The financial crisis in Korea and its lessons for reform ofthe international financial system

노트 : - Title: Regulatory and supervisory challenges in a new era of global financ

The East Midlands: economy a joint response to changing economic circumstances

This document provides an assessment of the regional economy as the UK entered recession in 2008 and sets out how emda, local agencies and Government would work together to tackle the challenges posed by the recession

Mechanical and Leakage Integrity Testing Protocols for Evaluating the Performance of Tissue Containment Systems Used During Power Morcellation Procedures

This tool provides protocols to evaluate the mechanical strength and leakage integrity of tissue containment systems (TCS) and its component materials

EU financial regulatory reform: a status report

In this paper, Nicolas Véron argues that the EU regulatory response to the crisis has been generally slower in the EU than in the United States, for four main reasons: swifter financial crisis management and resolution in the US; structural differences in legislative processes; the EUÂ?s front-loading of institutional reform, most notably the creation of European Supervisory Authorities; and the timetable of renewal of the European Commission in 2009-10. The EU has nevertheless initiated or completed significant regulatory initiatives in terms of banking, market structures, private equity and hedge funds, rating agencies and accounting. However, major further challenges loom.

Biopesticides, regulatory innovation and the regulatory state

This article analyses regulatory innovation. It considers, in particular, how a regulatory environmental agency has been encouraged to innovate in the area of biopesticides. The literature on regulatory innovation is reviewed, the discussion situated within Moran's theory of the regulatory state. It considers to what extent innovation has occurred within the agency, looking at its proactive stance, and how unusually for a regulatory body it has negotiated new policy spaces in which to operate. The article looks at the contextual drivers and also the exogenous and endogenous pressures behind the innovation. It shows how the executive has intervened in order to promote more use of biopesticides and how pressure is also being exerted within the regulatory authority. By using the existing literature and empirical evidence a framework is outlined for explaining the likelihood of regulatory innovation occurring in regulatory agencies

Regulatory coherence: blending trade and regulatory policy

Regulatory coherence has over the past four years become a term of art for domestic regulatory systems which interface seamlessly with the systems of other countries. And yet a precise or at least agreed definition remains elusive and descriptions often confuse ends and means. This article sets out to provide greater clarity, and in doing so illustrates that regulatory coherence can be thought of as both an ‘end’ (regulation that supports international trade and investment) and a ‘means’ (good regulatory practice). The adoption by countries of regulatory coherence objectives and practices increasingly blends trade and domestic regulatory policy

Regulatory Strategies

Over the years, there has been a shift from a wide command-and-control style of supervision whereby the regulator imposes detailed rules with which regulators supervise to one which consists of risk based regulatory strategies. ‘Enforced Self Regulation’, a regulatory strategy whereby negotiation takes places between the State and the individual firms, lies between the command-and-control style of supervision and meta risk regulation in that firms are still required to regulate but according to their own models. It differs from the traditional command-and-control style of bank supervision in that firms and not the regulator, are required to regulate. It is similar to meta-risk regulation in that the individual firm’s model is taken into consideration in regulating such firms. Whilst the merits and disadvantages of the individual regulatory strategies are considered, this paper concludes that all regulatory strategies should take into consideration the importance of management responsibilities – both on individual and corporate levels

Regulatory Horcruxes

The regulator that designs and first implements a federal regulatory program does not always have the ability to control the timing and process of how that regulatory program will, in this Symposium’s language, “exit.” As the 2016 election has demonstrated, the initiating regulator cannot necessarily plan in advance for the program’s expiration, diminution, or scaling back. A successor instead wields this power. Whether one views this as a terrible thing or a salutary feature of democracy depends in part upon one’s relationship to the regulatory status quo, but also implicates broader questions about policy stability and democratic accountability. At the very least, however, this fact raises several important questions about strategic regulatory design. First, is it possible to insulate or harden regulatory programs from successor exit? And second, when, if ever, would this be a good thing? This Article offers a systematic account of how regulators can make regulatory exit more challenging by looking outward, beyond the walls of a single, primary federal agency to other potential regulators or co-regulators, including secondary federal agencies, the states, and private actors. This Article identifies as a potential antidote to regulatory exit a constellation of strategic techniques that I call regulatory horcruxes—much like the horcruxes Lord Voldemort created by placing portions of his soul into multiple external objects in order to ensure his immortality. An initiating regulator, be it Congress or a federal agency, can use such horcruxes in an effort to make successor exit more difficult by splitting programs beyond the walls of a single federal agency into other institutions. This Article first offers an analytical framework laying out five primary types of horcrux. It then examines horcruxes from a normative perspective, evaluating the comparative benefits and costs of their use in terms of their potential impact both on the durability of regulatory programs and on the quality of democratic deliberation. It acknowledges that horcruxes are an imperfect solution. Although dispersal or fragmentation of regulatory authority may insulate a program from deregulatory pressure, the fragmented regulatory program may exist in a weakened form that cannot accomplish as much as more direct, centralized regulation can. The Article concludes by offering a research agenda, including suggestions for further empirical research