Convergence-Optimal Quantizer Design of Distributed Contraction-based Iterative Algorithms with Quantized Message Passing

In this paper, we study the convergence behavior of distributed iterative algorithms with quantized message passing. We first introduce general iterative function evaluation algorithms for solving fixed point problems distributively. We then analyze the convergence of the distributed algorithms, e.g. Jacobi scheme and Gauss-Seidel scheme, under the quantized message passing. Based on the closed-form convergence performance derived, we propose two quantizer designs, namely the time invariant convergence-optimal quantizer (TICOQ) and the time varying convergence-optimal quantizer (TVCOQ), to minimize the effect of the quantization error on the convergence. We also study the tradeoff between the convergence error and message passing overhead for both TICOQ and TVCOQ. As an example, we apply the TICOQ and TVCOQ designs to the iterative waterfilling algorithm of MIMO interference game.Comment: 17 pages, 9 figures, Transaction on Signal Processing, accepte

Algorithm Engineering in Robust Optimization

Robust optimization is a young and emerging field of research having received a considerable increase of interest over the last decade. In this paper, we argue that the the algorithm engineering methodology fits very well to the field of robust optimization and yields a rewarding new perspective on both the current state of research and open research directions. To this end we go through the algorithm engineering cycle of design and analysis of concepts, development and implementation of algorithms, and theoretical and experimental evaluation. We show that many ideas of algorithm engineering have already been applied in publications on robust optimization. Most work on robust optimization is devoted to analysis of the concepts and the development of algorithms, some papers deal with the evaluation of a particular concept in case studies, and work on comparison of concepts just starts. What is still a drawback in many papers on robustness is the missing link to include the results of the experiments again in the design

Equilibrium Computation and Robust Optimization in Zero Sum Games with Submodular Structure

We define a class of zero-sum games with combinatorial structure, where the best response problem of one player is to maximize a submodular function. For example, this class includes security games played on networks, as well as the problem of robustly optimizing a submodular function over the worst case from a set of scenarios. The challenge in computing equilibria is that both players' strategy spaces can be exponentially large. Accordingly, previous algorithms have worst-case exponential runtime and indeed fail to scale up on practical instances. We provide a pseudopolynomial-time algorithm which obtains a guaranteed $(1 - 1/e)^2$-approximate mixed strategy for the maximizing player. Our algorithm only requires access to a weakened version of a best response oracle for the minimizing player which runs in polynomial time. Experimental results for network security games and a robust budget allocation problem confirm that our algorithm delivers near-optimal solutions and scales to much larger instances than was previously possible.Comment: 20 pages, 8 figures. A shorter version of this paper appears at AAAI 201

Towards a science of security games

Abstract. Security is a critical concern around the world. In many domains from counter-terrorism to sustainability, limited security resources prevent complete security coverage at all times. Instead, these limited resources must be scheduled (or allocated or deployed), while simultaneously taking into account the impor-tance of different targets, the responses of the adversaries to the security posture, and the potential uncertainties in adversary payoffs and observations, etc. Com-putational game theory can help generate such security schedules. Indeed, casting the problem as a Stackelberg game, we have developed new algorithms that are now deployed over multiple years in multiple applications for scheduling of secu-rity resources. These applications are leading to real-world use-inspired research in the emerging research area of “security games”. The research challenges posed by these applications include scaling up security games to real-world sized prob-lems, handling multiple types of uncertainty, and dealing with bounded rationality of human adversaries.

Adversarial Bandits with Knapsacks

We consider Bandits with Knapsacks (henceforth, BwK), a general model for multi-armed bandits under supply/budget constraints. In particular, a bandit algorithm needs to solve a well-known knapsack problem: find an optimal packing of items into a limited-size knapsack. The BwK problem is a common generalization of numerous motivating examples, which range from dynamic pricing to repeated auctions to dynamic ad allocation to network routing and scheduling. While the prior work on BwK focused on the stochastic version, we pioneer the other extreme in which the outcomes can be chosen adversarially. This is a considerably harder problem, compared to both the stochastic version and the "classic" adversarial bandits, in that regret minimization is no longer feasible. Instead, the objective is to minimize the competitive ratio: the ratio of the benchmark reward to the algorithm's reward. We design an algorithm with competitive ratio O(log T) relative to the best fixed distribution over actions, where T is the time horizon; we also prove a matching lower bound. The key conceptual contribution is a new perspective on the stochastic version of the problem. We suggest a new algorithm for the stochastic version, which builds on the framework of regret minimization in repeated games and admits a substantially simpler analysis compared to prior work. We then analyze this algorithm for the adversarial version and use it as a subroutine to solve the latter.Comment: Extended abstract appeared in FOCS 201