appropriate to use in a certain situation or how to balance the latency-communication-storage costs is not an easy question

How to securely replicate services (preliminary version)

A method is presented for constructing replicated services that retain their availability and integrity despite several servers and clients being corrupted by an intruder, in addition to others failing benignly. More precisely, a service is replicated by 'n' servers in such a way that a correct client will accept a correct server's response if, for some prespecified parameter, k, at least k servers are correct and fewer than k servers are correct. The issue of maintaining causality among client requests is also addressed. A security breach resulting from an intruder's ability to effect a violation of causality in the sequence of requests processed by the service is illustrated. An approach to counter this problem is proposed that requires that fewer than k servers are corrupt and, to ensure liveness, that k is less than or = n - 2t, where t is the assumed maximum total number of both corruptions and benign failures suffered by servers in any system run. An important and novel feature of these schemes is that the client need not be able to identify or authenticate even a single server. Instead, the client is required only to possess at most two public keys for the service

Security and Privacy Issues in Wireless Mesh Networks: A Survey

This book chapter identifies various security threats in wireless mesh network (WMN). Keeping in mind the critical requirement of security and user privacy in WMNs, this chapter provides a comprehensive overview of various possible attacks on different layers of the communication protocol stack for WMNs and their corresponding defense mechanisms. First, it identifies the security vulnerabilities in the physical, link, network, transport, application layers. Furthermore, various possible attacks on the key management protocols, user authentication and access control protocols, and user privacy preservation protocols are presented. After enumerating various possible attacks, the chapter provides a detailed discussion on various existing security mechanisms and protocols to defend against and wherever possible prevent the possible attacks. Comparative analyses are also presented on the security schemes with regards to the cryptographic schemes used, key management strategies deployed, use of any trusted third party, computation and communication overhead involved etc. The chapter then presents a brief discussion on various trust management approaches for WMNs since trust and reputation-based schemes are increasingly becoming popular for enforcing security in wireless networks. A number of open problems in security and privacy issues for WMNs are subsequently discussed before the chapter is finally concluded.Comment: 62 pages, 12 figures, 6 tables. This chapter is an extension of the author's previous submission in arXiv submission: arXiv:1102.1226. There are some text overlaps with the previous submissio

Issues in designing transport layer multicast facilities

Multicasting denotes a facility in a communications system for providing efficient delivery from a message's source to some well-defined set of locations using a single logical address. While modem network hardware supports multidestination delivery, first generation Transport Layer protocols (e.g., the DoD Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) (15) and ISO TP-4 (41)) did not anticipate the changes over the past decade in underlying network hardware, transmission speeds, and communication patterns that have enabled and driven the interest in reliable multicast. Much recent research has focused on integrating the underlying hardware multicast capability with the reliable services of Transport Layer protocols. Here, we explore the communication issues surrounding the design of such a reliable multicast mechanism. Approaches and solutions from the literature are discussed, and four experimental Transport Layer protocols that incorporate reliable multicast are examined